Egypt has failed to take a holistic approach to security and terrorism, standing blind before the social and behavioural roots of radical Islam, writes Nabil Abdel-Fattah* Following terrorist attacks the same questions often surface. What were the security lapses? How professionally have the police reacted? What chances do we have of bringing the perpetrators to justice? In the event of serious attacks, an investigation into security methods is usually conducted. The outcome of such investigations is seldom released, but security chiefs are sometimes dismissed as a result. I have been writing on radical Islam and security methods since the 1980s and my latest book Scripture and Bullets: Political Islam, Copts and the Crises of the Modern State in Egypt may throw some light on the topic. With four terrorist attacks targeting Egypt in less than a year (Taba, Al-Azhar, downtown Cairo, Sharm El-Sheikh), it is perhaps time to revisit our security policy. Security measures have always been the government's favourite instrument for fighting terrorism. Government strategists see terror as a criminal and religious aberration. Although government clerics often issue edicts against terror, the bulk of the government's effort has been security-related. Rhetorical vilification has been used as a way of psychological deterrence. The word "terrorism", which is borrowed from abroad, is in frequent use in the media, along with other epithets that aim to boost the public sense of horror and shock at violence. "Terrorism", admittedly, is a vague term, loaded with sentiment, and yet it is in frequent use by politicians, journalists and academics alike. Little time has been spent on the political, cultural, religious and sociological examination of radical Islam. The rhetoric of vilification became a substitute for in-depth discussion, a logic that has impeded socio- political solutions to the problem. One hears people saying that the sources of terror must be rooted out, and yet studies into the socio- cultural, socio-political or socio-religious roots of so-called terrorism remain scarce. Little attention is paid to the organisational structure of radical Islamic groups, to the common ground between official and radical Islam, or to government policies that sanction symbolic and material violence. No one is writing about the metamorphosis of political Islam into social and behavioural modes. No one is discussing the spread of the niqab (face veil) and its symbolism. With the government, opposition, media and academia in the hands of what can only be described as an aging elite, political stagnation has set in. Official research institutions have failed to do any serious field study on religious violence. Academic and popular impressions of religious discourse are largely tautological. Radical Islam, and its organisational, sociological, and symbolic manifestations, is often portrayed as immutable and static, when in fact it is dynamic and ever changing. Since September 2001, radical Islam has undergone extensive changes, domestically, regionally and globally. Security measures have achieved some success since the Luxor attack in 1997. Following some give-and-take, the leaders of the Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya issued an initiative renouncing violence. As a result, some "repentant" Gamaa members have been set free. But since September 2001, no structural changes have been introduced to prepare us for the globalisation of radical Islam and for its shift to soft civilian targets. While terrorists formed dormant cells and began using the Internet extensively, our security measures remained unchanged. Egyptian security chiefs seem to think that Al-Qaeda has no interest in Egypt and that local groups are no longer a threat. Terror was going global, and suicidal, and yet we failed to grasp the full implications. With the occupation of Iraq, a major change happened in the phenomenon of terror, one that called for a parallel change in security and intelligence policies. The occupation of Iraq, just as that of Chechnya and the Balkans, offered radical groups new opportunities for operations, recruitment and training. Suicide attacks, mounted for any number of ideological reasons, became the method of choice. A new vision is sorely needed. For example, we need to understand how new generations perceive and react to US and Israeli policy in Palestine. A sense of cultural, political and symbolic repression is spreading globally and generating defiance, particularly among the young. This is a phenomenon that is worth examining, for it is among the young that radical groups recruit suicide bombers. Our official policy on radical Islam is obviously flawed. For example, the country's security needs fail to be reflected in public policy. Specifically, security considerations are often at odds with the country's media, religious, educational and cultural policies. Since the 1952 Revolution, radical Islam has been mainly viewed as a security issue rather than a problem with social, economic, religious, media-related and educational dimensions. There is a level of incoherence in Egypt's security policy, especially when political considerations are given precedence over economic and criminal matters. Parochial methods of crime prevention and investigation often do more harm than good. Small details, like the chaos in traffic and law enforcement, generate public mistrust, which makes the country as a whole more vulnerable. Our ruling elite wouldn't acknowledge that political reform is a good defence against terror. Reform, for one thing, would improve the quality of police services, training and methods. A more active political life would offer the young a chance to vent their anger more productively. Poor educational and media policies, a dubious human rights record and widespread corruption cannot be helpful either. The way political and constitutional reform demands have been addressed recently widened the gap between the government and Egypt's intellectual elite. To make things worse, the government has sided with conservative Islam against the intellectuals on several occasions, banning books. This has alienated the intelligentsia, which is the government's natural ally in the battle against radicalism. The political mood in the country is in a state of flux. With Kifaya (the Egyptian Movement for Change) on the move, the stakes are getting higher. The newfound political vitality of the middle classes, if anything, calls for a revision of conventional security methods. In brief, the government is either reacting belatedly or failing to react to social and political changes. Since September 2001, it has failed to adjust its approach to radical Islam, among other things. For a while it seemed that the government had quelled radical groups, but this has only lulled us into a sense of false security. Right now, we need a revised security strategy and a revitalised political scene. We need to react to the new realities of a fast- changing world. * The writer is assistant to the director of Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies and editor of Religion in Egypt annual report issued by the centre.
