By Taha Abdel-Alim Taha In Egypt and elsewhere, globalisation reveals itself through a number of overlapping processes. There is the globalisation of goods and services. Up to 65,000 multinational companies operate worldwide through 850,000 subsidiaries. These companies, some of which are active in Egypt, coordinate their lines of production on a global scale, hiring local contractors and outsourcing a segment of the labour involved. Electronics, semi-conductors, textiles, garments, shoes, software, financial services have all gone global. A global factory has come into being, where labour is divided and assigned to different groups working in various parts of the world. Some parts of the production process are higher in knowledge content than other parts, and these tend to stay at the centre of this global system. The peripheries, including Egypt, are generally excluded from design, development, and quality control -- the segments that are high in knowledge and profitability. Franchises, trademarks, strategy, and other high-end intellectual processes remain in the hands of the world's most advanced countries. Then there is the globalisation of economic and social systems. Socio-economic systems were made to adapt to free market policies. In part, this was due to the failure of command economies in achieving sustainable growth. In most development cases, high rates of growth were achieved at first but failed to continue. Some attribute the reversal -- witnessed in many countries including Egypt -- to the inefficient use of resources. The transformation to market economy was often carried out without much regard to the need to balance economic and social needs. Egypt has been careful to avoid complications of this nature by stressing the social dimension in economic reform. Under Hosni Mubarak, much of Egypt's foreign debts were written off, which helped the country avert a social crisis during the era of liberalisation. There is also the globalisation of economic policies. Under the watchful eye of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organisation, national economic policies were geared towards free economy. Liberalisation of local economies was often motivated by self-interest and stimulated by profit. In Egypt, liberalisation was the outcome of hope as well as weakness. When economic decisions are taken away from governments and given to multinational companies and international financial organisations, national sovereignty shrinks, and the delicate balance between democracy and globalisation is lost. Unlike the domestic market, where government agencies ensure stability and legitimacy, the international market has no regulating mechanism. The globalisation of economic priorities follows. National priorities have been subjugated to the requisites of liberalising and opening up economies. Consequently, governments had to cede some decision-making to market forces. New priorities came into the picture, such as women empowerment, environmental protection, good governance, and improved education. But the gap between ideals and practice remained wide, perhaps because economic mechanisms tend to surmount social needs. With the exception of the global campaign against money laundering, much of what have become globally-accepted ideals remain unfulfilled. Then comes the globalisation of economic concepts. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, national security has acquired economic and technological ingredients. Progress has been redefined as a complex quest for efficiency, justice, freedom, security and identity. When we think of regional economic integration these days, chances are we're not seeking independence from world economy, but equitable integration in that economy. Since September 2001, US neo- conservatives have been pushing for pre- emptive action, ranging from war to interference, in the domestic affairs of Arab countries, including Egypt. Consequently, things that used to be sacred, as the right of countries to choose their economic policy and pace of democratisation, are no longer so. Saddled down with high defence budgets and income disparities, Arab countries now find it especially hard to integrate their economies. As a group, Arab countries are becoming more vulnerable on a global scale. * The writer is an expert at Al-Ahram Strategic and Political Centre.
