In the events of the past Hassan Nafaa* finds hope for the future On 6 October the Arab world celebrated the 32nd anniversary of the 1973 War. Those who prefer the Islamic calendar commemorated the same event's 33rd anniversary on the 10th of Ramadan. Now that Ramadan once again coincides with October the two celebrations were only days apart. The double celebration sharpened our memories, urging us to contemplate the reasons for the Arabs' success just over three decades ago compared to what they are now doing, and what is being done to them. On 6 October, 1973 the Egyptian and Syrian armies began a coordinated military attack that many consider one of the most significant battles of modern history. Within a few days Arab oil producers, led by Saudi Arabia, played the oil card. Behind the battle lines channels to supply arms to compensate for battlefield losses were opened not only with the Soviet Union but other arms producers. On the political front most international powers appeared not only understanding of the motives of Arab states as they sought to liberate occupied land by armed force but also supportive, whether openly or not. Most importantly, however, on 6 October 1973 the Arab people were united behind their leaders. Arab success during this decisive historical moment was unexpected and surprised everyone, the Arabs included. After the 1973 War Israel and the United States were determined never to allow the scenario to be repeated. Yet they also admitted they had made fatal mistakes in their calculations. Israel had built its strategy on the belief that, after 1967, Arab armies would never want to fight again. And if they should, went the argument, victory would be impossible given the massive imbalance of military power in Israel's favour. Washington, on the other hand, had banked on the political vacuum that followed Gamal Abdel-Nasser's death remaining unfilled. The US didn't take President Anwar El-Sadat seriously. Due to his closeness to Saudi Arabia, its number one ally in the region, the US saw Sadat as a possible ally, useful, perhaps, for pressuring Syria, Moscow's primary regional ally. What Washington did not realise at the time was that its failure to reach a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, despite Sadat's flexibility as well as the advice and insistence of Saudi Arabia, had left the Arab world with one choice -- between war and surrender. A third of a century on and the Arab- Israeli conflict continues to fester, a settlement as far away as ever. More significant, though, is that the conflict, and attempts to resolve it, now happen in an environment that has changed beyond all recognition to that of 1973. During the intervening years the US and Israel have contrived to eliminate each and every trump card in Arab hands. Certainly the Arabs have lost any desire to fight -- there is not a single Arab state willing or able to slug it out with Israel, now or in the future. Inter-Arab relations have also deteriorated. Efforts to forge a cohesive Arab negotiating position have failed. As the gap between Arab governments and people widened tribal, ethnic, sectarian, religious, racial and other conflicts hijacked the agenda. Some of these conflicts not only threaten Arab states with disintegration, but they also carry the seeds of civil war. The USSR, the defeated superpower that once supplied some Arab states with arms, is now a regional power with limited influence. The victorious superpower, which once provided other Arab states with protection, has now revealed its real face, and it is ugly. The US comes to the Arabs one day as an occupying invader in the name of liberation from despotism, the next seeking oil, markets and military bases in the name of globalisation and shared security, and then, on the morrow, demanding a change of identity and culture in the name of modernity, democracy and the war against terrorism. How did this all happen? Sadat thought the October war would allow him to gather the cards that would give him a winning hand in reaching a comprehensive settlement to the Arab- Israeli conflict. The US, though, threw all its weight behind Israel, which was determined to prevent what had happened in October from ever happening again. Their strategy was phased. There were the Camp David Accords, followed by the Oslo Accords, the phased settlement with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (1993 onwards), and the Wadi Arba Accords with Jordan (1994). Through these agreements the US and Israel succeeded in removing Egypt from the military equation, then proceeded to steamroll the PLO and neutralise Jordan. They then topped things off with a wide scale attempt to normalise relations between Israel and other Arab states. While this approach failed to secure a comprehensive settlement it has extracted more than its fair share of concessions. The only state that plainly rejected the approach and attempted to resist it, despite failing to present a more effective alternative, was Syria. The late president Hafez Al-Assad excelled in forging alliances, even within the parameters set by the Iranian revolution. He did so not only to protect his regime but also to enable one of the most significant accomplishments since the October war -- the liberation of southern Lebanon by the Lebanese resistance, under the leadership of Hizbullah. Now, though, the US and Israel have returned to take up the reins in Lebanon, exploiting -- or creating -- the conditions that contributed to forcing Syria's exit. Internal Lebanese politics are being restructured, with the US and Israel the major outside players. The resistance has had its guard removed, and the Palestinians have been placed in a compromising situation. And as if this were not enough, the Syrian regime is now in danger, under direct Israeli and American fire. What has happened to the Arab world since the October war is not solely a result of the cleverness of the US and Israel and their ability to exploit circumstances. It is also the result of mistakes committed by decision-makers across the Arab world which, combined with the internal contradictions of Arab reality, necessitated greater care than was given. Despite everything, though, the battle has not yet drawn to a close. It is true that the Zionist project has succeeded in pulling the US to fight by its side, or even in its place. Israel assumes this approach will secure a final victory. But just one glance at what the US is doing in the region is enough to confirm that it is completely bogged down. Victory is far from certain. If Israel wants a comprehensive and final settlement to the conflict in the Middle East on the basis of a historical reconciliation that involves the distribution of historic Palestine between two peoples equal in sovereignty and rights, it could have reached such a settlement long ago. But that would mean an end to the original Zionist project that aimed to settle all Jews on the "promised land", an impossible goal. If the US was determined to assist Israel in realising its impossible dream, even at the cost of confrontation with the entire Islamic world, it was wrong to do so. The US has attempted to use Arab reactionaries against Arab progressives, traditional Islamists against fundamentalist Islamists. Now it is using the Shias against the Sunnis and the Kurds against the Arabs. These are the kinds of conflict that end up consuming those who ignite them. There will come a day when they all realise they were targeted by a common enemy. That day is not far off. The lesson of October remains before us. The US thought the death of Nasser and the fragmentation of the nationalist movement had ruled out all forms of Arab solidarity. But this was not true. It was in the void created by his death that the most important instance of Arab solidarity occurred. Perhaps Washington believes that arresting or killing Osama Bin Laden, and the collapse of Islamic fundamentalism that is supposed to ensue will force the Arab and Islamic worlds to accept a settlement on Israeli conditions. If the Americans do believe this they are grossly mistaken. This is the one lesson to be drawn from 6 October. * The writer is professor of Political Science at Cairo Unciversity.
