While it may appear that Iran has backed down on its nuclear energy demands, the final winner of the long-running standoff is yet to be announced, writes Amani Maged from Tehran Despite the uranium swap deal that Iran struck with Turkey, the international standoff over the Iranian nuclear programme continues. On Tuesday, the US and its Western allies won crucial support from Russia and China for new sanctions against Iran over its suspected nuclear programme; however, a tough campaign to get backing from the rest of the UN Security Council is looming. The draft UN resolution, as reported by AP, would ban Iran from pursuing any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, freeze assets of nuclear-related companies linked to the Revolutionary Guard, bar Iranian investment in activities such as uranium mining, and prohibit Iran from buying several categories of heavy weapons including attack helicopters and missiles. Clearly in agreeing to send most of its low- enriched (3.5 per cent) uranium to Turkey in exchange for uranium rods enriched up to 20 per cent Iran hopes to avert harsher economic sanctions. Iranian officials had initially turned down the Turkish offer. In an interview with Al-Ahram Weekly only a few days before the deal was announced, Iranian Atomic Energy Agency Director Ali Akbar Salehi explicitly rejected Ankara's proposal, as well as a similar proposal tendered by France. Why did Tehran change its mind? There are several possibilities. Perhaps the most compelling has been proposed by strategic analyst Amir Musavi who points to Iran's style of brinksmanship. In accordance with the Iranian "carpet weaving approach", as he describes it, Iran does all in its power to buy more time while it continues to work quietly and resolutely towards its ultimate objectives until it feels that it can unveil its policy and guarantee its interests. It is also important to consider Iran's determination to press its cause. Throughout the protracted tug-of-war with the West, Tehran has constantly insisted that it has a right to produce uranium enriched to higher levels. Since Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty and its additional protocol, which testify to its commitment to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, there are no grounds to deny Iran the rights sanctioned under these agreements. Not only has Iran maintained this stance up to the conclusion of its deal with Turkey, but also immediately after the deal was announced Salehi declared that Iran would continue its uranium enrichment activities, even up to 20 per cent. The agreement with Turkey must be seen against the backdrop of Iran's longstanding mistrust of the West. The sentiment dates to the early 1980s when Washington, Germany and other Western nations halted construction of nuclear facilities that Iran had paid for and cut off other forms of assistance for Iran's nuclear development programme. On the basis of such experiences Iran has held that foreign facilities and fuel supplies could not be trusted and, accordingly, it turned down the deal that the US, Russia and France had proposed last October. Under that deal, which would have been supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran would have sent more than 1,200 kilogrammes of low-enriched uranium to Russia where it would be enriched up to 20 per cent and then sent to France for it to be converted into fuel rods before being shipped back to Iran. At the time, the amount in question accounted for 70 per cent of Iran's stores of uranium. Fearful that its uranium stock would be seized, Iran insisted that if it does not receive the fuel rods within a year, Turkey would be required to immediately and unconditionally return the uranium to Iran, a guarantee incorporated into the deal. If, as some analysts claim, Tehran scored a diplomatic triumph with its deal with Turkey, it simultaneously gave the "neo-Ottomans" in Ankara the opportunity to rack up another success in its policy of increased engagement in the issues of the region. While Tehran might be said to have proven to the international community that it could be flexible to a degree while clinging to its right to continue uranium enrichment, Ankara has proven that it can play a key role in the handling of complex and delicate situations. Iran also introduced another player into the game: Brazil. This undoubtedly raised the fear among Western powers that the ball of international conflict resolution was passing out of their court. Optimists felt that the deal was constructive and that now Iran would be spared sanctions. This view was championed by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu who announced that there were no longer any grounds for sanctions against Iran. Somewhat more cautiously, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa stated that the nuclear agreement was a positive step and that he hoped that it would lead to an end to the crisis between Iran and the West. The Brazilian president echoed these sentiments. Western powers were predictably sceptical. Washington, for one, welcomed the uranium swap deal with Turkey as a "positive step", but added that it did not meet the international demand that Iran halt its uranium refinement operations. The IAEA is now waiting for written communication from Tehran declaring its agreement to exchange a portion of its low-enriched uranium for nuclear fuel rods. Most observers believe it is unlikely that the nuclear watchdog will attempt to obstruct the agreement since it had previously asked Iran to agree to a similar arrangement using Russian territory. Nevertheless, it has given Iran a week to submit the required letter and a month to ship the stipulated amount of uranium to Turkey. It remains to be seen whether Iran will pass this test. All possibilities remain open. Western powers may refuse to recognise the tripartite agreement until it obtains official approval from the UN Security Council. At the same time, the vote on sanctions by the Security Council may fail in light of the tripartite agreement. On the other hand, there are more calls for the US to finally sit down with Iran face-to-face to discuss not only the Iranian nuclear programme, but also over the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a chief player in both these arenas, Iran holds the key to an honourable US exit from these quagmires. (see p.10)
