Gamal Nkrumah finds the defining features of Sudan's tumultuous history graphically repeated in 2005 The fortunes of Sudan wax and wane as they always have since independence from Britain in 1956. Sudan stands now at a critical threshold. Early next year both the African Union (AU) and Arab League summits are scheduled to take place in Khartoum. These are just two small signs among many of Sudan's regained prominence as a leading African- Arab player. The prime mover and shaker of the direction of Sudanese politics is undoubtedly Washington. The United States (first the Clinton administration and then the Bush administration) masterminded the reconciliation between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) -- the country's most powerful and influential armed opposition group. Having moved so far ahead, Washington's stranglehold on Sudanese politics will be difficult to break. The Sudanese government and the SPLA signed a Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) on 9 January. In July, SPLA leader John Garang made a triumphant return to Khartoum to form a government of national unity that included both the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) headed by Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir and other opposition parties. Western powers and Sudan's African and Arab neighbours were elated at the signing of the CPA, which was also greeted with much international media fanfare. Optimists believe that the tide is turning for Sudan. In 2004, as in many other years in the past decade, the Sudanese failed to reach a political settlement. Such a dismal litany of failure was not repeated in 2005. The year was different in many respects. But in spite of this year's impressive political inroads, there remain many forlorn hopes. Despite peace agreements and ongoing peace talks, fighting still rages in many critical trouble spots. So much so that even optimists are nervous about speaking out. Perhaps the most consequential Sudanese event of 2005 was the death of John Garang. His passing was a bolt from the blue. The news of the first Sudanese vice-president's death caused disturbance throughout southern Sudan. Southerners in the thousands took to the streets of Khartoum rampaging and pillaging, venting their disbelief and distress on everything in their path. They clashed with police and scores were killed. The sudden death of Garang deprived the harshest critics of the SPLA of their primary target. Garang's death also threatened to disrupt the fragile and nascent Sudanese peace process. His characteristic amicability often lulled opponents into a false sense of ease. To some detractors, Garang was a southern Sudanese, or ethnic Dinka tyrant. But Garang was truly above tribalism. For nearly 25 years Garang realised his role as the Southern cause's most outspoken advocate. But he was also the champion of the underdog throughout the country. He wanted to make the SPLA a broad-based mass party, modelled on the African National Congress of South Africa, in which Arab and non-Arab played a part. Sudanese from the Nuba Mountains became prominent SPLA military commanders, perhaps the most important being the late Youssef Kuwa. Garang drew supporters from Juba in the south to Wadi Halfa in the far north and from Jeneina in the West to Kassala in the east. Garang's mantra of a "united, democratic and secular Sudan" remains as influential as ever. To be sure, this is not exclusively due to Garang's force of character; it is also thanks to outside intervention. Neither the Arab League nor the AU wants to see Sudan disintegrate or have parts of it secede, like neighbouring Eritrea did from Ethiopia. Washington's intervention was also instrumental in arriving at the formula used to resolve prickly issues such as power and wealth sharing between north and south. It would have been conceivable for the SPLA to do so with Garang at the helm. Now, with its erstwhile leader gone, it is difficult to see the SPLA playing a similar role. The task at hand could turn messy. The southern Sudanese- based SPLA and the Islamist government in Khartoum represent opposite poles of the Sudanese political spectrum. Their union remains a catalyst for the resolution of other conflicts raging throughout the country. Put it this way, Sudan's CPA has spawned many anomalies: the oldest of enemies became bedfellows. There is much speculation that the uneasy political truce may not last long. Running Sudan has always been a cut-throat business. Garang always took steps to strengthen his own position, within the SPLA, the local Sudanese political scene and on the international stage. Some of his southern Sudanese foes -- and there were many -- were sly enough to stir up trouble by roiling an already chaotic situation. One set of plaudits should go to the political leaders of Sudan's main opposition parties: Othman Al-Mirghani, leader of the northern-based Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and Umma Party leader Sadiq Al-Mahdi. They are both tirelessly working behind the scenes to advance the democratic process in Sudan. Yet power struggles remain, and are no more evident than in Darfur. The scale and desperate brutality of the struggle in southern Sudan was enough to breed an enduring enmity between the various tribal groupings and peoples in some parts of southern Sudan. The dispute pitted fiercely religious authorities against one of the most secular movements in Africa. In Darfur, the humanitarian catastrophe was apocalyptic. Fighting in the east of the country, even though at times as vicious and devastating as in both southern and western Sudan, was never as enmeshed in political ramifications as the war in the south and west. Currently, Darfur peace talks are taking place in the Nigerian capital Abuja. The talks, between the Sudanese government on the one hand and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on the other, are being held under the auspices of the AU. The pan- African body has 7,500 peace-keeping troops stationed in Darfur. Though critically short of cash, their mere presence is widely seen as a boost to the Sudanese peace process. Be that as it may, no agreement has yet emerged in Abuja. Internal strife has compounded intransigence on the part of the SLA and JEM over power sharing with the government. SLA Secretary-General Mani Arko Minawi is challenging the authority of SLA Chairman Abdul-Wahid Mohamed Nur. In November, Minawi organised a congress in the South Darfur town of Haskanitah at which he was elected president of the SLA, thereby unseating Nur as chairman. The political wrangling and violence in Darfur also poses dilemmas both for Sudan and for its neighbours, especially Chad, which borders Darfur. One idiosyncratic feature of the Sudanese political crisis in 2005 was that it dragged the country's neighbours into the fighting, either directly or indirectly. Earlier in the year Eritrea was implicated in uprisings in the east of the country. And by the end of the year, Chad had officially accused the Sudanese government of involvement in tribal violence in the eastern part of the country with the Chadians officially branding President Al-Bashir as "an enemy of Chad". What repercussions such political fracas could have between fraternal states remain to be seen. Finally, there is the issue of money. Greater oil production promises both an infusion of hope into a downbeat Sudanese economy, but also raises questions that impact upon politics. There are four million displaced Sudanese, in addition to an estimated five million Sudanese who have fled the country because of the civil war and its ruinous economic ramifications. Most of Sudan's oil is produced in conflict zones. With the promise of peace, oil production seems set to rise, but so too will competition over the spoils. 2005 witnessed an unprecedented upsurge in Sudanese oil exports. Who benefits from the boom depends on who comes out on top in the political game, and also vice versa. This classic political and economic chicken and egg question will doubtless play a big part in the annals of Sudanese history to be written in 2006.
