A breakthrough in the crisis facing Iraq is far from certain, with the country's politicians now looking towards foreign intervention, writes Salah Hemeid The lavish banquet thrown by the Kurdish president of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, for his political colleagues last week was meant to bring them together for one more desperate effort to end the lingering dispute over who should form the nation's new government three months after the inconclusive March elections. But after breaking bread and being served with roast meat and rice at Talabani's arabesque-style palace on the bank of the Tigris in Baghdad, rival leaders who have been jockeying for position in the new government failed to end the deadlock and left as divided as they had arrived. Notably absent from the banquet, which Talabani had dubbed an attempt to break the "psychological barriers" between the rival politicians, was Iyad Allawi, leader of the Iraqiya List, and other senior officials of the mainly Sunni- backed bloc that won the most seats in the new parliament. After the banquet, Allawi, whose bloc won 91 seats, beating Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki's State of Law Coalition by two, repeated his claim to the right to form the next government, citing his own interpretation of the constitution while doing so. Allawi and the leaders of his bloc also visited Iraq's most influential Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, in Najaf, asking him to intervene in the crisis. Allawi later said that Al-Sistani had assured the leaders of the Sunni-backed coalition that he would be keeping a distance from the feuding parties and urging them to form a new government quickly. Meanwhile, Al-Maliki told the Washington Post newspaper that rushing the formation of the new government could reignite sectarian violence in the country. "I say we should not bow to the pressures of time and make a big mistake," he said. Earlier, he had told the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat that the next premiership would come out of his bloc, suggesting that he would remain in the post of prime minister for a second term, "as there are no other candidates from the coalition for this position." The failure of the Iraqi politicians to use the high-profile gathering last week to resolve the dispute over forming a new government has provided further evidence that a solution for Iraq's deepening political crisis might already have been taken out of the hands of the Iraqi leaders and now rests in the hands of foreign and regional powers. Talabani himself acknowledged the difficulties Iraqi politicians are facing before his "reconciliation luncheon". During a trip to Cairo early this month he urged the Arab League to intervene to solve Iraq's "complex problems", and later he told Asharq Al-Awsat that Shia clergy in Najaf and neighbouring Iran had been pressuring Iraq's Shia politicians. It is now an open secret that efforts to resolve Iraq's governmental stand off have been taking place outside Iraq, with neighbouring countries expressing concern that a protracted crisis might create a political vacuum, worsen the sectarian divide and even spark another round of civil war. Last week, a senior member of the Saudi royal family accused Al-Maliki of trying to "hijack the results of the elections and deny the Iraqi people their legitimately elected government." The remarks, made by Prince Turki Al-Faisal, the former Saudi intelligence chief, signalled support for Allawi and indicated Saudi Arabia's worry that an Iraq ruled by Shia politicians with close ties to Iran could emerge. The United States, concerned that the dispute could raise political tensions and undermine plans for its troop pullout from the country, last week sent a top diplomat to the country to try to defuse the tension. Assistant US Secretary of State Jeffrey D. Feltman later said that rival Iraqi leaders should set aside their personal ambitions and accept positions other than the premiership. "People who may feel that they are the legitimate candidate for prime minister are going to have to start thinking of their Plan B," he was quoted as saying. Humam Hamoudi, a top official in the Shia Iraqi National Alliance, also claimed in an interview with Iraqi television on Sunday that Feltman, who had travelled to Baghdad on behalf of US Vice-President Joe Biden, had suggested a power-sharing compromise that would allow both Allawi and Al-Maliki to form a government, Iraqi media saying that Feltman had proposed that Allawi and Al-Maliki take it in turns to become prime minister for two years. The Iraqi media has also claimed that Turkey, backed by the Obama administration, has stepped in, trying to use its newly acquired position as a regional power broker to help the Iraqi groups find a compromise. Turkey was well suited to advance a deal through its relations with both Shia Iran and Sunni Arab countries, the media said. However, for his part Al-Maliki has rejected American intervention and warned that US pressure could be detrimental. "The demand made by the Americans for a faster pace would be at the expense of the quality of government," he said. "This is not like sitting in a café for tea and exchanging posts. I'm not one who sells and trades the interests of the people," he told the Washington Post. Al-Maliki also called on Arab countries to refrain from interfering in Iraqi affairs and backing specific blocs. Yet, the harsh reality is that with every day that passes Iraqi politicians seem as unable as ever to end their bickering and work out what is increasingly becoming a rescue package for their beleaguered country. Iraqi Shias cannot agree on who should be the next prime minister, although they have formed an alliance that is just four seats short of the majority needed to form a new government. However, if they did agree and formed a government without Sunni participation, Sunnis would feel disenfranchised and might return to insurgency. If this alliance falls through, Al-Maliki could try an alliance with the Kurds and parts of both the Shia alliance and the Iraqiya bloc in order to form a government. However, any such move would sidestep Allawi, so far rejected by the Sunnis. If Al-Maliki succeeds in the latter strategy, he risks alienating some Shias, especially the Sadrist Movement and its military wing, the Al-Mahdi Army, which could return to violence to advance its own anti-Al-Maliki agenda. On the other hand, if Allawi is asked to form the new government, as he insists is his right, then it is hard to imagine that he would be able to find enough seats to endorse it. Allawi needs Shia and Kurdish support, hard to get from members who have been elected to uphold their communities' interests and carry out their agenda. Meanwhile, the Kurds have said that they will come to no understanding with other Sunni and Shia groups unless these accept certain preconditions, such as those relating to the future of the oil-rich Kirkuk province and the country's oil resources. It is hard to imagine that the Arab Sunnis would be prepared to make compromises in these areas in return for the Kurds joining a new government. The failure of these scenarios will inevitably invite regional intervention if the crisis persists and the Americans start pulling their combat troops out of Iraq this summer. Iraq's governmental dispute is more than a national conflict, and the present power struggle will turn into a broader regional struggle when Iraqi politicians have exhausted their maneuvering and lost control of the dangerous game they have been playing.
