Shia determination to keep former Baathists out of Iraq's next elections has dealt a blow to Washington's desire for their rehabilitation, writes Salah Hemeid US Vice-President Joe Biden travelled to Iraq this week for talks with Iraqi politicians in a bid to resolve a simmering crisis over the disqualification of hundreds of candidates from the country's March elections on the grounds that they have links with Saddam Hussein's former ruling Baath Party. After two days of intensive discussions, Biden failed to convince leaders of the Shia-led government to push the Accountability and Justice Commission into rescinding its exclusion of suspected Baathists from the ballot, which Washington had hoped would stabilise the violence-torn nation and facilitate US troop withdrawals next year. The disqualification of 511 mostly Sunni candidates has outraged Iraqi Sunnis, who dominated Iraq for more than three decades under Baath Party rule and who see the disqualifications as an attempt to marginalise their community, casting doubt on the inclusiveness of the 7 March vote. The list consists of candidates accused of being members of Saddam's outlawed Baath Party's once-feared fedayeen (Men of Sacrifice) militia or his mukhabarat intelligence agency. Some of those now ordered purged are already in the government, including Defence Minister Abdel-Qader Al-Obeidi, or are key Iraqi lawmakers, such as Saleh Al-Mutlaq, head of the National Dialogue Front, and Dhafer Al-Ani, head of the National Accord Coalition. The controversy over these candidates' disqualification goes back to the earliest days of the US occupation of Iraq, when coalition authorities outlawed the Baath Party and established a commission to oversee what was known as de- Baathification, barring all but the party's junior members from public life. A new panel, the Accountability and Justice Commission, has since been formed to replace the De-Baathification Commission, but the Iraqi parliament has thus far refused to endorse the government's candidates for the new body. According to observers, Biden's failure to resolve the current crisis could have been predicted before he left Washington. Iraqi Shia officials had made it clear that they did not welcome US intervention, with government spokesman Ali Al-Dabbagh warning that attempts to influence the decision would be unacceptable. Protesters also waged anti-US demonstrations in several Iraqi cities having Shia populations, condemning what they called Biden's interference in Iraqi affairs. During his visit to Iraq, Biden met with Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki, President Jalal Talabani, parliamentary speaker Iyad Al-Samaraai, senior government ministers and a cross section of other politicians. At his later press conference, he acknowledged the difficulties he had faced in trying to make Shia leaders change their minds. "I want to make clear I am not here to resolve that issue [of the banned candidates]," Biden said. "This is for Iraqis, not for me. I am confident that Iraq's leaders are seized with this issue and are working for a final, just solution. The United States condemns the crimes of the previous regime, and we fully support Iraq's constitutional ban on the return to power of Saddam's Baath Party." However, Biden did not try to hide Washington's irritation at what the US sees as the arbitrary way in which the list of disqualified candidates seems to have been drawn up, or its questioning of the legitimacy of the commission making decisions that could undermine the forthcoming elections. "The issue is not the goal of holding individuals accountable for their past actions, but the process of disqualification itself. Iraqi leaders understand that if the Iraq people and the international community see the process as fair and transparent, it will enhance the credibility of the election," Biden said. Before his visit, Biden, who has responsibility for overseeing US policy in Iraq, had reportedly exercised pressure on various Iraqi leaders to help him end the row. Shortly before Biden's arrival, President Talabani, who is of Kurdish origin, came out in support of allowing "non- Saddamist Baathists" to run for election. Talabani also expressed his concerns about the legitimacy of the commission and its rulings. However, Al-Maliki and other Shia leaders resisted pressure to ease the restrictions on the Baathists, suspecting American attempts to undermine their power and forcing Biden to moderate his demands. Iraqi officials said that Biden had suggested that the disqualifications be postponed until after the March elections, proposing that some barred candidates be allowed to sign a declaration denouncing the Baath Party in return for being allowed to take part. However, the Accountability and Justice Commission rejected the proposals, with disqualified Sunni politicians such as Al-Mutlaq rejecting the idea of signing a denunciation of the Baath Party as humiliating and arguing that the ban was sectarian and politically motivated. As a compromise, Shia leaders agreed to submit a new list of members of the Accountability and Justice Commission to the Iraqi parliament for its approval and to ask the newly constituted commission to reconfirm the disqualifications. The commission also said it had taken some 59 names off the blacklist because of "discrepancies" in their identification and personal details. Behind the current crisis over the disqualification of suspected former Baathists lie American concerns about feuds between Iraq's Shia, Sunni and Kurdish communities placing obstacles in the way towards political progress in the country, though the US has also repeatedly said it is fully behind the Iraqi constitutional ban on the return of Saddam's Baath Party to power. The US argues that some Baathists have become partners in the political process and accepted its terms and that therefore they should be reintegrated into political life. However, Iraq's Shias, who fear that the Baathists have not accepted the new political system in Iraq and plan to topple the Shia-controlled government, argue that the Baathists will be a "Trojan Horse" inside the parliament if elected and will work to overthrow the government. While Shia officials claim that the commission worked independently to disqualify candidates with suspected links to the Baath Party, some are saying privately that the decisions were also prompted by reports of conspiracy to remove them from power. Under the alleged conspiracy, Washington and some Arab countries hope that the Sunnis will be able to send enough candidates to the next parliament to forge a coalition with the two main Kurdish parties and secular Shias and form the next Iraqi government. According to Shia politicians, if that goal proves unattainable then Baath-backed members of the parliament will move to form a bloc that will work to paralyse the government in an attempt to bring about its downfall. They also fear a Baath-orchestrated military coup that would rely upon the thousands of former officers from Saddam's army who have now joined the new army and security forces. Shia leaders have accused Baathists of being behind the spate of attacks in summer and autumn last year that targeted government buildings and killed hundreds of people. They also blamed them for three massive blasts that killed scores of people and injured tens of others in Baghdad on Monday. Although an Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist group has claimed responsibility for the two massive attacks in August and October last year, the government has claimed that the Baathists and Al-Qaeda are working together. Hours after last Monday's attacks, the Iraqi government announced that one of Saddam's most-trusted henchmen, Ali Hassan Al-Majid, had been executed. Al-Majid, known as "Chemical Ali" for his part in poison-gas attacks against the Kurds in the 1980s and the brutal crackdown on the Shias in the south of the country, had been given four death sentences, and many believe that his swift execution was meant to be a message that the government intended to deal harshly with the Baathists. Shia insistence on barring suspected former Baathists from the nation's political life also seems to be a way of tightening their control of the country, even if it means further dividing Iraq's two Muslim communities. If the current crisis is not handled judiciously, there will be fears that the country's next elections will not be recognised as fair and democratic, again pitting Iraqi Shias and Sunnis against each other.
