That Khaddam's remarks on Syria may have been driven by revenge does not change the fact that he endeared himself to no Syrian, leaving question marks as to why he spoke out, writes Hassan Nafaa* Abdel-Halim Khaddam, former vice president of the Syrian republic and a primary staff member of the Syrian Baath regime for 40 years, suddenly appeared out of oblivion to cast a bomb into the midst of the enflamed Middle Eastern arena. Because a thick, rising smoke followed the explosion, obscuring all sides, it is difficult to ascertain the losses or just what is taking place on the ground. The most significant aspect is timing, for this moment came when Mehlis' report seemed to be on the verge of collapse. It is well known that the report took its first blow when several German newspapers published an investigation that cast doubt on the credibility of one of its witnesses, Muhammad Zuheir Al-Sadiq. This was quickly followed by another blow, when a second witness, Hussam Hussam, the "masked witness," changed his statements asserting that they had been extracted under the pressure of blackmail and the temptation of bribery. Then Mehlis made the surprise of resigning from the head of the team investigating the assassination of Rafik Al-Hariri for "personal" reasons that failed to convince anyone. This gave the impression that matters had begun to enter the market of political auctions and that the door had opened to predictions on the fate of a process that had lacked, from the beginning, the fundaments of neutrality, independence and integrity required of any judicial investigation. The appearance of Khaddam has upturned the case's given assumptions and pointed everything in a different direction. The former deputy to the late President Hafez Al-Assad no longer remains a mere "witness from his people" who possesses important information that might benefit the investigation. Rather, he has become party to a struggle over power and a possible alternative to a regime whose change is being demanded. With this sudden and unexpected appearance, the "Syrian crisis" entered a new stage that may be a repeat of the "Iraqi crisis" shortly before the American invasion. It appears that what is required now is to bring together the ranks of the Syrian opposition and drive it against Bashar Al-Assad's regime to topple it. This is a dangerous development that might push the entire region to the brink of disaster. The danger of this development is that it helps to orient the controversy over Syria away from consequences that might ensue with regards to stability in the region. As previously took place with the division of Arab intellectual and political elites over Saddam Hussein, when the dangers of a probable American invasion of Iraq were forgotten or purposely overlooked, it is not at all unlikely that this elite will be split again over its position on Syria. Dangers that would certainly ensue from an attempt to topple Assad will be forgotten or disregarded, even if an invasion or foreign military operation ensues. Should that happen, it would have only one meaning -- the elite has not learnt or comprehended anything and no longer has a clear national or pan- Arab plan. To my mind, elites that cannot agree on requisite standards and precepts become accomplices to and directly responsible for disasters that befall their countries and the pan-Arab community as a whole. It follows that such an elite is not worthy of the name it carries, deserving the curses directed at it by the people. It is thus necessary that efforts to avoid such splits take first priority. No respectable observer can deny the despotic nature of a regime that depends on the support of security agencies in safeguarding its policies. Though the Syrian regime is not an exception, it cannot be considered the most despotic or totalitarian Arab regime by global standards. All the regimes are shining, as they say. It therefore seems to me that the concerned parties who define their position on the crisis ensuing from the assassination of Al-Hariri on the basis of, or with reference to, the Syrian regime's position on issues of democracy and internal reform have no political or moral justification to do so. Yet judging the extent of rightness or wrongness of these positions, from national and pan-Arab perspectives, requires minute knowledge not only of their holders' motivations but also of the actual or expected results that may ensue from such positions and whose interest they would serve. These are the same standards by which we should understand the intent and import of the position expressed by Khaddam in his lengthy interview with Al-Arabiyya satellite television. What, we may wonder, are the motivations and goals of this man, the probable results of his positions, and who are the parties likely to benefit? In my view, Khaddam's motivation is one of only two possibilities: an awakening conscience or a desire for revenge. His motivation is either noble, if it proves to be the former, or malicious, if it proves to be the latter. I bet on the latter, for I consider it improbable that the position Khaddam put forth on Al-Arabiyya was an expression of conscience. My reasons for this are many, most of which revolve around the simple fact that a conscience capable of sleeping for 40 years, during which many serious and reprehensible crimes were committed, is in fact a dead conscience that cannot possibly return to life suddenly on the occasion of one crime, even of the scope of the assassination of Al-Hariri; that is, unless this particular crime is tied to personal interests. Whatever the case, it is difficult to precisely determine the true motivations behind Khaddam's actions as long as the precise ends he seeks or thinks he can gain remain unknown. Again, we find ourselves before one of two possibilities: helping the international investigation committee to reveal those embroiled in the assassination of Al-Hariri, or participating in finishing off a regime he believes is on the edge of collapse and presenting himself as an alternative ambitious for the seat of the presidency that he believes he was most deserving of, even if that takes place under the spearhead of American lances. I expect it to be the latter possibility for several reasons. Firstly, it is unlikely that Khaddam possesses definite information about those truly involved in the assassination of Al-Hariri, simply because he was distanced from the real corridors of decision making in Syria even before the difference over the extension of Emile Lahoud's term flared up. Secondly, Khaddam decided to move rapidly from the position of an oppositionist volunteering testimony to that of a critic split from the regime, clearly announcing his desire for its downfall and appearing ready to participate in its collapse. Finally, it seems that Khaddam was secretly interviewed by the Mehlis team before he left Syria, making it possible that he was in fact the source of much of the information -- attributed to an anonymous source -- in Mehlis' later report. If this proves true it would serve as evidence that Khaddam had been used since the beginning as an important link in a chain with the aim of exploiting the Hariri case as a means of doing away with the regime of President Bashar Al-Assad. It initially appeared as though the Khaddam pawn was being orchestrated in a final, decisive step that would end the chess game in the interest of the United States and its allies. Yet the matter is not that simple. It is difficult to imagine that Khaddam, a man who held the Lebanese file for many years during which more than 30 assassinations claimed the lives of leading personalities (among them two presidents, Bashir Gemayel and Rene Moawad, as well as the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt and Lebanon's mufti, Sheikh Hassan Khalid), would be the winning card in the case of the assassination of Al-Hariri. It is only logical that before the man provides information on an assassination that took place during a period in which he was outside the political inner ring he be required, morally and politically if not legally, to reveal the circumstances of all the other assassinations. If the regime were found implicated, he, and not any other person, would have to personally carry the political and criminal responsibility for what had happened by virtue of his post and official responsibility at that time. In this context, Khaddam's statements and testimony may seem impaired and lacking credibility. Despite this, his statements are capable of channelling wind under the sail of the investigating committee, which may grow more insistent on questioning President Assad himself. Such questioning, should it take place, might lead the crisis into a new and critical stage in which the United States, France and Israel would necessarily be the greatest beneficiaries. There remains another side to the picture that no analyst has given requisite attention. The appearance of Khaddam in this manner on the region's political stage does not benefit him on the personal level, raise his worth, or improve his image among friends or enemies. Yet it has wrought damage to the Syrian regime that is irreparable no matter how loud parliamentarians scream and accuse Khaddam of being an agent and committing treachery. Regimes capable of embracing personalities prepared to sell their homelands in this manner, despite the honours reaped upon them over the decades, are not immune and lack the simplest mechanisms of accountability to separate the wretched from the valuable at the right time. The question is, how many personalities of this kind are crouching in dark corners waiting for the appropriate moment to pounce on what remains of the Syrian regime's credibility? My interest in the Syrian regime has been, and remains, tied to its pan- Arab position. I am concerned that Syria remains, both as a people and a state, steadfast in the face of Zionist and American avarice, whose incompatibility with the Syrian regime I well know has no relation, near or far, to issues of democracy or the assassination of Al-Hariri. * The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
