The Palestinian legislative elections have altered the face of Palestinian politics. The forces of political Islam have ousted the liberal and leftist currents that have traditionally dominated the Palestinian scene. While the rise of political Islam can be explained by domestic as well as external factors, we do well to remember that Hamas has always looked up to Islamists in Iran and Lebanon. With two rival currents now on the scene the situation is akin to a zero-sum game. Hamas has triumphed at the expense of Fatah, and the two don't seem to be able to coordinate, at least not for now. There might be other players on the scene but for the moment their influence is too weak to direct the course of events. Fatah and Hamas have one thing in common -- their approach to politics is self-reflexive. Fatah is unused to rivals. It launched the revolution and was the first to talk peace. It negotiated on behalf of the entire nation and expected to continue doing so. The Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas recently reminded his nation that the parliamentary elections were an implementation of the Oslo accords. Hamas is new to government affairs, though it has grassroots support. It performed well in the municipal elections and though its parliamentary win may have come as a surprise it has been influencing Palestinian politics for years. There are reasons for Hamas's popularity. It endorses armed struggle, fuses politics with religious sentiments and delivers social services. It has won public sympathy in the wake of Israel's assassination of its leaders at a time when its leftist rivals have lost credibility. But one should also see Hamas's victory as part of a wider trend. For years Islamists have been making inroads at the expense of secular movements across the Islamic world. Hamas has also received financial support from official and non-official Arab sources. In less than two decades it has turned itself from a marginal group into the Palestinian scene's most influential player. Now it has to deal with the consequences of power. In government Hamas will have to tackle the very issues that diminished Fatah's popularity. Will Hamas negotiate with Israel? Will it recognise Israel? How will it raise funds to run the country? How will it maintain law and order? How will it coordinate with other Palestinian forces? The peace process may be at a standstill but Hamas cannot afford to ignore it. It will have to develop a foreign policy, something it has not worried about till now. It will have to do something about agreements signed with Israel, about internal security, and about the number of weapons in the Palestinian street. What will it do? The answers will soon be apparent.
