Isolating Hamas will lead nowhere. Opportunity must be grasped for the hawks to make peace,writes Mohammed Abu-Nimer* Frantic alerts appeared in the media, including from concerned politicians, regarding the victory of Hamas in the recent Palestinian elections. Few voices of reason prevailed. The peace advocacy community remained remarkably quiet. The victory of Hamas touches upon deep-seated fears, which the Bush administration and Israeli politicians have been promoting, especially in the right wing, and among certain Muslim "secularists". In this context, several Arab politicians, especially Egyptians, rushed to offer their mediation services in this seemingly emerging crisis of "misbehaviour". Conflict resolution and negotiation theories can offer a different perspective to Hamas's victory. This turn of current events might offer a historical opportunity for Israeli, Palestinian and international communities to forge a breakthrough in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Prior to identifying the potential for constructive outcomes, let us briefly put this victory into perspective. First, Hamas did not secure a "sweeping victory" by converting the majority of Palestinians into believers in their religious ideology, as various analysts and commentators inferred. In local districts, Hamas candidates won the majority of seats due to internal divisions and political segmentation in Fatah. In reality, if you examine the national list, the results reflect that Hamas's overall support is less than 50 per cent. Those who stressed high percentages tried to increase the "shock" and play with existing fears of radical Islam. Nevertheless, by voting for Hamas, the Palestinians were explicitly stating their basic needs, including the right to defend themselves, to security in welfare, and finally the right to statehood. The Hamas vote should also be viewed as a collective outcry against corruption and as a demand for more internal security, in particular protection from Palestinian militias. Like any other election, internal and external factors can contextualise or explain the results. Internally, Fatah -- the leading party of the Palestinian Authority (PA) -- was financially, administratively and politically corrupt. This fact was already publicly acknowledged in the second year of the PA in 1994. It took, however, 12 years, thousands of Palestinian lives, and sweeping regional developments -- mainly democratic elections in Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon -- to bring Fatah down. Every Palestinian knew that the PA leadership under Fatah was mishandling and mismanaging limited funds (Israel and the international community also contributed to this image), yet many Palestinians waited in hope for peace dividends to materialise. The eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada was a mass protest and revolt not only against Israeli brutality but also against the Oslo agreement and its conveners -- the Israeli government and the PA leadership. By the 2006 elections there were more Palestinian deaths and checkpoints and less internal security in Palestinian cities, added to slow economic development and thus fewer jobs and basic human needs met. Thirteen years after Oslo, Palestinians have less hope than ever of a viable state being established. Serious discussion of such issues as the status of refugees, the further expansion of Israeli settlements, or alternative solutions to ones routinely proposed, has been conspicuously lacking. During this period the Israeli people elected another right-wing government headed by a prime minister implicated in the Sabra and Shatila massacres. Several Israeli ministers advocated transfer and other radical alternatives. The same Israeli leadership besieged President Arafat, paralyzed him -- with much humiliation and loss of dignity -- taking him out of the political equation. Palestinians believe it is the Israeli government that refused negotiate, even with Arafat, despite his wide legitimacy among all factions and his proven willingness to make different compromises. After the Arafat era, and despite US and European support for the second Palestinian president election, Israeli leaders marginalised the Palestinians further by refusing to meet with President Abbas or support him in any significant manner. Internationally, the US is engaged heavily in a war against Muslim radicals. The consequences of this war touch the global Muslim community. The Israeli-Palestinian issue, combined with a "war on terror" that has been focused mainly on the Islamic far right, has resulted in the perception of a conflict between the West and the religion of Islam. Additionally, the American administration is perceived as the most pro-Israeli yet in the history of the conflict (Prime Minister Sharon visited the White House nine times during President Bush's first term alone, and was often praised as "a man of peace" by President Bush and other top US officials). Both sides fail to acknowledge the Palestinian people's cry for basic human needs. Considering the above as typical of the Palestinian view of the situation, why would an average Palestinian person vote for Fatah or any group other than Hamas? Unknown to the global community, Hamas offered desperately needed social services, relief aid, moral schooling and a commitment to eradicating the chaos and insecurity of the Palestinian street. Hamas also offered to confront and match the belligerent rhetoric of the Israeli government's narrative. Hamas provided these basic alternatives to forlorn Palestinians when little assistance was forthcoming from the global community. Obviously, Hamas's social and religious agendas on the domestic level are major concerns for secular nationalist or democratic organisations. These groups will have to wrestle Hamas forces, which may move to impose stricter social and religious codes on the Palestinian public and private spheres. This battle against restrictive transformation has been fought for many years between Hamas and more liberal groups, especially since the first Intifada. The world's liberal governments and NGOs will need to intensify their help and assistance to Palestinian civil society groups and opposition forces when the imminent Hamas government begins its campaign to impose Sharia law or other restrictive measures. Nonetheless, in the Israeli-Palestinian context, the election of Hamas brings some symmetry to the conflict -- often a necessary condition for parties to finally engage in a meaningful process of negotiation. Hamas' ideology, interests and positions on many issues are similar to, if not perfectly reflective of, the current Israeli government. Historically, the Likud Party -- or right-wing camp -- won the Israeli elections under Begin, Shamir, Sharon and Netanyahu in 1977, following almost 40 years of unchallenged Labour Party rule over Israeli politics. Factors such as corruption, the marginalisation of Sephardic Jews, and the failure to end the Israeli-Arab conflict were cited as reasons for the collapse of Rabin's Labour government. This caused a sweeping victory for the right wing, which is ideologically and strategically very similar to Hamas currently. In 2006, Hamas utilised arguments and strategies similar to the Israeli right wing in 1977, and defeated Fatah after 40 years of dominating Palestinian politics. It is true Hamas does not recognise Israel's right to exist according to its charter. On the other hand, the Likud Party and right wing leadership in the Israeli government have not recognised the Palestinian right to statehood or their historical rights to the land of Palestine. The Israeli government continues to believe that the land of Israel belongs to the Jewish people, rather than all the Abrahamic faith believers, including Palestinian Muslims and Christians. The Likud Party and its government offer no explicit formal recognition of Palestine or the right of Muslims and Christians. Hamas creates a mirror argument using religious justifications, too. According to Israeli right wing governments and ideologists, Palestinians will never be afforded a true and full sovereign independent state, rather always remaining under some form of Israeli control (borders, territories, travel and commerce, etc). The Palestinian entity will at best be granted some kind of expanded autonomy. Hamas offers a similar package in which Israeli Jews may stay in Palestine as non-Muslims -- or Dhimmis --treated according to guiding principles of Islamic rule. Both Hamas and Israel have used violence and arms in the conflict. Politicians on both sides have often repeated the slogan "They only understand the language of the force." Hamas is willing to offer a long-term truce, but only according to the Islamic terms of hudna (cease-fire). For its part, the State in Israel never established its international boundaries. At the end of the day there is stalemate -- nothing but a long- term truce arrangement. Even the unilateral separation and containment of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in their cities surrounded by a gigantic wall is viewed as a temporary arrangement by many Israelis and Palestinians. It will be a long-term cease-fire only because no Palestinian leader or group can buy into such a territorial arrangement. Hamas and the current Israeli government have long opposed Oslo. When Sharon came to power, he acted with his own unilateral agenda to fully undermine the agreement. Both Fatah and the Israeli Labour Party -- designers and implementers of Oslo -- were ousted by their uncompromising opponents, Hamas and Likud. Based on the above picture, it is clear that lasting peace and genuine arrangements between Israelis and Palestinians must include an agreement between these two presently leading currents, Hamas and Likud. Fatah and Labour have failed to implement solutions and obdurate ideology is too powerful to be ignored in either society. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict therefore stands at a historic moment: any agreement they might together produce would be more sustainable and respected among the majority in the two societies. The US administration during the Bush Sr administration in 1991 stepped in and forced Shamir's government to attend negotiation with Arab countries and eventually the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. The international community intensively worked to bring to the negotiation table the Israeli right wing when they won the election in 1996 (Netanyahu defeating Peres) and in 2000 (when Sharon replaced Barak). As an alternative to dehumanising Hamas's leadership by labelling it as "Bin Ladenist," the present moment can be viewed as an opening to engage the peace process. Hamas has already made gestures, directed towards the US and Israel, to the effect that they may prove willing to accept certain aspects of Oslo and work with the roadmap plan. Their leaders have stated on several occasions, "We came to build on what the PA has achieved and not destroy." I believe that continuing to provide much needed aid to the Palestinian people and diplomatically engaging Hamas will have illicit better constructive outcomes than shunning Hamas and collectively punishing the Palestinian people for their democratic choices. After all, the regional democratic process is a priority supported and financed by the current US administration. Hamas may provide opportunity for US foreign policy to seriously and genuinely repair its negative image worldwide, in particular overcoming charges of hypocrisy relative to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. As a final point, from the peace and conflict resolution perspectives, we already know that drawing parties to negotiations is the only way to produce constructive results, even if short term gains can be achieved through other, perhaps violent, means. Pushing relevant actors in this conflict to the corner for following the lead of the democratic process would leave them with little face-saving means. Ignoring important cultural elements within Arab and Muslim traditional cultures will only deepen the conflict at both a regional and global level. Peace is made with enemies, not with people who are already in agreement. I hope we will grasp this opportunity. * The writer is assistant professor at the School of International Service, American University.
