A unified position on a nuclear Iran and other Arab-Iranian issues must be forged as a matter of urgency, writes Sameh Rashed* The Iranian nuclear standoff entered a new phase following the announcement that Iran now possesses the technology necessary to harness nuclear energy. Revealing that Iran has the capacity to enrich uranium at a rate of 3.5 per cent was not news in itself. Iran has been conducting research on the processes of enriching uranium for a long time, and has stressed more than once that its research is ongoing. From the official, public perspective, Iran has not concealed that it has made progress on this front. Thus, the recent Iranian announcement did not add anything new to the perception already drawn in the West generally of Iran's nuclear capacities, despite the exaggerations that some agencies and Western states embellish in order to inflate the danger of a nuclear Iran, or perhaps fabricate such a danger. What is new about this recent Iranian step is the psychological-political aspect of it. Negotiations based on a power balance implicitly understood without announcement or applause are very different from negotiations built upon a power balance that is overt and whose veil of secrecy has been removed. This second kind of power balance enjoys immense media attention, raising the morale of the negotiating party who has pre-empted usual and discrete forms of bargaining, granting them greater confidence. This is the point that Arab states must consider when dealing with the Iranian nuclear file in its new phase. The issue is no longer merely one of Western fears of Iran's possible nuclear capacities. The issue is that these capacities are now closer to established fact than possibility, and may actually have become reality. What is intended here by capacities is not the mere enrichment of uranium to 3.5 per cent, but rather much more; whether the possibility of enrichment at a higher rate or plans or intentions to use enriched uranium for peaceful or non-peaceful means. In other words, the Iranian nuclear file is based on new developments that are no longer a source of concern for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on behalf of the West. It has become a cause for attentiveness and reflection based on the actual givens Iran has declared and the new developments they may produce in the short term. By attentiveness I do not mean that Arab states should adopt premature positions on Iranian nuclear abilities, whether positive or negative. Rather, what is intended here is for the Iranian nuclear file, in its current situation and future possibilities, to be subjected to close, detailed study stemming from collective higher Arab interests and based only on objective standards for the national security of Arab states, collective or national. On the basis of these standards alone will it be possible to overcome the differences between Arab views, not only on the Iranian nuclear issue but also on the overall Iranian role in the region and the means of dealing with it. While this issue is wider and more comprehensive than the limited scope of the nuclear question, it must be studied, and a unified, collective and stable Arab position on it determined. Yet the more urgent and pressing issue is the nuclear one. As long as Arab states fail to pay close attention and realise its dimensions and consequences now, it will be difficult to confront the threats and dangers it may produce later on. The first issue that deserves consideration on a nuclear Iran is that there be Arab consensus on the nature and limits of the danger presented. Is it found in Iran's possession of nuclear weapons, or simply in its possession of nuclear capacities, even if peaceful? In this case, is the fear of Iranian intentions rather than Iran's manifest actions? These uncertainties, in turn, pose a fundamental question that precedes them: if Tehran possesses nuclear capacities that can be used in non-peaceful ways, or even possesses a nuclear bomb, does that represent a real danger to Arab states? If so, what are the dimensions and nature of this danger and its possible outcomes? This is a starting point that all Arab states must confront when examining new developments of the Iranian nuclear standoff. Yet care must be taken not to be pulled behind the escalating media campaigns waged by Western parties against Tehran or to perceive it as a capital danger to peace and security in the region and the world. Likewise, it must be kept in mind that not everything Iran announces necessarily reflects its true intentions and policies, particularly in light of the negative precedents recent history has produced in terms of relations between Iran and the Arabs. In this context, it is necessary to examine the Iranian view of self and other. The perception of Iranian decision-makers with regard to Iran's place in the region as well as their vision for its regional role must be well understood. Other steps and stages in the handling of the nuclear standoff will unfold on this basis of this vision, as will Iran's relations with the region's states on a wider and deeper level. The Iranian nuclear file is not an issue only for American-Iranian relations. Nor is it the only issue. The nuclear file is only one of a bundle of key issues that form the crux of dealings between Washington and Tehran. On the other hand, the United States and the West in general are not concerned with the issue of a nuclear Iran or any strategic or security concern in the region except from one angle -- the security of Israel. Another consideration for them, although less important, especially following the occupation of Iraq, is safeguarding the uninterrupted flow of oil from the region. While the Israeli factor is always present in American strategic considerations in the Middle East, Washington's primary concern, it claims, is the imminent Iranian "threat" embodied by its possible nuclear capacities. It is easily concluded that if this danger were removed and Washington was able to obtain trusted guarantees that Israel will not fall subject to an Iranian threat, Iranian nuclear capacities would not be a source of concern for Washington or serve as a motivating factor for moving against Iran in one way or another. Of course, it is not at all unlikely (and rather is likely in light of the current parametres of relations between Washington and Tehran) that an agreement or settlement be reached, not only on the nuclear file, but also on a raft of issues that are contentious between them. What is significant in this context is that the primary party concerned with the Iranian nuclear issue is Arab, for the Arab party is the first threatened if there is any danger and is the beneficiary if there is any advantage to be found in this scenario or that. This situation implies the necessity of there being full (not relative) Arab satisfaction, not exempting any state, with a nuclear Iran being viewed purely through the Arab lens and not according to the vision of any other party. In turn, this would be followed by an examination of other regional issues that sometimes seem unrelated to developments on the nuclear front but in fact may play an influential role farther reaching than Iranian nuclear developments themselves. Of course the most important of these issues is the Iraqi issue. It is self-evident that the American position on a nuclear Iran is influenced by what is taking place in Iraq and the Iranian role there. Thus, the developments taking place in Iraq, and the Iranian-American dialogue on Iraq, cannot be separated from the nuclear issue and its implications. Washington well realises that Iraq forms a primary card of pressure for Iran at the current time and that Tehran is capable of turning Iraqi territory into a blazing inferno under the feet of American soldiers. The second of these issues is the oil issue, whether from the perspective of Iran's threats to block seafaring in the Gulf and close the Hormuz Strait, or from the perspective of lowering Iranian oil production. The result of each would be an exorbitant rise in prices that consuming countries would not be able to bear, or at least not be willing to. Following that is the issue of the entire Arab- Israeli conflict, including its sub-issues on the situation in southern Lebanon and the close relationship between Iran and Hizbullah, as well as Hamas being in control of the Palestinian government, which also has good relations with Tehran. Finally, there is the direct road between Tehran and Tel Aviv, which witnessed two decades ago the Irangate scandal. Currently, threats are being exchanged and Iran is making reference to missiles that can strike at the heart of Tel Aviv while the latter is insinuating that a pre-emptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities is under consideration. A unified Arab stance on these issues is necessary, but not enough. There must be actual Arab movement, and the Arab role must not to be limited to the formation of opinions and the adoption of positions. Taking action on these issues would not only familiarise Arab states with what is taking place in the region and its affairs now and what is expected in the future. It would also impact on the serious possibility before us, that of a nuclear Iran. Distancing ourselves from these issues may leave us removed from Arab interests and security, wherein the dangers lie. The fundamental starting point that can neither be overstepped nor overlooked is to set a stable and unified Arab vision on the position of Iran in the region. On the basis of this vision, other steps can be taken, positions formed and influence -- or action -- wrought, whether directly on developments in the nuclear issue itself or indirectly on other concerns and questions. Unless this vision is formed, the compass of decision-making will turn astray, the Arabs able only to follow the actions of other parties for the sake of their interests, and to bear the consequences of that. * The writer is a researcher and political analyst.
