The shaping of a "new Middle East" is being attempted by force, but Hizbullah so far have the upper hand, writes Charles Harb The Israeli war machine has completely destroyed South Lebanon's infrastructure, has bombed milk and textile factories in the Bekaa Valley, Beirut's airport and harbour, and taken down mobile phone networks across the country. Entire neighbourhoods in Beirut and entire villages in the south have been flattened, in what the UN's humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator called "a violation of humanitarian law" (read: war crimes and crimes against humanity). Israel's stated aim is the destruction of Hizbullah, and yet it is Lebanon that is in ruins. Israel's military campaign is having a significant impact on the Lebanese socio-political establishment, further polarising divisions that crippled the government's decision-making process since Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri's assassination. Political forces in Lebanon were equally divided between two camps: the "government camp" representing large sections of the Sunni and Druze communities, and the "opposition camp" representing large sections of the Maronite Christians and Shia communities. As such, one of the aims of the Israeli war is to weaken Hizbullah to such an extent that the balance of power within the Lebanese system tips in favour of the government camp. However, the wanton destruction of Lebanon's infrastructure and the ineptitude of the Lebanese government to forcefully deal with the crisis are more likely to weaken the government than strengthen it. Lebanon will come out of this more fractured than united, and grand decisions will be even more difficult to implement. Israel has set forth three non-negotiable conditions for a ceasefire: the return of its two captive soldiers, the deployment of the Lebanese army (or an international force) along Lebanon's southern borders, and the disarmament of Hizbullah. None of these conditions are likely to be realised through war. Although the Hamas leadership has suffered a total financial and diplomatic embargo, and is the target of a fierce military campaign (including the kidnapping of half the Palestinian parliament and government ministers, the complete destruction of Gaza's civil infrastructure including the main electricity and water purification plants), Hamas has stubbornly refused to hand over the single Israeli soldier they hold captive. Hizbullah has by far a larger stature, and a wider margin of manoeuvre. As its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, stated in a recent interview, "The whole universe would not be able to secure the release of the two Israeli soldiers unless there are indirect negotiations and an exchange of prisoners." No matter what amount of bombs is dropped on Lebanon, Hizbullah's position is unlikely to change. This will constitute the first setback to Israel's demands. Disarming Hizbullah against its will is an even more remote possibility. If Israel's mighty army cannot defeat the resistance forces, who within the Lebanese social system will be able to do so? No outside party, be it Israeli, American or Iranian, can compel Hizbullah to surrender its weapons. This should come wilfully, and will require concessions the likes of which neither the Israelis nor the Americans seem willing to pay. The deployment of the Lebanese army to the south is a less problematic proposition. With the current distribution of power within the Lebanese political establishment, the army is loyal to the president of the republic and the army's chief of staff, both of whom have similar strategic outlook to that of Hizbullah. Furthermore, neither the Lebanese army nor an international force are likely to keep the Israelis from violating Lebanese sovereignty in the future, or to keep Hizbullah from retaliating. Finally, past experiences with multi-national forces have proved detrimental to all parties. A comprehensive settlement is yet again needed. Consequently, from whatever angle you look at the current crisis, Israeli demands are unlikely to be achieved through war, and Hizbullah is coming out psychologically victorious. The inability of the Israeli army to impose a military solution and the field successes of Hizbullah fighters are likely to shake the Israeli establishment. If the invincibility myth of the Israeli Defence Forces is broken, how will the military establishment react? What will the regional role of Israel become if its military strength is no longer credible? All sources converge in stating that the current war will have repercussions affecting the entire region. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has affirmed that American geo-strategic interests require "a new Middle East", and that there is no returning to the pre-war status quo. Hassan Nasrallah stated that Hizbullah's victory or defeat would affect the entire nation's fate. The central propeller of current events is American geo-strategic interest. Although the US is bogged down in Iraq, the administration is still eyeing Iran. The spread of Iran's influence (and through it Russian and Chinese interests) challenges America's monopoly over Middle East oil reserves and threatens its core allies (principally Saudi Arabia and Israel). The US and its allies perceive Hizbullah as the forefront of Iranian influence in the region; the tip of what they label the "Shia crescent". Thus, by neutralising the "Hizbullah threat" on Israel's northern border, the US would have a freer hand to take on the Iranian challenge. If the axis that comprises the US and its regional allies has its way, the projected scenario states that Lebanon will exit the Arab-Israeli conflict, Hizbullah will be a weakened political player, and leadership in Lebanon will remain in the hands of current pro-government forces. Such developments would roll back Iran's influence and further pressure Syria to orbit the US and Saudi-Arabian spheres of influence. On the other hand, if Hizbullah forces come out victorious, a substantial redistribution of power within Lebanon is likely to occur. The pro-Saudi Arabian and pro-US parties will shrink at the expense of the Maronite Christian and Shia alliance. Furthermore, Syria's bargaining position will become significantly stronger, and its regional leverage will increase. Israel's role as the region's titan will dissipate and its effectiveness as a US sidekick or executive agent will be put in question. Finally, a Hizbullah victory is likely to embolden Islamic-led resistance movements across the Arab world, and thus further weaken Arab regimes. While the war on Lebanon continues, Arab citizens remain glued to their television sets in a deplorable display of apathy and defeatism. This is a war to be remembered, and its outcome will affect everyone in the region. To be an apathetic spectator rather than an active participator to ones' life is the epitome of irresponsibility.
