Egyptians have the ability to challenge authority but lack an appropriate framework of political legitimacy, writes Ammar Ali Hassan* Egyptians of all backgrounds and persuasions have gone to prodigious lengths to diagnose the ills -- both temporary and chronic -- that infect the contemporary Egyptian character. They have scrutinised their subject from all perspectives and poured their opinions, ideas and findings into a prolific array of books and articles. Some of these volumes probe deep into the annals of history in search of the bedrock of our individual and national self and then journey up the subsequent layers of civilisation that have accumulated on top. Others go straight to the present, and focus on what current trends, events and opinions reveal. Others combine the two, in search of what the present has shed off from the past, or how the past has influenced the present. Few opinion pundits have taken the trouble, however, to create a model for contemporary Egyptian personality. Such a paragon would consist only of all the good and worthy traits of our ancestors from centuries gone by, after having shed, if only out of hopeful conjecture, all the flaws and defects that have also adhered over the years but need to be discarded if we are to produce a new society founded upon intellectually and emotionally modified people. Pride or laziness or both might lead some to a misleading oversimplifications, as though constructing this model of the ideal Egyptian involved no more than separating the chafe from the wheat or starving the negative traits and feeding the positive ones. Often these persons are fond of speaking of the "true Egyptian metal" that shows itself in times of stress. Yet they are undisturbed by the rust that accumulated on the metal and the corrosion this caused, or by the fact that the original metal may have gradually altered in the course of its interaction with other mineral ores in a country that has always been open to newcomers since the dawn of human history. So, the process of constructing the model of the ideal Egyptian is not at all as easy as it might first appear. Compounding the difficulty is the attrition upon the Egyptian personality wrought by forces of political despotism, social corruption, economic hardship, moral deterioration and the trend from religion to religiosity. It seems, therefore, that in order to build the new Egyptian character we must first induce some jolt, the effect of which would be to produce a shudder that would loosen stagnant layers of accumulated dust. I would suggest that this jolt be aimed at the system of government. Egyptians change in accordance with the nature of the political order, the engine that pulls everything in its wake, from morals to the value of accomplishment. Therefore, if we want to build the Egyptian who is characterised by creativity and innovation, tolerance and courage, vitality and dynamism, and patience and persistence, we need to generate a "democratic mentality". This is a mentality that refuses to bow to the claim put about by intellectuals who are beneficiaries of the status quo that the Egyptian people are not ready for democracy because they are not psychologically equipped for this type of government and that equipping people psychologically for this type of government is an educational process that is grounded in a collection of values that are instilled in an individual from his earliest upbringing in the family to his participation in a political party, passing through a host of other social institutions to which he belongs and by means of which he interacts with other members and groups of society. These intellectuals hold that all these social institutions as they currently exist in our country only produce different shades of masked tyranny. Democratisation, therefore, entails removing heavy layers of authoritarian ideas and practices, for only then will democracy be able to stand on solid cultural and social foundations. To substantiate their contentions, these intellectuals point to socio-psychological lore that maintains that a certain type of upbringing is essential to prepare individuals for democratic rule. This type of upbringing instills the individual who believes in civil liberties, who is keen to participate in public life, who is tolerant of others and subscribes to their right to freedom, who is ready to dedicate some of his time and effort to strengthening the pillars of civil society so as to forestall government heavy-handedness, and who will be prepared to fight if he feels that the democracy with which he is blessed is threatened by an outside power or in jeopardy of being hijacked by an authoritarian-minded individual or clique. Of course, the foregoing is essential in order to produce a democracy that is borne on sturdy shoulders and bathed in a light that vanquishes the darkness of tyranny and that can develop the strength to safeguard its progress and the fortitude to rectify its errors. However, the very act of making a set of psychological traits a prerequisite for a certain type of government is nothing less than a bid to hamper the efforts of those who seek to change their society for the better and, hence, to prolong the longevity of the types of regimes that are hostile to democracy and those that advocate for them. The plainest evidence of the fallacy of the arguments of the status quo apologists is that Western societies did not share a single mindset -- indeed similar mindsets -- at the time of their transition to democracy or even today. Studies on the psychology of different peoples at the outset of the 20th century demonstrate that there are vast differences between the national characteristics of different peoples. One such study was that conducted by economic geographer Andre Siegfried who observed that if the French were noted for their "brilliance" the British were fundamentally "stubborn", the Germans "organised", the Americans "dynamic" and the Russians "mystical". When these studies were conducted, the British, French, Americans and Germans, as different as they were, all enjoyed the same degree of democratic rule. The Russians, after decades of communist rule, are pressing to strengthen their nascent democracy. Among them are those who believe in attaining this goal autonomously, and those who do not object to some foreign support for their democratising efforts. Contrary to the doctrines of authority's philosophers, the right thing for the Arab peoples to do is to sustain continuous pressures for democratic change "now" and, simultaneously, to do everything possible to ensure that our nascent democracy emerges healthy and sound. Towards the latter end, we must begin by building democracy in ourselves. Parents should raise their children to despise despotism and enslavement, to favour collective solutions and the public interest, to insist on participating in the decision making processes, to listen to and respect contrary opinions, to grow accustomed to contemplating alternatives instead of mindlessly following a single course of action. It makes little sense merely to cite the Qur'anic verse -- "Verily, God changeth not the condition of a people until they change what is in their hearts." -- without exploring ways to act on it. Yet this is precisely what so much of the literature of change that has appeared over recent years has done. At least this literature did not overlook an important aspect of this verse, that portion that addresses the fatalism that is so ingrained in this deeply religious society. This verse has been interpreted to mean that mankind, whom God had blessed with an intellect and to whom He revealed what was good and evil, was endowed with free will and that this free will should be engaged to change wrong to right and to challenge the oppressive ruler in the event of the spread of corruption and tyranny. This, in turn, sanctioned the rise of a strong and youthful movement to end the deterioration and corruption and "to reform behaviour by guiding mankind to the path of salvation in the here and hereafter and to administer the affairs of life with the public in accordance with the laws of justice and rectitude," as Islamic jurisprudence defines sound government, as opposed to history's legacy of government's slide into tyranny. But, some scholars of Islamic law have turned to another Qur'anic verse: "Obey the Lord, obey the Messenger and obey those in authority among thee." This injunction they throw at the governed in order to enjoin them to bow to the will of the ruler, however cruel and oppressive he may be and however remote his rule may be from an equitable relationship between the rulers and the ruled. Unfortunately, these scholars appear to have overlooked the fact that the verse says "those in authority among thee" as opposed to over thee. The difference between the two is enormous: the former implies an element of free choice in the selection of those in authority, the latter the imposition of an authority upon others, perhaps against popular will. Still, we are left with the question as to how to produce change. How do we convert submission to the status quo into a positive force for restructuring the psychological relationship between Egyptians and their government? How do we transform the latter from an institution of coercion and oppression into an edifice of protection and justice? Which in turn means how do we change everything that has become wrong and distorted and how do we dismantle the context that feeds backwardness in all areas of life so as to clear the way for the construction of the Egyptian we dream of? There is no easy answer to these questions. Changing people's psychological make-up is far more difficult that changing their material circumstances, however dire. As the popular adage has it, "It is easy to build factories; hard to build men." Perhaps this is why so many reject reform from the bottom up, which they regard as too slow, and call instead for reform from the top down. "Those who ruin something should fix it," they say, meaning that since the government, by virtue of the way it is structured, fostered corruption and tyranny it should start by reforming itself and not hide behind the plea that the prevailing political culture in Egypt is not conducive to democratic development. The only way to fight this invidious perception is to start building the resilient politically active personality. This entails breaking with a long legacy of superficial apathy, noted in tomes of political, psychological, sociological and folkloric studies and attributed to numerous factors, such as "political Pharaohism", defined as the thousands of years old Egyptian proclivity for deifying their rulers, or the "river basin agrarian culture" in which a highly centralised command structure is required for the control and distribution of water resources, or the "spread of Sufism" among Muslims, monasticism among Christians, and other such spiritual movements that ostensibly encourage detachment from civil life or that have led many to believe, recently, that the church should resume a leading role in political life. Instilling political activism in the Egyptian personality is not all that difficult. The spontaneous outbursts that occurred in such areas as Edko and Abu Hamad in the 1990s in protest against government heavy-handedness, not to mention the more extremist violence by members of militant Islamist groups, demonstrate that Egyptians have it in them to wage protest to the fullest extent possible. Much historical testimony bears this out and puts paid to the preconception that has come to be accepted as incontrovertible that Egyptians are innately passive and submissive. By all means I am not suggesting we breed a desire to spread violence and chaos. I am contending, however, that Egyptians have the ability to challenge authority and that this ability should be developed into a constructive mode of behaviour that functions within the framework of political and ethical legitimacy. That way, instead of taking guns or bombs against figures or areas that are regarded as symbols or instruments of authority, they can engage in acts of civil disobedience, or fight corruption in public office no matter how lofty, or organise their fellow citizens to wage collective strikes, sit-ins and peaceful demonstrations until their demands are met or until they succeed in elevating Egypt to the status it merits. Egyptians need self-esteem and this can only come via inspiration from the ennobling aspects of their social and political history, from the awareness of those aspects of their religions (Islam and Christianity) that enjoin mankind to resist oppression, to fight evil and corruption, to work for the greater good as opposed to the fulfilment of personal or factional interests which only sew social discord and gives ruling authorities endless openings to tyrannise and oppress. The first step in this process is for research centres, writers, intellectuals, architects of educational curricula and preachers in mosques and churches to begin the psychological recasting of Egyptian personality, so as to free it from its false sense of inferiority and helplessness, rid it of depression and the bitter taste of futility, so that in the end there will emerge the Egyptian we dream of. * The writer is director of the Centre for Middle East Studies and Research in Cairo.
