Civil society is a contentious domain, caught in the middle between traditionalist suspicions and governmental domination, writes Ammar Ali Hassan* The challenges facing Arab civil society range from conflicts over abstract terms and concepts down to the smallest details connected with the manifold problems of day-to-day life. These challenges combine to form a thick and seemingly insurmountable wall that is keeping Arab civil society from developing the breadth and dynamism needed to tackle the very real and pressing issues that weigh upon Arabs, from across all sectors of their societies. Even the term "civil society" itself has still to be fully understood and assimilated into the conceptual system that governs the outlook of the greater swathes of public opinion, intelligentsia and laypersons alike. To the adherents of some radical Islamist trends, for example, "civil society" is a spurious import from the West. Its purpose, they believe, is to distort and undermine traditional institutions that shape the indigenous Islamic "community" which is highly empowered in our societies and can dedicate itself to the pursuit of its goals without stirring up ideological and cultural chaos or squabbles among intellectuals, rights advocates and political activists over definitions and the application of terms and concepts. Islamists are not alone in their mistrust of "civil society". Individuals affiliated with the government, and some Arab nationalists and leftists regard civil society as the spearhead of Western colonialist projects disguised as social and political development programmes, some of which do not respond to the urgent needs of the people and even conflict with our values and beliefs. They ground their suspicions on various arguments and "proofs", such as the links between Western governmental agencies and some Arab civil society organisations, the "agendas" of these NGOs and the rampant "yuppie" culture that often taints these NGOs and that, in the eyes of their critics, clearly stamps NGO operatives as "agents" or "claws of the cat" rather than philanthropists, proponents of social and cultural positions, or fighters for a better society. Aggravating both the scepticism and confusion is the considerable overlap between what is classified as "civil society" or "community" and the government or official establishment. For example, the Sufi orders in Egypt could be ranked as an integral part of the non- governmental community. However, they are linked by a heavy hidden thread to the government, not only in terms of how they are used to add legitimacy to the government, but also in terms of the fact that the ministers of waqf (religious endowments), the interior, information and local development are, by virtue of their portfolios, members of the Supreme Council for Sufi Orders. Then, too, there is the problem of Arab political parties, most of which do not exercise their presumed role as rival contenders for rule, having resigned themselves to their place on the sidelines of power and to serving as democratic window-dressing for the regime. From the fringes, political parties are, at best, little more than a small part of civil society's advocacy movement. Arab civil society is stagnant. The legal framework it has to work with is nothing less than backwards, in spite of the pressures that have been placed on Arab governments to modernise legislative infrastructure in a way that would strengthen civil society's ability to contribute to human and social development. While it is true that some Arab governments have responded to such pressure, their response has been hesitant and grudging, with every inch they have yielded accompanied by reservations, qualifications and any number of restrictions. As a result, NGOs are vulnerable to various forms of governmental intervention, be it mountains of red tape preventing easy registration, or rigid controls over their sources of finance, and the constant threat faced of dissolution for "security reasons". Governments have also been pressuring bodies that finance NGOs to redirect their funds to specifically designated organisations or, even, governmental agencies responsible for social affairs. One of the most intimidating barriers Arab NGOs encounter throughout the Arab world is the laws that explicitly prohibit them from engaging in politics, without delineating the boundaries that demarcate the very broad "political" arena from other forms of public activity. Oral instructions are given to government control and surveillance agencies to keep the heat up on NGOs to ensure that they do not overstep their nebulous bounds. Even so, some NGOs have drawn inspiration from the global context that encourages civil society to fight for its right of political participation and, simultaneously, have benefited from the drive being led at home by some political parties, social movements and intellectuals for greater political openness and democracy. There have been several instances in which these NGOs have succeeded in circumventing prohibitions and engaging in politics, even in an obvious form. In addition, the clampdown on opposition parties in many Arab countries has driven large numbers of people to express themselves politically through NGOs. Perhaps the clearest example of this is to be found in Egypt, where, at one point, occupational syndicates became primary political forums, until the government froze the operations of some, took over others, and issued a law prohibiting syndicates from involvement in politics. Law 100/1993 was effectively the government's answer to the rise of Islamist influence in such syndicates -- one of the only outlets for a movement that is barred from most other legal channels of political participation, above all from forming a political party. In terms of political efficacy, Arab civil society is most active in the Palestinian occupied territories. The appalling oppression and belligerence of the Israeli occupation has naturally driven Palestinian NGOs to engage in the struggle against occupation, to help alleviate the suffering of its millions of victims, and to intensify their lobbying of the international community in the hope of marshalling some form of protection for a defenceless people. But not all the difficulties facing Arab civil societies are borne from their immediate environments. Some stem from the way Arab NGOs operate; their own perception of their role and the degree of dedication of their operatives. Some people have leaped into NGO work as a treasure trove: a high- paying job or a way to get their hands on a slice of the pie made up of allocations by foreign governments and agencies to fund political and social development in the Arab world (or to generate an indigenous elite dependent upon and eager to promote Western interests, according to some that criticise the performance and function of NGOs). Other Arab NGO operatives see their positions as a way to attain social status or enter the media limelight. Many NGOs, themselves, have a severe credibility crisis. Some lack transparency and are infected by the very corruption in politics they presumably exist to fight. Many lack democratic mechanisms and a democratic culture. They are tyrannically dominated by an individual or clique whose decision- making processes are cloaked in mystery while the rest of the employees bow and scrape and do as ordered, like the ordinary masses of underpaid civil servants. A third and major reason for the credibility crisis of Arab NGOs is that, on the whole, they are not present in appropriate force when needed. At times of social crisis or natural disaster, whatever Arab NGO presence was on hand to help victims paled into insignificance against the contributions made by traditional organs of society, most of which are connected with Muslim or Christian institutions. If Arab NGOs are to surmount this dilemma, they must strive to attain a reasonable level of internal transparency and democracy, must respond more effectively to the most pressing causes of their societies and the most urgent needs of their people, and they must interact creatively with the traditional organs of society that have powerful communication networks and considerable material resources and which are deeply rooted in social and historical Arab soil and identified with Arab culture. At the same time, they should take greater advantage of opportunities to cooperate with government agencies in such activities as fighting poverty and unemployment, implementing development projects and improving the lives of the underprivileged and marginalised, but without forgetting their duty to keep up pressure on government to improve conditions of life in all social, political and economic domains. * The writer is director of the Middle East Research and Studies Centre, Cairo.
