اقرأ باللغة العربية The ongoing destruction in Syria declined this week, though not to a degree indicating the beginning of the end of the Syrian Civil War. The warplanes of the regime led by Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad are still flying, as are those of its Russian backers and of the US-led Coalition fighting the Islamic State (IS) group. Conflict continues within areas benefitting from temporary Russian-guaranteed ceasefires, and though the Russians say they are targeting terrorist fighters, 40 per cent of the victims are civilians and a quarter of those children. Talks have begun on ceasefire agreements in Ghouta outside Damascus and in the area south of Aleppo. The Russians are trying to escalate truce-making with Syrian opposition factions on behalf of the Syrian regime, apparently indifferent to what might result from the meetings in Riyadh to “unify” the opposition and pre-empt the Geneva meetings that UN envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura has now announced will be held in October. Postponing the eighth round of the Geneva Conference on Syria from September to October can be read in the same context as the current Russian drive. The decision may have been in response to a Russian request, since the Russians have the greatest influence on the Geneva Conference, the Americans having displayed indifference to the process for years. The Syrian opposition factions met in Riyadh, after the “Moscow” platform relinquished its refusal to attend. It seems likely that the opposition Higher Negotiations Committee (HNC) will now have to agree to incorporate the break-away “Moscow” and “Cairo” platforms into the delegation that will negotiate with the Syrian regime. This is despite the enormous differences between the “Moscow” platform and the “Cairo” platform and the HNC, especially in terms of their relative proximity to the Syrian regime and the aspirations of the Syrian Revolution. According to leaked information, documents on which the HNC had struck preliminary agreements with the two platforms will now be ratified. They reportedly avoid making any reference to the fate of Al-Assad, and nor do they address reforming the country's security agencies in the interim phase, instead deferring this to after the promulgation of a new constitution and the holding of elections. If these documents are ratified, the interim process will be under the supervision of the Syrian regime, and this will allow it to regain its former strength regardless of measures that might be taken in the interim phase. Syrian opposition sources told Al-Ahram Weekly that Moscow intends to put pressure on the regime in order to compel it to accept certain conditions in exchange for those accepted by the opposition. Moscow will then announce a compromise solution, agreed upon with the US administration, guaranteeing the political transition in Syria and also the survival of the state. Al-Assad will be stripped of effective power during the transitional period. The Russians maintain that a compromise is needed in order to ensure the safety of supporters and members of the regime. Some analysts believe that the Syrian regime is approaching victory in the civil conflict and that the Syrian Revolution is about to end. They point to the truce and ceasefire agreements signed with the Russians on behalf of the regime. These oblige the opposition to cease its recourse to arms, while not obliging the regime to do likewise, meaning that there is a stick to brandish against the opposition and nothing to deter the regime. They also cite statements by regime members suggesting that they are convinced that victory is at hand. The regime has been working to generate the impression that the conflict is almost over and that Syria has returned to something like the pre-2011 situation. A third factor has been the declining support for the opposition from regional powers, Turkey and Saudi Arabia above all. Turkey has reduced the support and assistance it gives to the Syrian opposition, even as the provisional government has announced it is unable to pay the salaries of its employees. Analysts also point to Saudi and Russian pressures to include the “Moscow” and “Cairo” platforms in the HNC delegation, indicating that the opposition will be compelled to make further concessions in the coming period. However, other factors suggest that the Syrian regime is a long way from victory in the civil war or even self-assurance or stability. The US is not party to any of the truce agreements, apart from the one in the south, which means that all the others remain delicate and subject to the vicissitudes of circumstances. Media statements made by regime officials are also simply variations on the hype the regime has attempted to market since the outset of the revolution. The country's media machine is at the service of the regime, and all Syrians are aware of the extent of its credibility. On the inclusion of the two other opposition platforms, the Syrian opposition and HNC still have the opportunity to place restrictions on the “Moscow” platform and limit its influence over the negotiations. Abdelilah Fahd, former secretary-general of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, believes that the three platforms will never agree on a single vision. The disparities that have emerged between the components of the HNC and the negotiating delegation are too great, he said. “There has been a clear decline in the HNC's performance for many reasons, the most important of which, apart from the disparities between the delegation's components, was the lack of a clear vision and a clear and systematic working plan,” he said. “After several rounds aimed at realising the Geneva declarations, one of the most important being the formation of an interim government body that exercises complete executive authority, de Mistura resorted to gathering the HNC delegation and the “Cairo” and “Moscow” platforms together in order to create a single delegation. He thought this an outstanding success… but in fact the platforms announced that the disparities between them were too great, with the fate of Al-Assad being the chief point of disagreement.” “Some components of the HNC held that Al-Assad had to go at the beginning of the interim phase, while the “Moscow” platform held that the subject should not be broached at all. The “Cairo” platform wants him to stay until the beginning of the interim phase. These contradictions do not bode well for the negotiations,” Fahd said. In view of the current international situation and the delicate military situation on the ground, the absence of a clear plan, whether Russian or UN-sponsored, for a political solution in Syria means there is still a huge quantity of work to be done to resolve the Syrian crisis. Russia needs to pressure the regime into making and abiding by major concessions, and the US needs to step in in order to ensure that the results are carried out. None of this can occur in the absence of a clearly formulated international agreement that meets the minimum requirements for the transition to pluralistic democratic government and at least a minimal level of transitional justice.
