Helmi Moussa traces the fault lines that threaten to tear Palestinian society apart Civil war in Palestine looks in danger of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Infighting between Fatah and Hamas is no longer confined to mutual recriminations and staged demonstrations but has escalated into street fighting with no-holds-barred. And as attempts to peacefully resolve outstanding problems between the two diametrically opposed Palestinian factions fail extremists on both sides have come to the fore. Unlike previous fights between Hamas and Fatah, which erupted spontaneously and were rapidly contained, this time round premeditation and deliberate incitement characterise the escalating conflict. Israel's insistence that Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA), stage his own Altalena moment, is undoubtedly a major factor in the escalation. A few weeks after the state of Israel was established the Altalena, a ship coming from France and carrying supporters and military arms for the Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL) faction, was sunk on the orders of David Ben Gurion in a bid to assert the Israel Defence Forces' monopoly over arms. The IZL brigades were disbanded shortly after. Now Abbas is being encouraged to adopt similar tactics. Asserting a monopoly over the use of arms had not been top of Fatah's agenda. Keen as the PA is on resolving conflicts with Israel peacefully, Fatah's leadership has been equally keen, especially since the outbreak of the Aqsa Intifada, not to resort to arms in resolving internal conflicts. The general mood among Palestinians until a few months ago was to resist the use of arms in settling internal disputes. But when, in an attempt to resolve internal strife between the PA and the resistance movement in general, Abbas appealed to the ballot box he failed to anticipate the outcome. He had assumed that once Hamas was allowed to become part of the PA it would abide by the agreements that created the authority and that when the elections were over the Palestinian Legislative Council would automatically sanction the monopoly of a single authority over the use of arms. The landslide victory won by Hamas in the January parliamentary elections surprised everybody, including the movement's leaders. The results allowed for the creation of a two-headed authority with two clashing legitimacies. From that moment on the Palestinians were caught in a whirlwind of regional and international pressures that overpowered the nascent PA which had, from the moment it came into existence, lacked any vestige of power on which to fall back. The election result provided the Israelis with a pretext for the collective punishment of the Palestinians and the newly-elected Hamas government fell prey to severe pressure applied by the international community. The Palestinian Prisoners' National Conciliation Document, first adopted by Palestinian prisoners held by Israel (including members of Hamas and Fatah) in spring 2006 and then revised following several rounds of national dialogue, was supposed to provide an exit strategy from the vicious circle engulfing the PA. The document attempted to engineer a major change in the political scene by reforming the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in a way that would allow it to play a key role in uniting Palestinian factions. For this to work, though, a revised political programme was needed, together with the reallocation of the factions' quotas on the basis of proportional representation and no real effort was exerted in either direction. Rather than attempt conciliation within a reformed PLO Fatah and Hamas entrenched themselves in long-held positions, with Fatah refusing to give up any of the powers it enjoyed and Hamas unwilling to make the required political concessions. It was an impasse from which extremists on both sides benefited. There has long been a wing in Fatah opposed to cooperating with Hamas, believing that the more the crisis intensifies the better it will discredit Hamas in the eyes of the Palestinians. It was this wing that incited security forces loyal to Fatah not to cooperate with the newly-elected government and acted to ensure that the initial agreement between President Abbas of Fatah and the Hamas Prime Minister, Ismail Haniya, to form a national unity government, was still-born. And it is this wing that is now exploiting the government's inability to pay salaries to encourage the security forces to take to the streets. Hamas also has an extremist wing that cares for little beyond its narrow interests. It believes that after being elected by the Palestinian people Hamas has acquired the legitimacy necessary to implement its entire political programme and assumes that the movement has the authority on the ground to do just that. When more moderate elements in Hamas called for a national unity government following the elections the extremists refused. They formed the "executive force" from among Hamas militia and insisted on deploying the militia by force. They are the ones obstructing the formation of a unity government, refusing to abide by the Beirut Arab initiative. In the past week they have insisted on confronting the "saboteurs" within the security forces. For the time being the two groups are locked in a bloody struggle with recriminations abounding on both sides. Fatah extremists accuse Hamas of serving Iranian and Syrian interests. Hamas extremists accuse Fatah of serving US-Israeli interests, leaving moderates on both sides engaged in a last ditch attempt to form a national unity government. Yet even if such a government arises it will not, many now believe, offer a way out of a conflict the roots of which are to be found in two clashing visions of legitimacy within the PA. To end the dichotomy some have proposed the dissolution of parliament followed by new parliamentary and presidential elections. While Hamas is unlikely to agree to new general elections some of its more moderate members are now considering another option: accepting a national unity government in which Hamas holds only a few portfolios. Maintaining its parliamentary majority Hamas would then be able to influence the government without leading it. Whatever the eventual solution to the crisis one thing is certain -- in meantime yet more Palestinian blood will be shed.
