“If [Trump's] policies match his campaign rhetoric, Israelis, with time, will grow to like him. American Jews, meanwhile, will seethe,” writes Shmuel Rosner in the The New York Times of 12 November. His column appears beneath the title, “How Donald Trump Will Divide American and Israeli Jews.” Historically, the majority of American Jews have tended to vote Democrat. Also, historically, the US's positions towards Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict have not been affected by the change of administration from Democratic to Republican and visa versa. Vice-President Joe Biden confirmed this in his address to the World Jewish Congress — a gathering of representatives of Jewish communities from more than a 100 countries that was held in New York on 10 November. He reassured his audience that the US support for Israel is constant because it is not contingent on the identity of the US administration. US commitment to Israel is solid because of shared values and interests and because of the continual support of Congress and, more importantly, because of the constant support of the American people for the US commitment to the protection of the security of Israel. The voting behaviour of American Jews has not differed much from their record in terms of their support for the Democratic candidate. About 71 per cent of Jewish voters voted for Clinton as opposed to 26 per cent for Trump. In addition, less than 10 per cent of Jews said that the first issue of concern in determining their choice was the candidates' (Trump's and Clinton's) stances on Israel. In addition, Clinton and Trump did not differ in their statements regarding conventional pledges to protect Israeli security, with the exception that Clinton vowed to defend the nuclear deal with Iran whereas Trump vowed to abolish it the moment he became president. As for the Jews who supported Trump, they probably feel that the pledges he made with regard to moving the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem and abolishing the nuclear accord with Iran are unlikely to come true. All US presidents since 1995 have pledged to move the embassy and all, from Democratic Bill Clinton to Republican George Bush Jr to Obama, have used their authorities to defer implementation of the decision which is brought up again for discussion every six months. The sense of anticipation heightens when we turn to Trump's possible handling of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. In a letter he sent to the World Jewish Congress, he expressed his hope that his administration could contribute to ending, once and for all, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Could Trump succeed where his predecessors failed? Could his administration offer something new that would satisfy both the Palestinians and the Israelis and convince them to reach a lasting agreement? Nothing in his or his campaign team's statements indicates that they have worked out a strategy or a plan of action on this front. However, from his remarks on US foreign policy in general we can derive some broad outlines we can build on. Trump, as he indicated in his speeches, believes in reducing the costs of the pursuit of US foreign interests abroad. He wants to shift a large portion of the burden onto the US's allies and, therefore, he may try to boost the role of a number of countries that he believes could handle the task. Towards that end he would grant them greater freedom in implementing their policy visions as long as these largely coincide with US interests. At the same time, he would back them politically and tone down the criticisms that Washington generally levels against them with regard to human rights violations, as a reward for doing what is required. Specifically, Israel, where Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed how happy he was at the victory of Trump, who he described as his and Israel's closest friend, believes that the Trump administration can use the security challenges that many Arab countries face due to jihadist and militant Salafi terrorism as a bargaining chip. Trump would offer US political support for those governments in their battle against terrorism and, in exchange, those governments would exert greater efforts to persuade the Palestinians to accept Israel's ideas for a lasting solution to its conflict with the Palestinians. Many observers believe that Saudi Arabia will be keen to use its political and financial influence with the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah and with Hamas in Gaza to compel the Palestinians to lower the threshold of their demands from Israel in order to end the decades-old conflict if, in exchange, Trump supports Riyadh in its battle against the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA). At the same time, the Gulf countries as a whole, which fear the spread of Iranian influence in the region, take Trump's hostile anti-Iranian rhetoric and his pledge to abolish the nuclear deal as a good sign that there will be warmer cooperation between them and Washington in the future. Even if Trump fails to come through on this pledge, he will exert enormous pressure on Tehran in order to compel it to change its policy in the Middle East and reduce the level of its interventions in many hotspots such as Yemen, Syria and, more importantly here, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The same applies to Egypt which has been subjected to mounting US and European pressures in recent years in order to compel it to re-assimilate the terrorist Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian political life. Trump has vowed precisely the opposite: To support the Egyptian government in its battle against terrorism. Some observers have interpreted this pledge as a sign that Trump may approve the inclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood on the US's list of terrorist organisations. But even if he does not do that, he is certain to be less stringent than Obama in linking Egypt's position towards political Islam with levels of US economic and military aid to Egypt. In all events, Cairo, which is uneasy with the continuation of Hamas rule in Gaza and which, together with the Gulf countries, is working to pave the way for a suitable alternative to PA President Mahmoud Abbas, could be highly instrumental in stimulating the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Indeed, Egypt could shoulder the largest share of the burden towards this end, sparing Washington the need to intervene directly in the process, which is precisely what Trump wants in the forthcoming phase. ISRAEL DOES NOT FEAR TRUMP, BUT FEARS THE DIVISION OF JEWS: Israel has little to fear from the policy that Trump is likely to follow with regard to a settlement with the Palestinians, but it is very concerned by the mounting division within Israel between supporters and opponents of Netanyahu and by the spread of this division to the Jewish community in the US. The US-based political advocacy organisation J Street has played a prominent role in the demonstrations and other activities protesting Israeli policies towards the Palestinians. The organisation, which is managed by a group of young American Jews, has adopted a slogan that may seem confusing. Its Website states that it is “pro-Israel” and “pro-peace and democracy”. In fact, it is not at all sympathetic with the Israel that is being led by Netanyahu. It believes that Israel must accept the two-state solution and prepare itself for peaceful coexistence with the Palestinians because this is the only way to secure the survival of the Jewish state as a homeland for Jews around the world, as the founding fathers of the Zionist movement envisioned. The Israeli right, however, accuses J Street of being anti-Israel. It also maintains that the organisation is undermining the cohesion of US Jews and their unified support for Israel that had enabled the Jewish lobby in the US to have such considerable influence on US foreign policy up to now. Some American academics support this view and have lashed out at J Street. A notable example is Harvard Law School professor Alan Dershowitz who, in remarks posted online in April 2014, said that he had read all the statements J Street had issued since it was founded and that he found it strange that the organisation calls itself pro-Israeli when it has never once said anything positive about any aspect of Israeli policy. Ultimately, Trump's entry into the White House combined with a largely critical media and the likelihood of continued anti-Trump protests from the US left will disturb Israel greatly. There is no clear demarcation between the movement of Jewish youths opposed to Israeli policies and the youth protest movements in the US in general. As greater numbers of US Jews join the protest movements against the Trump administration and against Israel, large and irremediable rifts will arise, creating an environment unfavourable to the activities of the pro-Israeli lobby, AIPAC. This, in turn, could sap Israel's ability to protect its interests in the US and perhaps the world as a whole.
