In a meeting with representatives of diverse segments of society on 20 April, President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi addressed various dimensions of the current situation in Egypt. Among his prime concerns were the repercussions of the Egyptian-Saudi maritime border agreement. In an article in Al-Ahram last Thursday he was quoted as saying: “The subject of the exchanges of communications between the two countries was not publicised so as not to harm public opinion in these two countries.” He continued: “If we had put this question into public circulation eight months ago, this would have had repercussions on Egyptian-Saudi relations ... I hope you don't think that the way [the media] handled the Renaissance Dam question served our interests. You, my fellow Egyptians, do not realise the consequence of that circulation without limitations or restraints, because through it you harm yourselves and your country.” The president appealed to all to put the subject of the two islands to rest as the matter is now with parliament, which is to form committees to study the various aspects of the agreement preparatory to a vote on whether or not to ratify it. All those who have had the honour to meet with the president agree that he listens attentively to other people's views and is open to hearing opposing views. I would therefore like to ask his permission to discuss some of those views. One has to grant that negotiations, especially on sensitive issues — and, above all, matters pertaining to questions of sovereignty — require a high degree of secrecy. Negotiations by their very nature imply that the positions of the negotiating parties can change, hardening or softening, depending on the degree of flexibility or rigidity negotiators feel they must show at any given stage. If all the details of a negotiating process were exposed to the general public, which naturally applauds when its government is “tough” and boos when the government makes concessions, which is seen as being “weak”, this would hamper the negotiators and their prospects of reaching an agreement. This is why we often find not only that the details of negotiations are kept highly confidential but also that the negotiating teams themselves are sometimes sequestered in some secluded spot, far away from the public eye. However, ensuring the secrecy of negotiations and preventing public access to the specifics concerned is one thing, and not informing the public that negotiations are in progress on an issue of concern is another. I believe that the reactions to the maritime border agreement had less to do with opposition to its substance than to the fact that the people had not even known that there was an issue between the two countries in the first place. To clarify my point, let's take Anwar Al-Sadat's initiative to visit Jerusalem. I realise that the context is totally different as Sadat was heading off to visit an implacable enemy whereas in the current case we are dealing with a solid friendship between two countries and peoples. However, I still believe that this comparison is useful. When Sadat announced his initiative it was welcomed by some and opposed by others. Then, as the steps followed, public opinion kept track with varying degrees of optimism or despair. More importantly, when difficulties arose public opinion proved the best support for Egypt's representatives, as was famously demonstrated when our foreign minister at the time, Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, rebuffed a particularly arrogant remark by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, defending Egyptian dignity and earning himself the cheers of the Egyptian people and praise from Sadat. I repeat: the context is radically different. However, I believe this example illustrates that it is not a bad thing when the public is able to follow the progress of a negotiating process, even on sensitive matters, on the condition that accurate information is available and a healthy media environment exists in order to ensure a proper understanding of the issues and an aware and supportive public opinion. Two factors were largely responsible for angry reactions to the announcement of the Egyptian-Saudi maritime border agreement: the shock of the surprise and the fact that the general public had no idea that the subject had been under discussion between the two countries to begin with. Only a handful of historians, geographers, political scientists and experts in the military sciences would have had some knowledge of the subject. Perhaps this explains the absence of a scientific approach in much of the impassioned discussion that took place and the lack of willingness on the part of many parties to listen to opposing views, despite the fact that in such sensitive issues no one should presume that he holds a monopoly on the truth. To illustrate my point, in a previous article on this subject I indicated that I favoured the opinion of Judge Tahani Al-Gabali that the matter should be brought to the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) for a ruling regarding a plebiscite. Since then, however, an eminent professor of constitutional law, Salah Fawzy, has explained to me that the SCC is not the appropriate judicial body to turn to in this case. He suggested that under the law pertaining to the Council of State it was possible to instead solicit the opinion of the fatwa and legislation departments of this judicial body. He stressed that this opinion would not be binding, although it would carry considerable moral weight. This brings me to a second point on which I disagree with the president: his appeal to the people to stop speaking about the subject of the two islands. Such an appeal is unachievable for a very simple reason. While sensible people might agree, troublemakers will persist in stirring doubts and suspicions. So why leave the field open only to those with malicious intent and prevent rational-minded people from airing their reasoning and arguments? Moreover, why deprive our parliamentary representatives of a source of objective views that they need in order to take as credible a decision as possible? With regard to the example of the Renaissance Dam that the president cited, I am aware of the possibility of the type of damage he mentioned. A member of the Egyptian negotiating delegation involved in those talks told me that the unrestrained and irresponsible handling of the subject by the media undermined the Egyptian negotiating position on more than one occasion. Nevertheless, this should not be taken to mean that experts and informed persons should not have a say, or that the general public should be deprived the right to voice its concerns on such vital matters. Nor should such views and opinions be automatically construed as an expression of a lack of confidence in the officials charged with defending and advancing Egyptian interests. The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.