King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz is currently being hosted by Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi in the Saudi monarch's first visit to Egypt since succeeding the late King Abdullah. Over the long history of Egyptian-Saudi relations, which have swung between extreme tension and the closest degrees of cooperation, Cairo and Riyadh have always taken pains to sustain a minimum degree of communication and coordination at all times, even under the most stressful circumstances. Therefore, this visit, like all previous visits of this kind, will probably conclude with a statement that it “succeeded in boosting cooperation between the two countries in the various fields”. Perhaps, too, during the visit some “protocols” will be signed, outlining or detailing the various aspects of this cooperation. However, statements of this sort will not elevate Egyptian-Saudi bilateral relations to a level commensurate to the challenges that both countries face at a time of momentous and perilous changes taking place in this region at an exceptional moment in its history. King Salman believes that his country faces an existential threat from Iran, which is surrounding it from the south, via the Yemeni portal, and from the north via Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. As the Saudi monarch realises the crucial role that Egypt can play in the face of this threat, he hopes his visit will yield a clearer Egyptian understanding of the bases of Saudi security, and a stronger Egyptian response to his requests. Although Egypt is currently a member of two Saudi-led military coalitions the “Arab” and the “Islamic” coalitions Saudi Arabia appears dissatisfied with the level of Egyptian involvement, which is limited to a few naval vessels near the Bab Al-Mandeb and the participation of some combat regiments in military manoeuvres and exercises with other member countries. Recent media reports have indicated that a large gap separates Cairo and Riyadh's positions on how to resolve the crises in the region, especially those in Syria and Yemen. President Al-Sisi, for his part, is besieged by several threats at home and abroad: an economic crisis which could precipitate widespread turmoil; the danger of the spread of Daesh (the Islamic State group) into Sinai in the east and Libya to the west; and the ongoing crisis surrounding Ethiopia's construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam to the south. As Al-Sisi realises the crucial role that Saudi Arabia can play in remedying these crises, he hopes that his Saudi guest will come away with a clearer understanding of the bases of Egyptian security, yielding a stronger Saudi response to Egyptian needs. While the Egyptian president is deeply grateful to the role that the late King Abdullah played in support of the Egyptian people's revolution against Muslim Brotherhood rule, many reports in the press indicate that Saudi policy towards Egypt as shifted significantly since King Abdullah passed away. Of particular concern is that Saudi rapprochement with Qatar and increasingly closer ties with Turkey may come at Egypt's expense and diminish its influence with Riyadh. Both the king and the president are therefore keen to dispel any misunderstandings, rebuild trust between the two countries and arrive at a formula for bilateral relations that responds to the needs and interests of both sides and boosts cooperation to a level commensurate to the nature of present challenges. Most political and intellectual circles in both countries, and regardless their particular outlooks, are aware of the importance of the Egyptian-Saudi relationship and the urgent need to develop it qualitatively. However, there are two conflicting approaches on how to attain the best formula for this. The first holds that Egypt and Saudi Arabia have two different socio-political systems and that their relationship should be shaped on a purely bilateral basis in accordance with their respective views on how each side can serve the other's particular needs and interests. Accordingly, and proceeding from the premise that Saudi Arabia needs Egypt as much as Egypt needs Saudi Arabia, the two sides should manage their relationship on the basis of the notions of “bargaining”, “mutual benefit”, “reciprocity”, and “give and take”, etc. I strongly disagree with this outlook for several reasons. Firstly, it takes a narrow view of the interests of the ruling regimes in both countries and, therefore, may not necessarily serve the best interests of the two peoples or the Arab nation as a whole. Secondly, it is more in the nature of a palliative rather than a remedy to chronic and intractable ailments. Thirdly, it has been tried frequently, on the grounds that it is the most commonly applied practice. However, the fruit has often been bitter and, indeed, it largely accounts for the current state of deterioration in the Arab region. The second approach sees Egypt and Saudi Arabia as the backbone of a regional order that is currently in critical shape and needs a major boost that can only be produced by a strategic alliance between the two countries. As no country, on its own, however strong it is, can save itself from the predicament of the Arab world as a whole, a sense of national and Arab nation responsibility should compel both Egypt and Saudi Arabia to forge their bilateral relations in accordance with the needs and requirements of Arab national security first and foremost. This is the perspective that I believe should prevail during the meeting between King Salman and President Al-Sisi. The impartial observer requires little proof to demonstrate that the Arab regional order has lost all cohesion and is on its last legs. Sudan has already split into two separate states and appears on the verge of fragmenting further. Numerous Arab countries Somalia, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen are mired in civil wars and appear unlikely to emerge as unified as before. Some regions in these countries are already exercising autonomous rule and international powers have begun to speak openly and officially of federal systems as a possible solution to some of the current crises. As for the remaining Arab countries that have retained their unified central authority, such as Egypt, the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, they are victims of terrorist attacks that threaten to wreak a level of attrition that could eventually reduce them to failed or semi-failed states. As the Arab region is surrounded by three powerful states Iran, Turkey and Israel that are vying, each in their own way, to inherit the greatest chunk of the legacy of this region, we need to address the following question: Can Egypt and Saudi Arabia forge a strategic relationship capable of preventing the collapse of the Arab regional order and the partition of its spoils between those three regional powers? It is perfectly natural that Arab countries, due to their different geopolitical circumstances, should have differing views on the sources of threat to their national security. While some countries overlooking the Gulf consider Iran as their chief source of threat, to the Palestinians, Israel is the chief threat, as it is Israel, not Iran, which is occupying their land. By the same token, the vast majority of the Egyptian people believe that the Ethiopian decision to proceed with the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam without proper consultation or coordination in advance poses an existential threat. Other Arab peoples might see such fears as exaggerated. The solution to this dilemma is to take every main source of threat to any one Arab nation as a source of threat to Arab national security as a whole. Then, the institutions for joint Arab action would order the priorities and mobilise the resources necessary to respond to each source of threat in accordance with the agreed upon priorities and within the scope of available resources. As the Arab League seems no longer capable of performing its functions in the defence of Arab national security, the only alternative is to strike a new formula for an Egyptian-Saudi relationship that will enable them to work together to reinvigorate the Arab regional order. For this to occur, the meeting between King Salman and President Al-Sisi will hopefully produce the following: - The formulation of a common vision of the nature of the required settlements to the crises in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Palestine, as well as the Renaissance Dam crisis. - Action to unify the Arab position behind this vision through a coordinated and effective political and diplomatic drive. - Communications with all international and regional stakeholders in these crises in order to lead them to act in a manner that promotes the success of efforts to reach the required settlements. - Efforts to seek a way to serious and profound dialogue with Iran and Turkey, which constitute an Islamic depth that should not be mismanaged. - A drive to enable the Arabs to regain the initiative in handling the Palestinian cause in its capacity as the chief Arab cause. - Re-adjust the relationship between religion and the state in the Islamic world through a coordinated reform drive between Al-Azhar and the Wahhabi school so as to promote the unity of the Islamic world and eliminate the roots of sectarian strife and religious extremism. This vision may seem unrealistic. However, if political leaders do not do all in their power to realise it, the Arab order will continue its slide towards a bottomless chasm. The writer is a professor of political science, Cairo University.
