Hassan Nafaa* finds more than one sub-text in the Baker-Hamilton report From an American point of view, the report prepared by the Iraq Study Group (ISG), led by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, is serious, sound and non-partisan. It reflects a clear awareness of the nature of its mission. The seriousness of the report is illustrated by the composition of the ISG, the reservoir of experience drawn upon, the methodology of the case study and the final report. The ISG included 10 venerable political figures, half from the Republican Party and half from the Democratic Party. Their professional backgrounds and experience were appropriate for the sensitive and complex job at hand. The group also made use of four research teams of 12 specialists each in economics and development, military affairs and security, political development and strategy as well as a consultative higher military committee that included five senior military commanders. The ISG chose an approach suited to its assigned task, defined by the group as: to diagnose the current situation in Iraq from various angles; to study the probable consequences of maintaining current policies, and to offer proposals to escape from the current dilemma. The ISG sought to meet everyone with direct or indirect links or knowledge about events in Iraq. On the American side the ISG met current officials, including President George Bush, his vice- president, his secretary of defence and secretary of state, as well as several former officials such as Clinton, Carter, Kissinger, current and former congressmen and specialists in various relevant institutions. On the Iraqi side the group met members of state, the government, parliament, representatives of various parties and religious figures, including Muqtada Al-Sadr. The ISG also arranged interviews with several ministers, ambassadors and envoys from countries neighbouring Iraq in Washington and New York. These included Syrian and Iranian officials, senior officials from the superpowers and the UN, meeting Kofi Annan himself. At the same time, the content and language of the report reflect a keen awareness of the magnitude of the dilemma facing the US, or rather the dilemma created by the current US administration. However, the ISG realised it was acting more as a research group assigned to examine ways to extract the country from the quagmire in which it now finds itself rather than a political or legal fact-finding investigative commission focussed on assigning responsibility and blame. As such, the group avoided petty infighting and political extortion, concentrating its efforts on diagnosing the situation and finding ways of moving forward. Since the report contains no references to opinions or controversial issues, even among the members of the group or the specialist committees, and no reference to attitudes or outlooks adopted by a majority or a minority, it can be taken as an expression of the common ground uniting the two major parties. It can thus be seen as reflecting the pulse of American society at a moment of crisis. Herein lies the significance of the ISG report. When a report written in this spirit confirms that the situation in Iraq is very bad, and may in fact grow worse if current policies continue, and states that overcoming the crisis requires a fundamental policy change, it will be very difficult for the current administration, despite its obstinacy, to challenge the report's conclusions or its credibility. Despite the severe criticisms it has faced, no one can deny that the Baker-Hamilton report revolves around American motives and interests. It has only one objective: maintaining and defending US interests. The report is divided into two major sections. The first addresses the study and assesses the current security, political, and economic situation, as well as the international community's stance. It concludes that the situation is deteriorating. It then examines the consequences of this deterioration in light of several possible scenarios: a speedy withdrawal from Iraq, maintaining the status quo, increasing troop levels in Iraq, or dividing Iraq into three federal regions. The first part of the report rules out all these choices because of the possible negative impact on the status, reputation and interests of the US, as well as the implications for stability across the region. The second part of the report outlines the features of a new policy based on two pillars: external, aimed at building a new international consensus and creating a new international mechanism to support Iraq through what the report calls "a large diplomatic offensive", and internal, aimed at helping Iraq help itself. The report contains 78 recommendations; it recognises that none of them can offer a magical solution, but they might, if implemented fully, in good faith, and without biased selectivity, open the door for a way out of the difficult, dangerous crisis. The integrity of the policy advocated by the report is illustrated in its explicit demand that the US administration start convincing the world that the US is not after Iraqi oil and does not intend to establish any permanent military bases against the will of the Iraqi people. This is an indispensable condition for the success of the "new diplomatic offensive". Some have noted that the report adds nothing new to what is known about the situation in Iraq, that it will not shake the convictions of the public and has remained silent on important issues. These criticisms may be partially, or wholly, correct but the intelligent, inspired way in which the report selects, presents, and classifies information allows us to read between the lines; in turn, it is able to contain both the overview and detail without great distortion, even if from an American point of view. For example, although in estimating casualties the report relies on official numbers and makes no mention of losses in the ranks of private security firms, at the same time it is careful to note the high proportion of disabled and severely injured among the total of 21,000 American injuries in Iraq. In estimating the costs of the war, the report seems to depend on academic studies that official sources had described as excessive or exaggerated. The report states that American military expenditures on the war in Iraq have reached $400 billion so far, and that some $8 billion is spent on the war every month, bringing the total costs of the war to $2 trillion. When the report notes that the budget of the Iraqi Defence Ministry this year did not exceed $3 billion, it is also pointing out this is less than what is spent by American forces in two weeks in Iraq. In turn, this highlights the serious structural flaws in the situation in Iraq more than three years after the invasion. In my opinion, the two most import conclusions of the report, explicit or implicit, are: that the US, which unilaterally launched the war on Iraq, is incapable of extricating itself or resolving the situation alone and that the problems of the Middle East are related; i.e., the US will not be able to find an honourable way out if it does not address these problems simultaneously, particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Lebanese crisis. Nevertheless, while the recommendations proposed by the report may theoretically provide a graceful exit for the US, actually implementing the recommendations is something else entirely. The gap here is so great that many recommendations seem to reflect an unrealisable utopianism. The reason for the gap may be that the report abstained from examining the real reasons for America's fall into the Iraqi quagmire, or identifying those responsible for the deterioration and the parties that benefit from it. If the report had addressed these issues, it would have found that implementing its recommendations depends on the good intentions of the very same parties that have caused a catastrophe, benefited from it, and have an interest in seeing it continue. As such, I expect the Baker-Hamilton recommendations will face public and private objections and will meet fierce resistance from three parties: the Bush administration in Washington, the Maliki- Talabani regime in Baghdad, and the Olmert government in Tel Aviv. Implementing the Baker-Hamilton recommendations in good faith requires the Bush administration to adopt pragmatic policies that conflict with its moral system; this will not be so easy for an administration that thinks dogmatically. For example, it is hard to imagine Bush being convinced -- and in good faith -- that he should offer incentives to Iran, which in his moral universe is a pillar of the axis of evil, to encourage it to cooperate in finding an honourable way out of his dilemma in Iraq. It is no surprise that President Bush responded selectively and unenthusiastically to the ISG's recommendations. His response was so ambivalent that Baker was led to remark that the recommendations were not "a fruit salad" from which he could pick and choose. It is also doubtful that Bush possesses the flexibility and pragmatism to open up to Syria, Iraqi resistance groups, or even Palestinian groups that recognise Israel in order to offer them sufficient incentives to cooperate in resolving the region's problems, as the report recommends. The stick, not the carrot, is still Bush's preferred option in dealing with these parties. Implementing the resolutions in good faith also requires the current Iraqi government to take measures or offer guarantees which I do not believe are possible, even if the will is there. These are parties that came to Iraq on the back of American tanks and achieved power through ballot boxes protected by these tanks. Perhaps some of them, particularly the Kurds, believe they have become strong enough to say no to their American master. The report contains sections on Kirkuk and the distribution of oil revenues that will not please the Kurds. Similarly, there are sections on Shia militias as a source of violence and corruption that will not please the Shia-dominated government. Finally, implementing the recommendations requires Israeli Prime Minister Olmert to evince a real readiness to make peace with Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese. This is the biggest obstacle. After playing a pivotal role in dragging the US into war in Iraq and plunging the region into chaos to allow it to resolve its problems on its own terms, Israel will not cooperate to reverse the situation. * The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
