Regardless of the change of ideology and political system, Russian foreign policy, in the Middle East in particular, as it has developed since 2000 under Vladimir Putin, is a kind of continuation of Soviet policy. Russia's role as a major power and its interest in this strategic region is being asserted. When President Putin assumed power in 2000 he was determined to rebuild the Russian economy and military power, to restore Russia's role in the world system and international relations. To be sure, he acknowledged that the Cold War was over. He even extended a hand of cooperation to the US and Europe. In this framework, Putin worked to assert respect for Russia's role and interests. This policy developed into a call for a multipolar world order, opposing the hegemony of one power. To develop this concept Russia started to build multilateral relations with emerging regional powers (particularly China and Brazil, with which Russia established BRICS as an emerging world power). It is in this broader international milieu that we can understand Russia's policy towards the Middle East. Today, Russia's engagement in the Middle East seems clear in four issues: Iran, Syria, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the evolving Arab uprising since 2011 with the rise of radical Islamic groups in the Middle East. As for Iran, Russia supported Iran's right to possess a nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes, refusing to impose economic sanctions on Iran. However, Russia's cooperated within the P5+1 group to reach an acceptable final agreement on Iran's nuclear programme. Russia's policy towards the Syrian conflict seems its most assertive since the Ukrainian crisis. From the beginning it supported the Bashar Al-Assad regime diplomatically and militarily, claiming that Syria's future must be decided by the Syrian people. Russia's position towards the Syrian crisis seemed influenced by NATO's intervention in Libya, as Russia believed it was deceived and would not repeat this mistake. The recent Russian escalation in Syria strongly indicates Russia's involvement in Middle East politics. The Russian move also has implications on international relations. Regionally, Russia's involvement in Syria was seen by a number of powers, particularly Saudi Arabia, as support for the Syrian regime, which they believe has no role in the future of Syria. Internationally, the US administration in particular believed Russian escalation was a mistake and would further complicate the crisis. It remains to be seen whether Russian involvement will succeed in defeating the Islamic State (IS) group, or was intended to bolster the Syrian regime. In this context we have to mention the latest development, when Russia recalled Al-Assad to Moscow on 21 October. According to a Russian statement: “On the question of settlement in Syria, our position is that positive results in military operations will lay the base for then working out a long-term settlement based on a political process that involves all political forces, ethnic and religious groups. Ultimately, it is the Syrian people alone who must have the deciding voice here.” As one of a number of Russian concerns in Syria, it is indicative that Putin said, “There are more than 2,000 fighters from Russia and ex-Soviet republics in the territory of Syria. There is a threat of their return to Russia.” Putin added: “This the most important thing that encouraged us to provide assistance to Al-Assad.” On the broader international level, a Newsweek magazine article argued that Putin's move was related to the Ukraine crisis more than to the Middle East. Further, Henry Kissinger, in an article in The Wall Street Journal, called for a new American strategy in the Middle East. He said that the Russian move in Syria was one of the impacts of the deterioration in the US role in establishing stability in the Middle East. However, Russia coupled its support to the Syrian regime with political efforts to build national consensus by inviting opposition powers to meet with representatives of the regime. Objectively, Russia partnered its military move with a diplomatic process, assuring Al-Assad in turn that Russian military support would be tied to a political process that includes all Syrian fractions. As for the Palestinian issue, while Russia is keeping and even developing its relations with Israel, Russia is firm in supporting the right of the Palestinian people to establish a national state within June 1967 borders. Russia's role in the peace process developed within the International Quartet, a formula restricted by the mobilising role of the US, which explains Russia's early call to convene an international conference to determine the basis of a settlement. However, some analysts argue that Russia does not exert serious efforts towards convincing Israel to stop its settler-colonial behaviour against the Palestinians, or towards kick-starting a meaningful peace process. On the contrary, as Netanyahu's recent visit to Moscow indicated, Russia is engaging Israel in the war against terrorism. Within the broader Middle East, the Gulf region looms large as an influential petroleum, economic, trade and financial partner in Russia's Middle East strategy. The substantial agreements, including on nuclear cooperation, reached during the visit of Prince Mohamed bin Salman to St Petersburg in June 2015 are indicative of Russia's keenness to develop its relations with Gulf countries. As for Egypt, following 30 June 2013, Cairo adopted a new strategy of expanding its international relations. In practice, Russia was the first destination. Similarly, Saudi Arabia, after agreement was reached between Iran and the US amid Saudi doubts, sought also to expand its international relations, starting with Russia. But the new Russian-Saudi relations were not without differences, the most recent with Russia's escalation in Syria, which the Saudis regarded as being in support of Al-Assad. Hence the visit of Prince Mohamed bin Salman to Moscow to discuss and contain this difference. At the same time, Putin said that he agreed with a number of countries in the region — including Saudi Arabia — on the need to combat terrorism. Regarding the Arab uprisings since 2011, Russia's initial response was sceptical, particularly when political Islamic groups started to dominate the scene. The rise of political Islamist groups raised the concern of Russia on the impact of this on Muslims in its environs. Russia's response towards the 30 June Revolution in Egypt represented a qualitative change. From the beginning Russia's political leadership supported the aspirations of the Egyptian people, contrary to the negative and hostile response of the US. This explains major developments in relations between Egypt and Russia, reflected in high-level visits, including the two presidents, which produced agreements on cooperation in areas vital to the two countries. The August 2015 summit in Moscow between presidents Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi and Putin was the fifth meeting between the two presidents. This is the first time in Russia's foreign policy to convene five summits within a year. It is known in the international relations that summits represent a culmination of relations between two countries, particularly on critical regional or international issues.
On bilateral relations, the summit reviewed what has been achieved from prior agreements and summits. On regional issues, the summit came at a critical time, particularly in the context of the Syrian crisis and combatting IS. It was not surprising that Egypt expressed understanding of the Russian move in Syria, expecting that it would contribute to defeating IS. Egyptian relations with Russia, as they have developed since 30 June 2013, represent a model of relations between a major power and a regional power based on mutual respect and mutual interest. The writer is former Egyptian ambassador and member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
