Iraq's Shia insist that they seek only proportional power, and are not Iranian stooges, writes Salah Hemeid Twice this month, the phrase "cultural extension" popped up in final statements of two key Arab organisations -- the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council -- in clear reference to what many regard as growing Iranian-Shia influence in Iraq. It wasn't the first time Arabs expressed concern about the Shia revival that followed the 2003 war that toppled Saddam Hussein. Two years ago, Jordan's King Abdullah warned of a rising Shia "crescent" extending from Iran to Lebanon. In April, in another surprisingly frank warning, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said Shias in Iraq and across the Middle East are more loyal to Iran than to their own countries. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states issued similar warnings, though in more subtle ways. Arab nations appear increasingly worried about Iranian influence in Iraq and the possibility that the situation there will stir up Shias across the entire Middle East. This mistrust emerged immediately after the end of Saddam's rule as along with it the monopoly of minority Sunni Arabs over Iraq's governing structures, held since 1638 when Sunni Ottoman Turks captured Iraq and incorporated it into their empire. The empowerment of Shias has sent shivers across the region, raising fears of a region- wide Sunni-Shia split that Arabs would be powerless to control and which could greatly benefit Iran. While Arab governments have mostly expressed their alarm in diplomatic language, some religious Sunni quarters have been much more direct. Earlier this month more than 30 prominent Saudi Islamic clerics called on Sunni Muslims around the Middle East to support their brethren in Iraq against Shias. The clerics said: "what has been taken by force can only be regained by force," a clear reference to increasing Shia control of Iraq. Saudi newspapers are full of articles that denounce what they call "Shia hegemony" in Iraq and the rising Iranian influence on the region. Meanwhile, reports in Arab media suggest that Shia money is being used to convert Sunnis into Shiism in several countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Morocco. In Iraq itself, while Sunni political leaders such Adnan Al-Dulaimi and Harith Al-Dhari have been vociferous in criticising the Shia- controlled government, more radical Sunni groups have been calling for jihad, or Islamic holy war against Shias. On 18 December an Al-Qaeda-linked coalition urged Sunni Arab and Kurdish tribes in Iraq and around the region to fight Iraq's Shia Muslims, denouncing Sunnis who cooperate with the Baghdad government. The appeal appeared as designed to rally Sunni Iraqis against Shias. "Chop off their heads, spill their blood, set fire to the ground under their feet and let the sky rain bombs on their heads. God is victorious, but the crusaders, Shias and renegades are unaware of that," the statement said. Sunnis both inside Iraq and across the region claim that Iran is meddling not only in Iraq. They point to expanded influence also in Lebanon, where Iran backs Hizbullah. Some Arabs have been talking about a "Shia International" in the making, which would lead a "domino" effect energising Shia communities in other countries. Still others talk about an American-Zionist- Iranian alliance aimed at weakening, and later controlling, the Sunni dominated Arab world. Sectarian strife and suspicion in Iraq has profoundly changed the Middle East. Since the removal of the Baathist regime, social and political tensions increased, including sectarian killings, though it is widely believed that the bomb attack on a sacred Shia shrine in Samarra 22 February 2006 and subsequent reprisals against Sunni mosques and the killing of Sunni Arabs was the decisive moment that brought deep rifts to the surface. Many observers are of the opinion that a sectarian civil war is underway and Iraqis are drawing new communal borders. If this is the case, the ramifications will echo throughout the Middle East, which itself is a mosaic of religious, sectarian and ethnic communities. Nawaf Obaid, a Saudi security consultant, suggested that Iran has created a Shia "state within a state" in Iraq, providing support to armed groups and funds for social programmes. "Where the Americans have failed, the Iranians have stepped in," Obaid opined in an article in The Washington Post. Obaid said that Saudi Arabia would use oil and influence to support Sunnis and thwart Iranian efforts to dominate Iraq if American troops pulled out. The Saudi government fired Obaid, yet many believe he was expressing official Saudi thinking. For some Arabs, the Shia phenomenon in Iraq is not an internal problem -- rather it is an American-created problem. They believe that the war on Iraq was meant to enhance US-Israeli domination of the Middle East and spread division among its religious and ethnic communities. They also believe that sectarian violence in Iraq has been deliberately created by the US and Britain, the two main foreign occupiers of Iraq. By ousting Saddam, the Bush administration empowered Iraq's Shia majority and has helped launch a broad Shia revival that is expected to upset the sectarian balance in Iraq and the Middle East for years to come. While American officials avoid talking about the advantages of such a development, it could be a chance for Washington to build bridges with the region's Shia as a counterbalance to radical Sunni groups and in its fight against terrorism. That would also serve, in the long run, the goal of promoting democracy in the Arab world. Recently, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described the current Middle East order after the Iraq invasion as a moment of emerging "clarity" in the region. It is "one of those critical junctures in international politics," she said, "because a lot of the old bargains in the Middle East have really collapsed." In other words, what she was suggesting is that the lid has been lifted and there's a struggle between Shia and Sunni to redefine their relationship and eventually the roles of politics and religion in the region. As for Shias in Iraq, they see it as a moment of opportunity for which they have been waiting for more than 80 years, after British occupiers excluded them when they set the rules for the modern Iraqi state. Iraqi Shias insist that they only seek empowerment proportional to their majority in the Iraqi population. Iraqi Shia leaders also counter allegations of an Iranian link, saying that while they may naturally have ties to Shias in Iran, they are not Iranian stooges. Instead, they believe Sunnis both inside and outside Iraq simply resent their new power and the general Shia regional momentum. The region faces a daunting challenge. What Arabs should do is to avoid falling into the trap of sectarianism, which unfortunately many are doing by pushing debate on Iraq from the realm of politics into the realm of sectarianism and racism. First and foremost, they should look at Shias in their countries as being citizens and Arabs and avoid any linkage to Iran. Second, they should avoid what happened in Iraq during Saddam's rule and build nation- states and civil governments where people can share power and wealth equally. Sectarianism, as the Iraqi experiment has proven, feeds on injustice and autocracy.
