I still count myself among those who believe that the Muslim Brotherhood youth are victims of their leaders, men who said one thing and did another and who made countless promises only to break them. I also hope that the government takes advantage of the leaders who broke away from “Islamo-politics” in order to reach out to the youth. In fact, I have previously written about what I called three testimonies written by three important breakaway figures. One of the articles is by Nageh Ibrahim. A founder of Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya in the 1970s, he was one of the chief individuals who steered that organisation and shaped its thinking through its phases of takfiri jihadism and terrorist violence, through imprisonment in the 1990s and its processes of ideological revision. At what I believe was the height of his intellectual maturity, he asked himself: “How did the Islamists squander opportunities?” He attempted to answer this question in an article that was later published. In it, he painted a historical panorama of the Islamist movement. Ibrahim wrote: “The Islamist movement was presented with four opportunities during the entire century, from the beginning of the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood until the present.” The first was presented by Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan Al-Banna during the premiership of Mustafa Nahhas. Nahhas had given the fledgling organisation unrestricted freedom to proselytise, enabling it to grow, increase its membership and expand its influence. But the Muslim Brothers soon forfeited this opportunity when they entered politics, supporting the king in all his decisions, including the most unpopular ones, and when they decided to enter parliament, despite their condemnation of political parties and the political party system. Before long, their poor political judgement led them into clashes that culminated with the assassination of Al-Banna and a massive clampdown against the group. The second opportunity arose following the July 1952 Revolution, in which the Muslim Brothers initially took part. During the two-year honeymoon between the Muslim Brothers and the Free Officers Movement, the Muslim Brotherhood resumed their proselytising activities and their organisation began to flourish. But then they began to present themselves as a political player rivalling the Free Officers. Again, confrontations erupted and before long the second opportunity was lost. They were presented with the third opportunity under President Anwar Sadat, who also gave them freedom to proselytise and, again, they took advantage of that freedom to plunge into the maelstrom of political conflict, triggering another wave of arrests that lasted beyond the Sadat era. The fourth opportunity arose after the 25 January 2011 Revolution. Islamist parties were formed and won in the elections. Soon, however, they entered into conflict with large segments of the population who rejected their methods of controlling the state. Instead of responding to popular demands, the Muslim Brothers and their supporters opted for confrontation, with the result that they were toppled from their seats of power and landed once again inside the confines of prison. Following this overview of the cycles in the history of the Islamist movement, Nageh Ibrahim remarked: “I have long been struck by what Abdullah bin Omar said to Hussein bin Ali when trying to prevent him from seeking to succeed as caliph. “He said: ‘God will not combine for you [the powers of] prophecy and the caliphate.' It is as though God has ordained that Islamists must choose between prophecy (proselytising) and the caliphate (i.e., government).” One gathers from Ibrahim's account and conclusion that the problem is an old one, more in the nature of a chronic ailment that resurfaced four times under different political systems. Each time, the chief representatives of the Islamist movement confused the pursuit of worldly power with the sanctity of the faith, with the result that they propelled themselves into battles that eventually lost them the freedom to spread the Divine calling, regardless of how they understand that. In other words, because their ambition extended beyond spreading the faith to spreading their own power over the people, they forfeited both. The second article is by Mohamed Habib who once served as first deputy of the Muslim Brotherhood supreme guide. Appearing beneath the title, “What happened when freedom came?” it discusses a number of structural problems in the Muslim Brotherhood. These, to me, explain why Muslim Brotherhood youth fell victim to the inaccurate perceptions of their leaders, to the degree that some of these youths revered their leaders almost as if they were companions of the Prophet. Despite the fact that these leaders are ordinary Egyptians, with as many virtues and flaws as anyone else, it appears that the era of police crackdowns and the desire to keep the organisation strong led to a form of organisational control that disseminated a romantic image of the leadership in the minds of the youth. Habib, in his article, recalls that during the Mubarak era the regime employed a policy of eavesdropping on and surveillance of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, arresting key figures and bringing them in for questioning, and using torture on those who denied belonging to the Brotherhood or refused to supply information. He then underscored a very important point: “[T] he group's leadership was very careful to ensure that the information available to individuals was extremely limited, just enough so that they can perform their roles, so that if any of them were subject to extreme torture one day the would not be able to reveal any more than that limited amount of knowledge. “This gave rise to a huge gap between the [membership bases] and the leaders, especially the higher echelons. The members knew very little about those leaders or about how they grounded their decisions and positions. Their connection with the leaders was based on unquestioning obedience to directives and instructions. “This is what lent the leadership an aura of sanctity, especially given that the circumstances and context affecting the Muslim Brotherhood at the time did not permit for questioning those leaders or calling them to account.” I suggest readers reread the preceding paragraph because it explains why Muslim Brotherhood youth behave as though they are speaking about the Caliph Omar Ibn Khattab when they refer to Mohamed Morsi, whom they had never seen in person in their lives. It also explains why many of the best youth left the Muslim Brotherhood once they realised that their intellects had matured and they could no longer accept being treated like mindless minions. Habib goes on to explain that because of police pursuit and surveillance, “the Brotherhood was unable to hold its internal elections for branch, district and administrative bureau positions according to the systematic rules and principles governing the selection processes. “Because of the fear that the place could be raided at any moment, the electoral process was conducted in a haphazard, slipshod way. As a consequence, it often led to the selection of unqualified leaders, lacking in talent and distinguished only by their adeptness at the culture of blind obedience.” I ask readers to reread the previous paragraph too. It helps explain the many unqualified leaders that began to surface during the period of Muslim Brotherhood rule, in government administrations, municipal boards and the media. There was a selection process that was less focussed on rewarding competence than on rewarding yea-sayers who might or might not understand their jobs later on. As a matter of fact, some appointees displayed a reasonable level of competence, but the general trend was to seize the opportunity to empower members of the organisation in various branches of government, regardless of competence. Habib concludes: “What the Brotherhood most needed and hoped for in the period before the 25 January Revolution was freedom. Freedom to educate, to promote the calling and to pave the way for a different generation of Muslim Brothers, a generation that was creative and innovative. Sadly, when freedom came, they did not know how to handle it. They were unable to appreciate its benefits and its requirements. “So they leaped straight into the crucible of government unprepared and unequipped and, moreover, with confused ideas about the nation, democracy and citizenship. Therefore, they lost that opportunity of a lifetime they had long been waiting for, when instead they could have made the most of the opportunity to reorder their positions and ideas.” In so saying, Habib echoes the conclusions drawn by Ibrahim regarding the Brotherhood's failure to take appropriate advantage of the freedom available because of their desperation to attain power as quickly as possible, regardless of how unprepared they were, or are, for it. The third testimony is by the famous lawyer and former Brotherhood leader Mukhtar Noh. Published under the title, “El-Hodeibi and Mashhour are against Rabaa and against revolution,” it serves as an appropriate conclusion. What struck me in Noh's article was that what I had anticipated and advised was already part of the literature of wiser Muslim Brotherhood leaders. But that wisdom went unheeded by the current leaders who, after mismanaging power, mismanaged opposition. In both cases, the youth suffered because of the failure of their leadership. Noh relates that in a meeting with former Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mustafa Mashhour (1996-2002) the latter read out a passage from Hassan Al-Banna's address to the Muslim Brotherhood convention on 2 February 1939. Said Al-Banna: “As for revolution, the Muslim Brothers do not think of it, do not rely on it, and do not believe in its use or results.” Noh continues his account: “Mustafa Mashhour then cautioned me against thinking that right was on my side. That belief was not sufficient in itself ... What was more important was that the pursuit of what was right should not result in any harm for myself, or others or society.” One can only ask, if that is what Al-Banna and Mashhour believed, what made the current leaders act as they did? As I said above, they were hungry; they ate too voraciously and died from acute dyspepsia. To eat too greedily and keel over as a result can happen in the best of societies. But when it happens to the same group four times running, there has to be a problem. Muslim Brotherhood youth: Wake up! Be free Muslims. Do not be Muslim Brother minions. The decision is up to you. The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
