For almost a century now, Egyptian politics have been dominated by one party even when a multi-party system was in place. From 1923 until 1952, the Wafd Party eclipsed all others. From 1952 onwards, a one-party system was introduced, leading to the domination of the Arab Socialist Union until Gamal Abdel Nasser's death in 1970. Sadat reshuffled the deck slightly, allowing something akin to a multi-party system, but eventually it was his National Democratic Party (NDP) that won the day. The NDP towered over its tiny rivals throughout the Mubarak era, until it crashed in 2011. By that time, all secular political parties were in poor shape, and the new ones that were hastily formed after the 2011 Revolution didn't fare much better, thus giving the Islamists a formidable edge in the elections that followed. Islamist-leaning parties, whether affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafist movement, had no trouble winning a parliamentary majority in early post-revolutionary elections. But these were not parties in the real sense of the word, rather facades for an assortment of religious groups. Religiously inspired parties, as the public soon discovered, had the same despotic tendencies common to all one-party systems, and then some. So although the Islamists won elections fair and square, proof that Egyptians didn't pre-judge them on the whole, they failed to keep their end of the bargain. And before long, their heavy-handedness alienated the electorate. The Islamists had a good section of the public behind them during the referendum on the constitution in March 2011. And their performance in the parliamentary elections that followed exceeded their expectations. But the clock was ticking. By May and June of 2012, when the country's first free presidential elections were held, the mood was already shifting. Six months earlier, the Islamists waltzed their way through an easy win into parliament. But their preferred candidate, Mohamed Morsi, had trouble beating a man from the discredited old regime, former prime minister Ahmed Shafiq. Morsi won the presidential elections with the slightest of margins. And instead of seeing this as a sign that the country was already in two minds about the Islamists, he went on to see his victory as an unqualified mandate. A new era had begun, but its traits even in the summer of 2012 were still hard to identify. For starters, a sea change happened in the voting process. With voters allowed to participate by showing IDs, rather than voting cards, the turnout became much higher than at any time in recent memory. Also, the judiciary became closely involved in organising the elections, with all polling stations placed under strict protection by the army and police. As a result, what we used to call the “silent majority” turned into an “active majority”, something that no one had expected. The Egyptian mainstream became a major force in the electoral process, and the “silent majority” finally found its voice. It was this “silent majority” that brought the Islamists into power in a moment of revolutionary zeal. And it is this same “silent majority” that, having been exposed to their hypocrisy and selfish zeal, was to turn against them in the following months. Within a year of the Muslim Brotherhood rule, the “silent majority” staged a revolution against the Islamists, starting with the massive protests on 30 June 2013. To recap, the “silent majority” of this country has managed, within the span of four years, to turn itself into an “active majority.” Anyone interested in foreseeing the future of this country should pay more attention to the shifting mood of this “active majority.” The “active majority”, one most note, has not been kind to the procession of minor secular parties that appeared on the scene after 2011 in the hope of capturing the votes of the revolutionary youth. This comes as a surprise, knowing that the 2011 Revolution owes much of its success to the emergence of protest movements, such as Kefaya, in the final years of the Mubarak era. But let's keep in mind that Kefaya's strong message was one of opposition to the inept politics of the NDP, not of support for any particular political group. In the post-revolutionary elections, the secular parties have so far fared poorly in comparison with the Islamists. So far we know that the Islamists are losing public sympathy, but there is no proof that post-revolutionary secular parties are in a position to capture the votes the Islamists are likely to lose in the coming elections. So what does one expect of the parliamentary elections due in a few months in Egypt? One thing is for sure: the winner in these elections is not going to be any of the country's familiar parties not of the Mubarak era, nor the Muslim Brotherhood era. Eventually, the “active majority” will determine the winner, but so far there are no clear frontrunners on the scene. The “active majority” is definitely the main player. And it will make its decisions according to its own interests. Over the past four years, this “active majority” sided with the Muslim Brotherhood and then against it. It is so far sympathetic to the “new regime”, although the latter is still admittedly taking shape. But there is no guarantee that it will not change its mind once again. In the end, the “active majority” will side with the party that seems capable of protecting it and addressing its concerns. All politicians and parties must therefore position themselves to win the sympathy of the “active majority.” They can do this by revamping their positions, sharpening their abilities and ramping up their resources. The political parties that want to survive will have to start building a base of support among the “active majority.” At the end of the day, the “silent majority” will side with any party that seems capable of meeting their needs even if that party turns out to be a radical group. Remember this: the “silent majority” was once willing to accommodate the Muslim Brotherhood. It was the Muslim Brotherhood that let it down, forcing it to look for other options. Today, the “active majority” may seem pleased with the current regime. But let this be clear: it is still shopping around. The writer is managing editor of the quarterly journal Al-Demoqrateya published by Al-Ahram.
