No regional power in the world today is causing as much international debate as Iran. The Islamic Republic, fresh from signing a framework nuclear agreement with the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany), is likely to stir even more debate as time goes by. Arab nations and countries surrounding Iran were not part of the Lausanne talks. But they are expected to receive a full briefing during a summit meeting at Camp David soon. In the West, doubt may linger about Iran's nuclear programme, but a sigh of relief could be heard as the sensitive talks neared completion, with Iran promising to curb its nuclear activities in return for a lifting of the sanctions that have crippled its economy for so long. In the Arab world, there was less excitement for a clear reason: Iran doesn't need nukes to destabilise the region. All it needs are conventional weapons, a crude ideology for domination, willing partners and proxy armies none of which are in short supply. A discrepancy is therefore emerging between the Western attitude to Iran, which is that it should be stopped from making the bomb, and the Arab attitude, which is that it must be stopped, period. The Western view, as presented in the US media, is that Iran is no threat to the Arabs and that we're projecting our own problems onto the Iranians. Speaking to the American journalist Thomas Friedman, US President Barack Obama recently said, “The biggest threats that [Arab countries] face may not be coming from Iran invading. It's going to be from dissatisfaction inside their own countries.” The dissatisfaction argument is not one to be ignored. But the threats coming from Iran are immediate and present, and not all involve Iran “invading”. Tehran has proved itself time and again capable of destabilising countries in the region by buying loyalties, inflaming sectarianism and promoting “proxy armies” that answer to its commands. Even with a worldwide blockade against it, reduced finances and crushing trade embargoes, Iran managed to have a foothold in Iraq, bring Lebanon's politics to a stalemate and push Yemen into a civil war. Iran is intent on promoting its brand of interventionism around the region, a legacy perhaps of the Islamic revolution's pledge to export its ideals, a pledge enshrined in Iran's constitution. Deep down, it is all a power game, one in which Iran is using ideology as a tool for regional dominance. Religion, when combined with Persian nationalism, is a potent weapon one that is more disruptive to the region than Iran's nuclear potential. Hezbollah may be Iran's masterpiece of regional interventionism. But it is not the only one. Iran, even with blockades and sanctions cutting deep into its resources, scouted around the regions for allies and found the Houthis in Yemen, co-opted governments in both Damascus and Baghdad, and is looking for more. It has bought and hired, trained and armed militias and politicians with one aim in mind, which is to become the dominant power in the region. To dominate, Iran infests countries with sectarianism, and leaves them in ruins. And now that the West is about to feel more comfortable about the Iranians, the region is going to become less secure. It is almost certain that the funds released for the Iranians in connection with the nuclear deal are going to go to more disruptive schemes in the region, more expansionism and more interference. Iran's main weapon of expansion in the region is not nuclear warheads but the Republican Guards (IRGC), now deployed in Syria and Iraq and getting ready to do damage elsewhere on short notice. Iran is a cynical country, as the Americans know from the Iran-Contra affair, a deal which saw Iran obtain weapons from America in exchange for the release of its hostages. When the Arab Spring uprisings started, Iran was the first to call the pro-democracy protests “Islamic revolutions”, a prophecy that seemed bizarre at the time, but less so now. The Iranians are obsessed with expansionism. This is true whether their leaders are hawkish like Ahmadinejad or dovish like Rouhani. Expansionism and blatant intervention are by now so ingrained in the Iranian political doctrine that a change of leadership will not alter its course. Recently, Iranian leaders hinted that Baghdad is part of the Persian Empire. These are not just words, for Iran's rhetorical bravado is almost always followed with disruptive deeds. Not content with control of the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran is now eyeing Bab El-Mandeb, and its surrogate militia is trying to deliver it into its hands. So, even if Lausanne has appeased Western concerns, the Iranian threat it addressed was almost beside the point. In fact, the lifting of sanctions on Tehran is likely to make it more, not less, aggressive towards its regional neighbours.
