When Egypt shifted its foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s to close cooperation with the former Soviet Union, it was due to its frustration with the US. Washington had refused to provide arms to rebuild the Egyptian army and declined to finance the building of the Aswan High Dam. The Soviet Union was ready to fill the gap for three major projects: provision of military supplies and equipment; acting as the main partner in building the High Dam, which became the symbol of Egyptian-Soviet partnership; and undertaking major heavy industrial projects in Egypt. The Soviet Union's support — economically, politically and militarily — continued until the 1970s, and was particularly important during the October War. Egyptian generals acknowledged that Egypt fought the war with advanced arms provided by the Soviet Union. Times have changed and the Soviet Union no longer exists. However, the memory of that cooperation still exists in the minds of the new leadership in both countries. It is not surprising that in the new era, after the 30 June 2013 revolution, Egypt has adopted a new strategy and broadened the base of its international relations, giving Russia a prominent position. This follows the negative stand of the US towards the revolution (coupled with the suspension of the delivery of essential arms to Egypt), and the Russian leadership's immediate support of the Egyptian people's choices. On 13 February 2014, Egypt's then-foreign minister, Nabil Fahmy, and then-Defence Minister Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi visited Moscow for talks, during which the basis for cooperation in the fields of economy, trade and military was established. In what was a rare occurrence in Russian diplomacy, both Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu visited Egypt on 13 November 2013. Then came the visit by President Al-Sisi to Moscow on 12 August 2014, which signalled an advanced phase in cooperation between the two countries. Following this confidence-building trip, came the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin on 9-10 February 2015. The visit was the culmination of new relations, backed by major economic agreements, particularly Russian participation in a free trade zone and steps to increase Egyptian exports to Russia. But the most significant agreement was Russia's commitment to build a nuclear reactor in Dabaa. The question now is how will Washington react to the new level of Russian-Egyptian cooperation, and how will it affect US-Egyptian relations? When Egypt started to develop its relations with Russia, US statements downplayed the importance of the development. The same happened following Putin's visit. Jen Psaki, spokeswoman of the US State Department, seemed unconcerned about it. She said that the US does not oppose the memorandum of understanding on Russia's building a nuclear reactor in Egypt. But she refused to comment on the two countries' agreement to replace the dollar with the ruble in their trade relations. While the official American reaction was reserved, US analysts and scholars were more frank. Some wrote that Russia is pushing the US out of the Middle East, in belated response to the US's excluding of the Soviet Union from Egypt and peace diplomacy in 1979. Others asked: “Who lost Egypt?” and blamed Obama for alienating the new regime in Egypt, suspending arms at a time when Egypt was badly in need of weapons to fight terrorism. Others regarded Putin's visit to Egypt as signalling that Russia and Egypt reject external intervention in their policies. Putin's visit to Egypt came at a time when the US is engaged in a confrontation with Russia on the Ukrainian crisis, and when US economic sanctions are trying to isolate it internationally. The Russian leader's visit to Egypt, a central country in the Middle East, together with his visits to China, India and Turkey, appear aimed at proving to the US that Russia cannot be isolated. No doubt the visit will be debated within US institutions — the White House, National Security Council, State Department, Pentagon and Congress — as all hold different views on how to deal with Egypt. In this context, we can expect two views to emerge: first, those who argue that Egypt is allying itself with Russia at a time when the US is pressuring it to support its stand on Ukraine; second, that Egypt is valuable to the US in critical issues (i.e., the Suez Canal, opening its airspace to US flights, keeping peace with Israel and in fighting terrorism). US officials and others in the coming days will be asking whether Egypt is committed to cooperation with the US in these areas. We can expect Egypt's response to be — as it has claimed from the beginning — that broadening its international relations will not come at the expense of other powers. Egypt will remain interested in healthy and sound relations with the US, based on mutual interest and respect. The writer is executive director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
