In discussing the recent Egyptian-Russian rapprochement, we can detect five sources and motivations for it. The first was Russian support for the 30 June Revolution and its consequences since overthrowing the Brotherhood regime and its president, to the arrangements included in the roadmap: a transitional system with a temporary president, drafting a new constitution, to be followed by presidential and parliamentarian elections. What gave the Russian support meaning and value is that it came at a time when the Unites States and the West adopted a reluctant and unfriendly response, to say the least. The second source was the US administration's suspension of essential parts of US military assistance: F16 planes, Apache helicopters and M1A1 tanks. This unfortunate step came in a critical time for the new regime in Egypt where it was fighting terrorism in Sinai. The third source for Russian-Egyptian rapprochement was that while Egypt and the new regime was engaged in a fight against terrorism in Sinai by jihadist and radical Islamic groups, Russia was obsessed by deep misgivings about radical religious groups actively working in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and even in the capital Moscow. The fourth source was Egyptian experience with the former Soviet Union, which the Russian Federation inherited, as the Soviet Union was supportive to Egypt in difficult times: the Tripartite Invasion in 1956 and when the United States refused to respond to Egypt's demands for arming the Egyptian army; at this time the Egyptian leadership found in the Soviet Union a replacement to satisfy these demands — what was known as the “Czech arms deal” in 1957. The more effective and supportive Soviet Union stand was Soviet international and military support after the 1967 war, which helped develop preparations for 1973 War. There is a conviction among the Egyptian military that Egypt fought and won by Soviet arms. This experience was recalled by Field Marshal Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi when he was addressing Russian President Vladimir Putin during his visit to Moscow, saying that Egypt would not forget this support. As for the fifth source, it is Putin's strategy since he assumed power in 2000 and after he experienced the retreat of Russia's international standing during Boris Yeltsin's time. Since then, he was determined to restore Russia's international role as a great power that has its voice heard in international and regional issues. It was clear that the Middle East was the most strategic region where Moscow was interested to secure its presence, with Egypt the principal power in this region. The unfriendly American position since the 30 June Revolution, the suspension of military assistance versus Russia's supportive response, was one of the main motivations to adopt an Egyptian foreign policy strategy poised on broadening the base of Egyptian international relations in a way to provide it with choices and alternatives that do not keep it bound to one power. This strategy started to be implemented in the series of visits by Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy to a number of major foreign powers, starting in Moscow in September 2013. The Russian response came quickly, when both the Russian foreign minister and defence minister visited Egypt in November 2013 in what was known as “Formula 2+2”. The visit explored areas of military and international cooperation between Moscow and Cairo. It was abundantly clear with the visit of Field Marshal Al-Sisi and the accompanying military delegation to Moscow that the military dimension was essential, with reports indicating that the basis of a military deal was agreed upon where Egypt would receive advanced Russian military assistance, this in addition to the international component where the respective foreign ministers discussed Egyptian and Russian positions on a number of regional issues — principally the Syrian crisis, where there is agreement from the two sides on two principles: a) The importance of a political solution to the crisis; and b) The principle of military non-intervention in Syria. Other issues such as non-proliferation and the Palestinian-Israeli peace process were also part of the equation. As for bilateral relations, the very modest level of trade and investment exchange — with Egypt's exports to Russia at $65 million dollars, while Russia's exports to Egypt reach $1.9 billion — are expected to rise in the coming years, with Russian exports reaching $5 billion in addition to the promise of raised Russian tourism to Egypt, which reached three million tourists and is expected to reach five million. Such dimensions and motivations to Al-Sisi's visit was bound to raise international reaction, particularly for a power like the United States, which counted Egypt as its strategic ally in the region for more than 30 years. American statements tried to diminish the importance of the visit and the new Russian-Egyptian cooperation. In this context it's indicative that the Egyptian side, while explaining its new strategy in terms of opening choices, was keen to indicate that Egyptian-Russian relations would not aim to substitute Egypt's relations with other powers, including the United States. While preparing for new Egyptian-Russian relations, the Egyptian foreign minister was also preparing for an Egyptian-American strategic dialogue. It can be expected that the dimensions of new Egyptian-Russian relations could drive the US administration to its recalculate its stance towards the new regime in Egypt, and to correct the imbalance that was inherent in the relationship since 1970. This might lead to more healthy and mature Egyptian-American relations. A last word on the future of Egyptian-Russian relations in its new era: what attracts attention is the Russian president's saying that Russia will enact its agreement with Egypt after the election of a new president and parliament, and the formation of a stable new government. The implication of this statement is that Russia implicitly connects its future relations with Egypt's success in building a consistent and stable political system, which is the same for most foreign powers, and what they expect. The writer is executive director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
