The secession of South Sudan did not come as a surprise. It had been the most likely outcome since the Machakos Protocol was signed in 2002. Under this framework agreement, Khartoum was obliged to grant the right of self-determination to the South after a six-year interim period beginning from the date of the final peace agreement between the warring parties, namely the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The protocol was largely the product of efforts made by US Senator John Danforth, appointed US presidential envoy to Sudan in September 2001, not long after George W. Bush was sworn in to his first term of office. Assigned the task of brokering a solution to the Sudanese civil war, the last phase of which had persisted for more than 20 years, Danforth took as his guide a study undertaken by the International Strategic Studies Centre in Washington. The study, which had been requested by the US State Department, found that the best solution for Sudan was to remain a single state but with two systems of government, one for the North and one for the South. In other words, Sudan would be a bi-regional state with a different legal system for each, a blend between the federal and confederal system. But events propelled Khartoum towards acceptance of the South's right to self-determination, the transitional phase towards which began with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), known as the Naivasha Agreement. This was signed between the government of Sudan and the SPLM on 9 January 2005. The date for the South's referendum on whether to remain united with Sudan or to secede was set for the same date six years later, in 2011. The prospect of secession was present from day one after the Naivasha Agreement, and it increased over time due to disputes between Khartoum and the SPLM, which now governed the South and was a primary partner in government at the national level. By 9 January 2011, there was little doubt how people in the South would vote. The polls returned a nearly unanimous vote in favour of secession, leading to the creation of the Republic of South Sudan, which was internationally recognised as the 11th state in the Nile Basin on 9 July 2011, the date of its official declaration of statehood.
THE CRISIS CONTINUES: The option of a referendum on secession was justified on the grounds that it offered a solution to the civil war in the south. It was also thought that it would alleviate the ethnic-identity conflict between Arabs and Africans and the religious-identity conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims (affiliates of Christianity and African traditional religions) since the South was the chief locus of this conflict and grievances against discrimination. It was hoped that with the secession of the South and the voluntary and peaceful acceptance of this on the part of the North (as the South had not forced this option on the North by dint of military victory at the time the Naivasha Agreement was signed), Sudan would be able to win peace, the bloodshed would stop, and it would be able to focus on development. Sadly, those hopes were clearly not well founded. Hostilities soon flared up again in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, both of which border on the South and had fought with the South during the civil war. An attempt was made to remedy the problems of these two states in a special protocol that was incorporated into the Naivasha Agreement. The protocol introduced a mechanism termed “popular consultations,” but the term was vague and was interpreted differently by the concerned parties. The fighting in these two regions has continued since then, and in the interim the two states have upped their demands to call for autonomy, a development that portends a new process of fragmentation in what remains of Sudan since the secession of South Sudan. At the same time, there remain numerous pending issues between South Sudan and Sudan. Prime among these are disputes over certain border areas. The most important is the dispute over Abyei, which is particularly intractable due to the conflicting affiliations of the tribes that inhabit the area and constantly threaten war if the area is annexed to either the North or the South. In addition to these problems, the Darfur crisis is still simmering. Security and stability are still out of reach in spite of the many agreements that have been signed.
THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT: The secession of South Sudan involved much more than breaking off about a third of Sudan's land area. Given the magnitude of its ramifications, it would be no exaggeration to call it a geo-strategic earthquake. The secession was a major precedent in the history of the African continent with its artificial borders inherited from the colonial era. In 1963 the Organisation for African Unity established the principle of the sanctity of the existing borders out of a realisation that anarchy could erupt once the door to redrawing borders was opened in view of the complex tribal demographics and ethnic conflicts throughout the continent. Except for the case of Eritrea, which had a special legal status as it had been under an Ethiopian mandate authorised by the UN but was not actually a part of Ethiopia, the case of Sudan is the first incidence of secession in Africa. As such it has stirred anxieties throughout the continent that it will be regarded as a model to emulate in areas where ethnic conflict prevails and as an alternative to the search for instruments to promote assimilation and equal rights. Nevertheless, the African Union and African nations individually approved the secession of South Sudan. Some, such as Uganda and Kenya, welcomed it as they saw in it opportunities for gain and the promotion of their own interests. Others accepted it as though bowing to the inevitable as the secession came about through the voluntary agreement of the two parts of Sudan. Nevertheless, the greatest and most immediate impact of the secession will be felt in the Nile Valley. The birth of South Sudan, especially given its strategic position, is certain to precipitate a reordering in strategic balances south of the Egyptian border. The new nation borders on the Horn of Africa to the east and the Great Lakes region, which includes the equatorial sources of the Nile to the west. The shifts in balances will work in the favour of the countries that were instrumental in securing the secession of the South and inaugurating the new realities. Foremost among these are the US and Israel. It is equally clear that the secession will promote the status of two main countries in the Nile Basin: Ethiopia, which is seeking to assert its hegemony over the Horn of Africa and augment its influence in the Nile Basin in general, and Uganda, which, in addition to its ambitions in South Sudan, has been working to build a cooperative framework in East Africa in which Kampala, under President Museveni, would play a leading role. Both Kampala and Addis Ababa enjoy excellent relations with Washington, and both within their respective regional environments are pillars of US strategy. Consequently, the US together with Israel will be highly instrumental in shaping South Sudan. The process of generating the new regional balances is likely to come at the expense of the Egyptian role and lead to Egypt's isolation from the South.
SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN: Following the secession of South Sudan there remained a dozen pending issues between it and Sudan. All these questions, itemised in the referendum law under post-referendum issues, are crucial to both countries. However, the most sensitive are Abyei, verging on becoming another Kashmir contested by India and Pakistan; the dilemma of drawing the borders; the question of oil, where most of the wells are in the South while the pipelines for transporting it are in the North; and the status of the South Sudanese in the North after secession. There are also outstanding issues over water, debts and shared assets. The two sides have been unable to reach an acceptable settlement for these issues. Fierce clashes have erupted in the area of Umm Hajlij, which was occupied briefly by Southern forces and then retaken by the North. They were occasioned by disputes over shares in oil and fees for its transport. South Sudan possesses 75 per cent of total Sudanese oil production, reaching about 470,000 barrels a day. The Umm Hajlij crisis erupted in December 2011 when Sudan moved to claim its dues in concrete form until a final settlement was reached. Khartoum argued that if it did not do so the South would be under no pressure to reach agreement. On 20 January 2012, Juba responded by halting production of the oil it exports through Sudan. This move came as a surprise as South Sudan is dependent on oil for 98 per cent of its income, but Juba will have realised that that about a third of the North's national budget depends on revenues from transport fees for oil exports from the South. The South's decision to deprive Khartoum of this revenue at the expense of its own revenue stream underscores the sociopolitical dimensions of the conflict and just how deep and bitter the long conflict has been.
CIVIL STRIFE IN THE SOUTH: The South was not ready for independence when it became a new African state. It had virtually no infrastructure and a bare minimum of public services and utilities. In addition, tribal affiliations reigned supreme. The Southerners still perceive their identities in terms of the tribe to which they owe their allegiance. The notion of an overarching national affiliation and citizenship bond still has a feeble hold in South Sudan, and in view of the long history of conflict between the Southern tribes it was clear that the only factor that united them was the war against the North. Even during that war some Southern tribes or groups sided with the North against the South. Following secession, there remained huge quantities of weapons in the hands of Southern fighters and the government of Juba was unable to collect them. Then, as a consequence of rampant corruption, mounting violence and tribal biases, and accusations of tribal favouritism, tensions mounted between South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and former vice-president Riek Machar, eventually erupting into widespread clashes in December 2013. The hostilities continue to defy peacemaking efforts today, and although an agreement was signed, it did not last long enough to be put into effect. The battle lines in South Sudan's internal strife are largely informed by tribal affiliations and old arguments, even if differences are couched in political terms and demands. The fighting has already claimed the lives of thousands of people and caused the displacement of around 1.8 million. This situation has put the US under pressure as it has been the chief sponsor of the political process and negotiations that led to the secession of the South. As the internal strife threatens to destroy the nascent state, Washington is exerting efforts through IGAD, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, to broker a settlement and to safeguard the lives of civilians, who are always the ones to pay the costs of wars and humanitarian tragedies.
