Many observers of Yemeni affairs have voiced concerns over Iran's influence in the country. Some have spoken of possible Iranian domination of Yemeni politics but this may be going too far. What is most likely to happen is that Iran will influence Yemen in the same manner in which it does Oman. Just as Muscat tries to accommodate Iranian policies without jeopardising its special relations with the Gulf countries, Sanaa may follow the same path. This phenomenon, of an influential neighbour limiting the options of a smaller country without infringing on its independence, is not new to international politics. Former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger once warned of the “Finlandisation” of Europe, recognising the fact that the former Soviet Union had a restraining impact on Finland's policies during the Cold War. Yemen is unlikely to become an Iranian client state, but it has every chance of getting Omanised in the sense of becoming overly sensitive to Iran's needs.
THE HOUTHI VETO: The spectacular rise of Houthi power over the past few months has redrawn the map of Yemeni politics. This Shiite group, believed to be Iranian-backed, is now in a position to dictate domestic policy, including such weighty matters as the appointment of the prime minister. In early October 2014, the Houthis vetoed the appointment of Ahmed Awad Ben Mubarak as prime minister. They claimed that Mubarak, the director of the office of Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Hadi Mansour, could not lead the country away from the tribalism and corruption that have long marred its policies. The Houthis said that he was unfit to implement the National Peace and Partnership Agreement (NPPA). The NPPA was signed on 21 September 2014, practically at gunpoint, after the Houthis took control of Sanaa and sent their combatants marching on other parts of the country. As a result of the Houthi opposition, Mubarak's nomination was withdrawn within hours. Later, Mansour appointed Khaled Bahah as prime minister, picking him from a list of three names that the Houthis had provided. Having taken control of Sanaa, Houthi fighters advanced into other parts of the country with the confidence of a regular army. Their firepower, augmented by weapons seized earlier from the army, saw them take the law into their own hands. Meanwhile, their leaders promised to redress the injustices they had experienced under the country's federal system, declared in February 2014, that had divided the country into six regions. The Houthis complained that the federal divisions denied them access to oil fields and sea ports. So they marched on the country's oil fields, promising to grab by force what they considered to be their birthright. Over the weeks that followed, they practically obliterated the borders of the federation, bringing the country back to square one. In a daring move, Houthi fighters seized Hodeidah, a port city just north of the strategic straits of Bab Al-Mandeb. This raised considerable concerns in world capitals, where experts hotly debated the outcome of Iran's increased influence at a point so close to a strategic waterway. The move constituted a challenge to two powerful regional powers, in particular: Egypt, which controls the Suez Canal, and Saudi Arabia, whose economy and security hinge on Bab Al-Mandeb being in trusted hands. Although the port city is the headquarters for several Yemeni army brigades, the Houthis grabbed Hodeidah without resistance. The importance of the city to Yemen's stability cannot be overstated, as it provides Sanaa with almost 70 per cent of its food supplies. Controlling Hodeidah could give the Houthis leverage in any future deal, but the city is unlikely to be do-cile if the Houthis decide to throw their weight around. The city is predominantly Sunni, and its population may not be supportive of the Shiite combatants. But at least for the duration that the Houthis retain control of this port city the Shiite group will be able to receive any assistance it needs from Iran unhindered. It is highly unlikely, however, that the Houthis or the Iranians will interfere with international shipping across Bab Al-Mandeb. The strategic importance of this waterway to world trade is such that any challenge to navigation would incur immediate action by the major powers, something that the Houthis are smart enough to recognise. However, the rise of Houthi power in Yemen is going to play to some extent into Iran's hands, with Sanaa having to go the Muscat way when it comes to appeasing Tehran.
SOUTHERN OPPOSITION: Obstacles to Houthi control of the international waterway are numerous, one being that the southern Yemeni factions are unlikely to accommodate the Shiite group. Abdel-Hamid Shokri, leader of the Council of the Peaceful Movement to Liberate the South, said that if the Houthis attempt to seize Bab Al-Mandeb southerners will rise up against them. Egypt is also keeping a close eye on developments in Yemen's south. Nabil Fouad, Egypt's former assistant defence minister, recently told the online site Alarabiya.net that it would be difficult for the Houthis to interfere with Bab Al-Mandeb, given that the US, UK, Canadian, and French fleets are deployed in nearby waters. According to Fouad, the Houthis and their backers could face “destruction” if they tried to control Bab Al-Mandeb. Ruling out unilateral action by Egypt, he said that pertinent decisions would be made in consultation with other nations. The Houthis have also long proved themselves pragmatic enough to not antagonise major regional and international players. For example, they did not reject a UN decision that called for their withdrawal from Sanaa, the return of seized army weapons, the dismantling of checkpoints, and the end of incursions on state authority. Their leaders have assured domestic and international interlocutors that they have every intention of complying with the requests. Furthermore, the Houthis have cooperated with the Yemeni government in battling Al-Qaeda and may even have helped free some hostages. What the Houthis have done, above all, is to take full advantage of the post-revolutionary power vacuum in Yemen. The 17 February Revolution, which ended the rule of former Yemeni president Ali Abdallah Saleh in 2011, opened the door for an organised group to dominate the political scene. The Houthis saw their chance, much as the Muslim Brotherhood did in Egypt. With the Yemeni army spread too thin due to multiple battles with separatists and terrorists, the Houthis found easy pickings in a country torn apart by tribal and sectarian conflicts. They have refrained thus far from portraying themselves as a Shiite group, and their rhetoric has stopped short of promoting the interests of their own community at the expense of others. They have not requested any special quota for the Shiites in government or in terms of resources. Nor have they asked for the post of prime minister or parliamentary speaker to go to a member of their faction. Instead, the Houthis have stressed what appears to be a non-ethnic and non-sectarian agenda. When they marched on Sanaa their main demand was for the government to reinstate fuel subsidies, a popular demand at the time. In general, the Houthis prefer to use the threat of force rather than its actual use, and they normally do not go into battle if there is a chance to negotiate. Their tactics are not strictly military, for they also engage in protests, sit-ins and campaigns to collect signatures from the public.
DOUBLE TALK: The Houthis are puzzling to researchers as they seem to act differently in different areas, according to the level of power they have. It is also unclear whether this movement is more motivated by a social agenda or sectarian ambitions. When the Houthis show flexibility during negotiations, it is not always clear if they are doing this to gain tactical advantage, or if they are truly interested in co-existence. The bulk of the Houthi doctrine derives from the writings of the group's founder, Hussein Badr Al-Din Al-Houthi. In these writings, Al-Houthi advocates a revival of the Zaydi doctrine of Shiite Islam, with the marked influence of Iranian Twelver Shiite ideas. Central to this doctrine is that the leadership of the Muslim community, or imamate, should be exclusive to the offspring of Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein (the Prophet Mohamed's grandsons). But this aspect of Houthi ideology has not influenced any of the movement's political positions so far. According to Yemeni researcher Abdel-Nasser Al-Wada, the movement adapts its policy to the nature of the place involved. In areas where the Houthis have full control, as in the Saada and Amran governorates, they act as a totalitarian regime, monopolising power, suppressing all opposition and enforcing a Taliban-like lifestyle. However, even there the Houthis have not declared independence, and they are at least nominally subject to the central government. In talks with other political groups, the government and foreign officials, the Houthis act differently, however. Their tone is flexible and pragmatic and their officials publicly praise democracy, pluralism and modernity. This rhetoric is not necessarily insincere. When the movement had to send representatives to a national dialogue session, for example, the individuals they chose as their interlocutors came from varied backgrounds, including leftists, liberals and Sunnis. During the current protest movement, the Houthis have also tried to be inclusive. In the first Friday prayers they organised in Sanaa, for example, they had the mufti of the Taaz governorate, a Sunni, lead them in the service. Some powerful symbolism emerged from this event, as the imam who stood at the front brought his hands together in front of his abdomen in the Sunni fashion; the first row of worshippers behind him, however, let their hands drop by their sides, Shiite style. The message the Houthis wanted to send was that they are open to other doctrines. The Houthis claim that they only fight as a last resort and in self-defence, and that the only people they consider to be their enemies are takfiris, a reference to groups that denounce and try to kill Shiites. But reality does not always match this claim, as the Houthis have also fought bloody battles against Yemeni government troops and rival tribes, as well as members of the Sunni-dominated Islah Party. None of these groups can be strictly called takfiris, but the Houthis are willing to stretch the definition whenever it suits their purposes. Militarily speaking, the Houthis are not invincible. When they seize cities or grab land this is not because they are exceptionally competent fighters, but because the central government has fallen into disrepair and other tribes and factions are engaged in their own conflicts. The Houthi ascendance is mostly due to the weakness of others. With no organised force left to stop them, they have seen their opportunity and have taken it.
TRIBAL ALLIANCES: Many of the developments in Yemen today can be attributed to the disintegration of the tribal alliance that bolstered the state for almost half a century, with the powerful Al-Ahmar clan controlling the government and commanding tribal loyalties. The disintegration of the tribal alliance became evident when former president Saleh started to actively promote the succession of his son. This phenomenon, known across the Arab world as the bequest of power, in which one president hands power to one of his own offspring, is often a thin facade for totalitarianism and corruption. In Yemen, as elsewhere in the region, it was one of the main stimuli for the uprisings known as the Arab Spring. Moving away from tribal alliances that bolstered the power of the state towards the authoritarian model, Saleh came to blows with the Houthis in 2004, feeling that they were a threat to his power. But even then he had already started the process of keeping power in his own bloodline. After some ferocious battles, Saleh's forces managed to kill Hussein Badr Al-Din Al-Houthi, the movement's founder, but this was just the beginning of a long and tortuous struggle that failed to subdue the Houthis. In the five wars that were to follow between Saleh and the Houthis, the conflict acquired political complexity as the president used it to enhance his domestic and regional status. In his wars against the Houthis, Saleh tried to weaken the influence of Ali Mohsen, his own second in command. Aware of Saleh's plan to pave the way for his own son's succession, Mohsen tried to hold onto his power base. The fight with the Houthis took place in areas under Mohsen's command, so when Saleh ordered Mohsen to move in force from Sanaa to the Saada governorate to fight the Houthis, Mohsen saw through the instructions. If he were to take his entire force to Saada, Saleh would likely deploy the Republican Guard, commanded by his son, in Sanaa and Mohsen's fate would be sealed. Mohsen understood Saleh's intentions and sent only a small portion of his troops to Saada, which is why the Houthis were able to repel them with relative ease. Meanwhile, Saleh failed to provide Mohsen with the men and material he requested. The president wanted the Houthis out, but he didn't want Mohsen to be the one who succeeded in defeating them, as that could have tipped the balance of power against him and perhaps undermined the chances of his son's succession. The Houthis benefitted from this rivalry. Avoiding military defeat, they reinforced their positions and gained valuable combat experience.
THE SAUDI CONNECTION: Saleh also used the Houthi threat to gain regional backing. The Houthis were seen as potential allies of Iran, and they had made incursions into Saudi Arabia, during which they had held a border area known as Jabal Al-Dokhan. This was enough for Saleh to use them as a bargaining chip. Appealing to the Saudis for help, with this potential foe on their borders, Saleh received the backing he needed. From then on his battles against the Houthis were half-hearted. Their presence as credible foes was more beneficial to him than their demise. When the 17 February Revolution erupted Saleh was quickly forced out of office. This gave the Houthis the opportunity to put their political and military prowess to work. Siding with the revolutionaries, the Houthis were welcomed with open arms. As soon as Saleh was out of the picture, the Houthis tightened their control of the Saada governorate, as well as large parts of the Amran and Jawf governorates. From then on they consolidated their power through a carrot-and-stick approach that kept the government on its toes. As the tenuous alliance between the state and the tribes came to an end, the power of the state disintegrated. In the old formula, mutual recognition had kept the peace, with tribal sheikhs commanding authority over the president and the president commanding allegiance in return. In common Yemeni parlance, this was a situation in which a tribal sheikh could boast of the nominally equitable relations between himself and the head of state by saying, “He is my president and I am his sheikh.” Without this formula, the central government became weak and vulnerable to attacks and challenges. It was unable to defend even a tenuous federation that was supposed to give every clan and faction a piece of the pie. The nation was exhausted, the wings of power had been clipped, and the Harak Ganoubi (Southern Action) group and other secessionists had no use for the central government. This was when the Houthis moved in on Sanaa, claiming to speak on behalf of the common people. By the time they seized Sanaa the Houthis had real grievances. The federation formula that other groups in the country had tried to enforce had threatened to exclude them from resources, oil and sea access. Now the Houthis found themselves to be the top dogs. With battle experience, stolen army weapons, alleged Iranian aid and the backing of a protest movement, there was nothing to stop them. For them, getting to the top wasn't difficult, but staying there is likely to be hard. The social agenda they claim to back will not be easy to implement in a country that is torn by war and where more than half the population lives under the poverty line. Their relations with Iran are as likely to benefit them as undermine their credibility. And their infatuation with a medieval lifestyle may not sit well with the country's leftists, liberals and secularists. The Houthis have reinvented themselves over the past few years, but if they are to retain their newly earned power they may have to reinvent themselves once more.
