Between the 1950s and 1960s, Egypt and the United States went through a period of tension and estrangement. This ended when Anwar Al-Sadat, during and after the 6 October War, invited American diplomacy to play a principal role in ending the war. This marked the beginning of an era of negotiations and peace between Egypt and Israel, which led to the Camp David Accords in 1978, and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979. This drastic development was the base for the building of new and strategic relations between Egypt and the United States. When Mubarak assumed power, he continued Sadat's policy. The new and flourishing relations were supported by two pillars: US annual economic and military aid of $1.3 billion and Egypt's cooperation with the US, as proven in the US-led coalition to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991. Regardless of some clouds that gathered during Mubarak's era, such as Egypt withdrawing its ambassador from Tel Aviv following Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Achille Lauro incident 1986, and Mubarak's reaction to George W Bush's policy of promoting democracy in the Middle East, the two countries remained keen to keep relations on an even keel. Mubarak took number of steps that pleased the US, such as reaching “QIZ” (qualified industrial zones) agreements with, and selling Egyptian gas to, Israel. By the end of Mubarak's era, however, the national feeling was that Egypt was subordinated to the US, which had led to a weakening of Egypt's role and status in the region. The second phase in Egypt's relations with the United States came after the 25 January 2011 revolution and the removal of Mubarak — the US's strategic partner for 30 years. It seems that the revolution surprised the US administration. The first reaction of then secretary of state Hillary Clinton, apparently on the advice of her ambassador in Egypt, Margaret Scobey, was to affirm that Mubarak's regime was “stable.” The momentum of the revolution created a debate within the US administration where Clinton, the vice president and defence secretary advised “caution” while the president's White House advisors appealed to Obama not to wait to see how things would develop, but to do something. Obama adopted that view. In a televised address he called on Mubarak to “step down.” When the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took power following Mubarak's removal, the US followed developments closely. The main concern of a number of visiting US officials was to ensure that Egypt after Mubarak would continue its commitments to the peace treaty with Israel, and Egyptian-US military and security cooperation. It was clear that SCAF gave assurances on the two American concerns. The Muslim Brotherhood's assumption of power in 2012 opened a controversial era in US-Egypt relations. The prevailing view among civil society and political forces in Egypt was that the United States welcomed the coming of the Brotherhood regime on the basis that Morsi was elected democratically. But many scholars and analysts argue that the US administration was motivated by the expectation that the Brotherhood, as a moderate movement, would help contain radical Islamic groups in the region. This assumption found support in fact when Morsi succeeded in achieving a truce between Hamas and Israel in late 2012. Critics of US policy believed that the administration was tolerant of the Brotherhood's behaviour in power. Their reaction to Morsi's “Constitutional Declaration” on 20 November 2012 supported this belief, with the spokesman of the US State Department referring to it as an “Egyptian concern.” The 30 June revolution created further tension between the regime in Egypt and the United States. The US administration's reaction towards the post-3 July 2013 regime wasn't friendly. It reacted by suspending significant parts of US military aid to Egypt, including F-16 fighter planes and Harpoon missiles, at a critical time when Egypt was fighting terrorists in Sinai. Meanwhile, the post-3 July regime was advancing steadily in implementing Egypt's new political “roadmap”: drafting a new constitution, approved by a free referendum, and electing a new president through free and transparent elections. The regime looks determined to implement the third pillar of the roadmap by holding parliamentarian elections. Parallel to these internal developments, the regime was active on regional issues, including reaching a ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel. What was decisive in making the US administration reconsider its policy towards the new regime was the fact that Egypt was fighting terrorism that was threatening not only Egypt's national security, but also regional security — a decisive development after the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) group and its gains in Iraq and Syria. Subsequently, the US established a regional and international coalition to combat IS, in which Egypt's participation is considered essential. What will be the main characteristics in US-Egypt's relations in the new era? To start with, we have to recognise that Egypt's relations with the US are determined by the fact that the US is a global power and has global interests, while Egypt is a regional power with regional commitments and priorities. This reality imposes the need for an institutional and regular strategic dialogue between the two countries, to systematically review their bilateral concerns. Egypt needs this dialogue all the more to introduce its policies and clarify misconceptions that might emerge. It was encouraging that John Kerry, in his visit to Cairo on 3 December 2013, declared that the US is willing to establish such dialogue. This willingness was reaffirmed by President Obama in his recent meeting with President Al-Sisi. Obama called for a dialogue to be established at the ministerial level. In my view, to give the dialogue continuity, it should also be at the level of high officials, as well as civil society organisations. The writer is executive director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
