Qatar's quarter-turn The conditions for reconciliation between Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have finally been made public: the expulsion of seven Muslim Brotherhood figures and supporters from the Qatari capital, Doha, where they sought refuge after president Mohamed Morsi's removal in July 2013. The step comes five months after representatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries met in Riyadh to address the crisis between the three monarchies. Speaking on Friday, 12 September, the Muslim Brothers said their departure from Qatar was at their own initiative, and intended to save their host further embarrassment. It's likely that more Muslim Brotherhood and related figures will also be leaving Doha soon. There has been no official statement from Qatar to explain the policy shift and it's not expected to announce one, but its silence speaks volumes. After more than a year of positioning itself as a political opposition to Egypt's post-Morsi regime, Doha has succumbed to the pressure of its Gulf partners and is possibly re-prioritising its interests as a member state of the GCC. What happens next remains to be seen. Will Doha review its overtly politicised media policies and, after calculating its losses and gains, assume a more neutral role? Doha's losses aren't only measured by its alienation from other countries in the region, as evidenced by the withdrawal of the Saudi and UAE ambassadors from Qatar in March, but also by the reputation it has acquired as a small, oil-rich emirate that has overreached itself in its meddling in the region. Doha's policy since July 2013 has been to hopelessly tilt the balance in favour of the Muslim Brotherhood. It has done this by using various measures, such as giving voice to the group's leaders and supporters on its Al-Jazeera television channels, many of whom recklessly attacked Egypt's new regime and its regional allies on a daily basis. In other words, Qatar's rulers thought they could change Egyptian politics through its media outlets. Not only is this naive, it begs serious questions over Doha's reliability as a GCC member and how it will conduct its foreign policy in the future. Doha's miscalculated bet on the Islamists, who took on the role of an opposition-in-exile through Qatar's airwaves, has come to an end. But it is the Islamists — not Qatar's rulers — who are paying the price for the emirate's disastrous exploitation of their presence over the past year. Egypt's official reaction to the expulsion of the Brotherhood figures has been cautious, but the step should be received as a sign of goodwill on the part of Qatar. Indeed, the political mindset here will demand further concessions from Doha to convince Cairo — and, indeed, GCC states — of Qatar's seriousness. In reality, however, it is doubtful that Qatar will cease its support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists, even after the departure of these and possibly other figures who are still based in Doha. Ultimately, as all eyes turn to Turkey, which might be the next stop for some of the expelled figures, it might prove wise for Ankara to learn from Qatar's experience and adopt a more sensible approach to the issue of Egypt's opposition forces abroad. It serves no one's interests to allow or encourage dissidents to conduct their political opposition from states sympathetic to their causes. This has never brought stability to host countries, and Turkey's past experience with the Kurdish opposition abroad should serve as a practical reminder of its implications.
