The Muslims Brotherhood published a long communiqué 9 May that took many observers by surprise and led to speculation about the true intentions of the Brotherhood in the midst of presidential elections in Egypt. Unsurprisingly, the communiqué painted the organisation as a democratic force striving to set up a democratic regime in the country, and spoke of the “people” as the sovereign and custodian of the state.
The most revealing part of the communiqué was the attack on the Egyptian army.
The communiqué accused the army of seizing power in 1952 and turning itself into the “master” of the Egyptian people and rigging all elections and referenda ever since. It added that the organisation wants to correct the current situation in Egypt and in this context it asked for the return of the army to the “barracks” and to stop playing politics. In addition, it called on the army to stay away from the affairs of governance and to concentrate on the protection of the country and its borders.
The communiqué reiterated all the known positions of the Muslim Brotherhood and made clear that they persist in ignoring that a majority of Egyptians had took to the streets last year to chase them out of power. Instead of looking at the present from this perspective, they resorted to the old wrong duality of the army versus the people. And they still believe they are speaking in the name of all Egyptians.
If any observer thought that political developments in Egypt last year taught the Brotherhood a lesson, the latest communiqué of the group would dispel any faint hope that it is ready to change course and adopt a more inclusive political ideology away from political Islam. Going over the communiqué, one is led to believe that the Brotherhood is still in the mind-set of 1954 when it had tried to evict the army from power in order to govern instead. It adopted the same tactics from 2011 to the end of 30 June 2013, but this time the people came out in force to bring to an end a regrettable chapter in the contemporary history of Egypt and a quick end to the Brotherhood's presence in power. The communiqué's aim is to reduce the situation in Egypt today to a confrontation between the army and the people and to depict the former as an obstacle to democracy and not its defender in the long term.
The aim of the communiqué is obviously targeted to favour, indirectly, the chances of the sole candidate against Field Marshal Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi in the presidential elections scheduled to take place on 26-27 May: Hamdeen Sabahi. The latter is projecting himself as the one who is closer to the ideals and aspirations of many young people, and that if Al-Sisi wins the elections it would perpetuate “military rule” in Egypt that began in 1952, according to some parties and political forces in the country.
On the other hand, the communiqué also addresses both the United States and the European Union, to drive a message that the Brotherhood believes in democracy and is ready to actively take part in participatory democracy with other political forces. It is no wonder, then, that the communiqué was published almost simultaneously to what is called the “Brussels Document” by followers of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, which spelled out 10 principles that are not far from the gist of the 9 May communiqué of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Muslim Brotherhood is aiming to exert maximum pressure both internally and externally. Internally, it wants to mobilise the maximum number of voters against Al-Sisi and send a message to his opponent in the presidential elections that if he would win, he would have to reckon with the Brotherhood and reintegrate it into Egyptian politics, which means rescinding the decision of the former cabinet of Hazem Al-Beblawi to consider the group a terrorist organisation.
Externally, it is repositioning itself in case Al-Sisi carries the elections, so that American and European pressure would lead him to soften his position against the Brotherhood. In one of his interviews with the Egyptian media last week, Al-Sisi said that the Muslim Brotherhood “would not exist” during his rule. The communiqué wants to make sure that the Brotherhood comes back in force once presidential and parliamentary elections are over.
The thrust of the communiqué, however, is anti-army and aims at lending a hand to the prospects of Sabahi in the presidential elections. It is easy for the Muslim Brotherhood to deal with a weak, civilian president than with a stronger one — in this case Al-Sisi, who will have the backing of the state and all Egyptians who opposed the rule and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, and who are determined to work against their return as a significant political force in the future. It is interesting to note that Sabahi has adopted the same message, calling on the army to stay away from politics. I wonder why he had not said so 3 July 2013.
The deeper significance of the communiqué is that Egypt still suffers from the absence of a third political force that could mobilise a majority of Egyptians behind a grand vision based on the rule of law, democracy and equality, away from the ideology of the forces of political Islam, including the Muslim Brotherhood. Regardless of the branding of this third force, the longer it takes to develop, the deeper Egypt will remain in a political dilemma that has haunted us from the end of the 1940s when the political legitimacy of the monarchy collapsed and the army stepped in on 23 July 1952 to save the country from anarchy and the obscurantist rule of the Muslim Brotherhood.
How long it will take to develop such a force, or a strong coalition of various like-minded parties committed to the ideals of democracy and the rule of law, will be conditioned on how successful and quick the transition to democracy will be.
In this context, I have to admit that the prevailing economic conditions and dire financial situation in Egypt will greatly determine the outcome of this enduring confrontation between those who have fought for a true democratic order in the country and those who have built their political appeal and legitimacy on religion. By definition, the democratic claims of the latter will always be questioned. That is the reason why references to democracy rings hollow in the 9 May communiqué of the Muslim Brotherhood.
All those who hoped that the Muslim Brotherhood would undertake a drastic revision of their modus operandi and their ideology after their failed and disastrous one-year rule in Cairo were disappointed. They should have known better. The Muslim Brotherhood will never change. The group has always wanted power, and to keep it forever.
30 June will be the first anniversary of a mass popular movement across Egypt that had the courage and determination to enter into a showdown with the Muslim Brotherhood to prove that the country belongs to all Egyptians. Based on this communiqué, I doubt very much if the Brotherhood grasped that lesson. Instead, they have reverted to the same stale and old message that the army should go back to its barracks. If the army had remained in the barracks in 1952, and if the army had decided not to put an end to the dangerous and explosive political struggle last year, Egypt would have been a country ruled by a political force that only believes in its own political and religious legitimacy — and that there is no other alternative to such a legitimacy.
The communiqué of 9 May has made it clear that the Muslim Brotherhood and democracy are diametrically opposed, despite all claims to democratic orientation made in this communiqué. It is the same old mentality that still guides this closed organisation. And it remains the biggest threat to a quick transition to democracy in Egypt — not the Egyptian army. The writer is former assistant to the Egyptian foreign minister.
