Turkey these days is brimming over with conflicting images that have been riveting public attention and causing passions to flare at levels that have been unseen since Turkey's last date with rigged elections in the 1940s. Today, the controversy over reports of foul play in the conduct and counting of the results of the municipal elections that took place on 30 March looks as if it will continue to rage into the foreseeable future. What is certain is that this controversy has further damaged Turkey's democratic credentials in the EU and US. The latter country is the more important, but even so the Turkish newspaper Zaman, affiliated with Muhammed Fethullah Gülen, the Turkish preacher who had been the political and spiritual mentor of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for 12 years until he was identified as a mortal foe, devoted an editorial to the question of why US President Barack Obama had not congratulated Erdogan on his election victory. Surely, the answer was that the fraud and tampering in the recent polls were so flagrant as to shock Europe and the US and heighten their fears over Turkey's commitment to democracy and democratic values. This was why Obama, contrary to custom, did not pick up the phone to congratulate Erdogan. On top of the reports of electoral crimes and irregularities, the Turkish government has been actively obstructing the legal mechanisms for investigating them and bringing them before the courts. Nevertheless, the Turkish newspaper Milliyet has produced an opinion poll that contradicts the realities of the polls and, perhaps, even itself. It reports that 98.5 per cent of respondents would support Erdogan's nomination for the presidency, but if parliamentary elections were held now the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) would only win 48 per cent of the vote. The Republican People's Party (CHP) would win 26.5 per cent, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) would win 14.1 per cent and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) would come in with 6.4 per cent. Regardless of what one makes of these figures, statements by Turkish politicians and particularly by Erdogan have made observers gape. From these announcements, one could be forgiven for believing that Erdogan was not just at the centre of the state but that he was also above the state and its laws. It is difficult to imagine a political leader who would openly proclaim that he had not respected the rulings of his country's supreme constitutional court. Yet, Erdogan has had no compunction about denigrating Turkey's highest judicial authority for having performed the functions for which it was created, which are to uphold the constitution and overturn legislation that conflicts with its provisions and spirit. It was for this reason that the court opposed the AKP government's drive to restrict civil and political freedoms through bans on Twitter, YouTube and other social-networking sites, and it was for this reason, too, that it overturned points in the controversial law that threatened to place excessive control over judicial appointments in the hands of the executive. The law had previously been approved by a narrow majority in parliament and ratified by Turkish President Abdullah Gül. In order to avert any possible misunderstanding, the president of the court, Hişam Kılıç, stressed that its ruling on the law was clear and effective immediately. The justice minister was to be stripped of the powers that had been granted to him under the previous version of the law to appoint judges and public prosecutors, he said. However, Erdogan has had no respect for this ruling, and he has given the go-ahead to a plan to bring a bill before parliament with the intent of crushing the country's wayward judiciary, which issues decisions that conflict with the “popular will” that has given its unrestricted mandate to the ruling party and its leader. That leader has set his sights on a single goal. As one commentator put it, “Erdogan will not let anyone, big or small, compete with him or any institution, governmental or otherwise, stand in his way. His path to the presidency has to be smooth without the slightest bump in the road.” Yet, there is a problem: What will Erdogan do about the country's thorny Kurdish problem and the commitments he is supposed to meet in keeping the pledges he has made to the Kurds? The respite given to Erdogan during the municipal elections season is now over, and the time has come for him to act, even if that time is also punctuated by the sounds of gunfire. After a truce in which it supported the ruling AKP, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is turning once again to acts of kidnapping, intimidation, blocking roads and vandalising vital facilities. Its points of departure are the towns and villages of southeastern Turkey, including Şırnak, Viran, Urfa and Diyarbakir. Urfa has been the scene of particular tension between supporters of the AKP and of the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), against a backdrop of allegations of electoral fraud that led to the victory of the ruling Party's candidate in the town. In view of the area's high numbers of Kurdish inhabitants, it was not surprising to hear chants in support of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader who is serving a life sentence in prison on the Imrali Island in the Sea of Marmara. In the course of the violence in the area recently, gunmen set fire to several trucks after seizing their contents of food supplies. The assailants then fled to the mountains, threatening to return when their provisions and money ran out. In another incident, a group of gunmen attacked an oil-drilling company on the outskirts of Mardin, a city near the border with Syria, and set fire to a fuel tank and three trucks. Those actions were meant to serve as reminders. The PKK had cautioned the government that it would take concrete steps to bring the stalled peace process back on track and if not it would revert to arms. Milliyet charged last week that the separatist Kurdish movement was negotiating with the government “at gunpoint” in order to force Erdogan to make concessions in advance of the presidential elections in which the prime minister is expected to stand. One of these demands is for the government to grant autonomous rule to the Kurds in southeastern Turkey. Implicit is the warning that if Erdogan fails to meet this demand, he will not receive the support of the BDP, without which he will not succeed in winning the first round of the presidential elections on 10 August. If no candidate wins over 50 per cent of the votes that day, a second round will be held on 25 August, in which case Erdogan may have to face the prospect of the opposition parties uniting behind a single candidate to stymie his prospects of gaining the presidential palace. Analysts believe that the AKP government now has little choice but to offer significant concessions to the Kurds in order to secure their continued support for Erdogan. The decisions to remove a number of security chiefs from the cities of Hakari and Tunceli cannot be viewed in isolation from this matter. The officers who have been relocated are said to be supporters of the Gülen group, which has no great affection for the Kurds.
