“Closed organisations such as the Brotherhood have no place in the society of the 21st century. Things have changed from 100 years ago.” This is what Mustafa Hegazi, political adviser to the interim president, told Russia Today when asked about the status of the Muslim Brotherhood. His words summarised the official view of Egypt's oldest Islamist organisation, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). In a severe blow directed at the group, security forces arrested the MB's eighth Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie in the early hours of Tuesday on charges of inciting violence during the Rabaa Al-Adaweya and Nahda sit-ins. An arrest warrant against Badie was issued a few weeks ago. In a statement published in the Anadol Turkish news agency, the MB said that arresting Badie “is nothing but settling old accounts with the group and which reflects an official intention towards escalation.” The statement said that Badie “is just one of the group members and that arresting him will not weaken the group or hinder its members from continuing their struggle against the coup”. Immediately after Badie's arrest, the group stated that Mahmoud Ezzat, Badie's deputy, will temporarily occupy the post of the supreme guide. Such a quick decision indicates that the group was anticipating Badie's arrest. Political analysts differ on the repercussions of Badie's arrest on the future of the group. Some predict MB members will continue demonstrating and inciting violence to prove that the group is still strong. As analysts argue, the second generation of the group will play such a role. However, other analysts insist the MB will disintegrate with the arrest of its leaders, adding that the second generation will either sit at the negotiating table with state officials or totally disappear from the political scene. A third group says violence will be on the increase among the young generation of the MB who are seeing their leaders behind bars. On 16 January 2010 Badie was elected the eighth supreme guide of the group taking over the post of his predecessor Mahdi Akef, now arrested. Badie's son, Ammar, 38, was killed last Friday during Ramses clashes with security. Badie did not attend the funeral, fearing he would be arrested. Now, is it possible to extinguish the Muslim Brotherhood? The answer to this question depends on the way you interpret events of the past few weeks: the break-up of the sit-ins in Rabaa Al-Adaweya and Nahda on 14 August; the subsequent demonstration in Ramses; the Fatah Mosque attempted sit-in and the failure of protests called by the National Alliance in Support of Legitimacy to materialise. The Egyptian government says the Ministry of Social Solidarity is currently examining the legal status of the MB. But banning the group, warns rights activist Negad Al-Boraai, offers no easy answers. “The MB cannot be disbanded according to legislation for the simple reason it didn't come into existence through legal means,” Al-Boraai told Al-Ahram Weekly in an interview. According to Al-Boraai, the current crisis will not be solved by security or legal measures. It requires a political solution, and that needs social engagement and negotiation. MB members who wish to remain active in political life and who have not committed any crimes must be welcomed back and integrated into society. Al-Boraai criticised the current government's inability to handle the crisis. “Where is the cabinet?” he asked. “The Ministry of Interior is busy dealing with the violence but where is the rest of the cabinet?” Al-Boraai urged the government to start negotiating with moderate MB members, men like former Local Development Minister Mohamed Beshr and former Planning Minister Amr Darrag. Meeting with groups like the “Brotherhood against Violence” and “MB Youths” is pointless, he said, since they lack influence within the organisation and have no weight in the street. There is a danger, Al-Boraai warned, that South Egypt and Sinai are about to secede from the state. The solution, he argues, is not to ban the MB, but to explore political, social and developmental solutions. The question of the legal status of the MB has been repeatedly raised since the 25 January Revolution. Last March the MB said it had legalised its status by forming a society with branches in all governorates. But the society, says Al-Boraai, is a hollow front. Analysts say the MB's future depends on its relations with its rank and file, with the state, with society at large, and with the MB's International organisation. A member of MB Youths, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that young Brothers are critical of the way the group's leaders handled the crisis that led to Morsi's expulsion from office. Dissatisfaction among MB members is not something new. It started with the group's belated support of the 25 January Revolution. Ideological stagnation within the group has also caused disenchantment among members. The MB's thinking is widely seen as outmoded, lagging behind the times, and its attempt to resort to a “theology of necessity” has further alienated its political adversaries. The manner in which the MB reacted to Morsi's ouster is likely to poison its relations with the state for some time. Following its rise to power the Brotherhood acted with hostility towards many institutions, including the judiciary, the media, the police, the army and the entire executive apparatus — accusing them of being fulul, sympathisers with the previous regime. As for the group's relations with Egyptian society, one need only recall how millions took to the streets in support of the Tamarod call on 30 June, and again on 26 July, to sanction army intervention. Analysts attribute public opposition to the MB to the widespread belief that the group puts its own interests before those of the country. During the year in which the MB was in power it wasted no time in promoting relations with the members of the MB's international outfit: Hamas in Palestine, Al-Nahda in Tunisia and the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. Egypt, meanwhile, was overwhelmed by fuel and food shortages. Such problems turned many Egyptians against the MB in general and against political Islam in general. This will pose a considerable impediment to the future of Islamist-leaning parties in the country, the MB especially. Relations between the MB and its international organisation are also precarious. The MB's failure to handle the 30 June crisis was a blow to its international wing which had placed great hopes on an Islamist-governed Egypt. So what comes next? One possibility is that the MB will groom the so-called doves of the middle generation, such as Darrag and Beshr, for leadership roles, a step that may open the way to a broad-based political reconciliation in Egypt. Another possibility is that the disappearance of the — mostly hawkish — older generation will lead to fragmentation, something which has happened before to other parties, including the Wafd and the Communists. The emergence of a popular leader in one of the splinter groups may lead, later on, to their unification. A third possibility is that the MB will disappear altogether from the local scene, as happened in 1955 and then again in 1965 when MB members sought refuge in other countries, especially in the Gulf. It is doubtful, however, if Gulf countries will be as sympathetic to any influx of MB members as they were in the past. The fourth, and most frightening possibility, is that some MB members will join jihadist groups, leading to a wave of terror similar to that of the 1990s.
