The Tunisian armed forces are pressing ahead with their campaign against the militant Islamists in the Chaambi Mountains, the work of the country's Constituent Assembly has been suspended until further notice, and the sit-ins calling for the resignation of the current government and in defence of its legitimacy are still camped out in front of the parliament building. While there have been calls for dialogue, these have offered little hope for a solution to the crisis that was precipitated by the assassination of political activist Mohamed Al-Brahmi on 25 July in Tunis. The current bleak situation in Tunisia has a certain similarity to the current stand-off in Egypt. Public opinion is divided between opponents and supporters of Islamist rule in the country, though the confrontation with the terrorist forces ensconced in the mountains near the Algerian border is more reminiscent of the scenario that has been playing out in Mali. Regardless of how the current crisis might be characterised, however, to many it seems that the process of democratic transition in Tunisia has been put on hold just as the country's draft constitution was nearing completion and the transition itself was nearing its final threshold. More ominously, the country seems to be heading into the unknown even as the intransigence of its political elites can only serve the interests of the counter-revolution, which seeks to reproduce the conditions that prevailed before the Arab Spring revolutions across the region if not actually to return to power. Some members of the Tunisian opposition believe that the Tunisian revolution has been hijacked by the Islamist-oriented Al-Nahda Party that won a majority in the elections in October 2011. This segment of opinion accuses Al-Nahda of trying to lay the foundations for a theocratic state based on the literal application of Islamic Law, arguing that the current draft constitution has not only retained article 1 of the 1959 constitution but has also supplemented this with article 141 that explicitly states that Islam is the religion of the state. This, the opposition says, excludes religious minorities from the national polity, though in reply Al-Nahda has said that such provisions are “only natural” in a country in which the majority of the population is Muslim, adding that most of the country's opposition parties have not signalled their disagreement with either article. Nevertheless, some anti-government demonstrators have gone so far as to break the Ramadan fast in public and even to issue what may be heretical statements. Among these were members of the Tamarod (Rebel) Movement, which has been working to bring down the current troika coalition government, their provocative actions triggering outrage on some social networking sites, even among people who are not affiliated with Al-Nahda. But at the official level, the opposition has not employed such tactics and instead has focused on what it describes as the “dismal performance” of the government and the Constituent Assembly. The current government needs to go, it says, because it has failed to bring security to the country and has facilitated the rise in political assassinations in Tunisia and the proliferation of militant Islamist groups. The opposition also argues that the government has failed to deliver on the social and economic demands that originally inspired the Tunisian revolution. It says that the Constituent Assembly has failed in the task which it was charged to fulfil, namely the drafting of a new constitution within a stipulated period, and the opposition parties have now withdrawn their representatives from the assembly, demanding that it be dissolved and replaced by a commission of experts that would draft a new constitution that could then be put to public referendum. This stance may explain the decision taken by Mustafa bin Jaafar, the assembly's speaker, to suspend the activities of the Constituent Assembly until the members boycotting it, some 60 out of the assembly's 217 members, can be persuaded to return to it. However, according to experts on constitutional law the assembly needs a quorum of two-thirds of its members to continue its work and such a quorum still exists. The absent members could also be replaced by runner-up candidates on the electoral lists, and various suits have already been filed with the country's administrative court in order to overcome the problem of the stalled assembly. Nevertheless, many analysts believe that this problem should be regarded as a political and not a legal one. Al-Nahda's leaders are proceeding from this premise, believing that they will be able to find a way out of the crisis through dialogue and saying that they are prepared to compromise with respect to the composition of the government but reject the notion of dissolving the assembly. This, they say, is the chief source of the government's legitimacy, and it can only be replaced through new general elections. In this Al-Nahda has strong support among public opinion, as was reflected by the hundreds of thousands who participated in the “pro-legitimacy” demonstration that initially rallied in Kasbah Square in Tunis on the evening of 26 Ramadan and then moved to Bardo Square, only metres away from the anti-government protests immediately after the feast marking the end of Ramadan. Earlier this week, opposition parties and civil society organisations authorised the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) to represent them in national reconciliation talks with the parties making up the ruling troika government. In an emergency meeting convened following the assassination of Al-Brahmi, the UGTT adopted a resolution calling for the resignation of the present government and the creation of a non-partisan government that would administer the remainder of the interim period. However, it did not object to the continuing functioning of the Constituent Assembly, on condition that new elections would be held as soon as possible. But stability in Tunisia rests on more than the UGTT, and it is also contingent on the “revolutionary immunity” law that aims to prevent any possible resurgence of the former ruling party, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD). This was dissolved following the 2011 revolution in Tunisia, but its forces have begun to coalesce again beneath the banners of other parties, most notably Nidaa Tounes (Call for Tunisia). This party, perhaps the single most formidable opposition to Islamist rule, has now joined the initiative proposed by opposition politician Hamma Hammami to create a national salvation government to replace the current troika. Although Al-Nahda leader Rached Al-Ghannouchi has signalled his willingness to compromise on the revolutionary immunity law, a significant portion of public opinion rejects this, shouting slogans during the pro-legitimacy demonstrations to the effect that the “immunity of the revolution is a national duty.” In the opinion of some analysts, the deteriorating state of security in Tunisia is connected with the counter-revolutionary forces operating in the country, these being masterminded by what are described as the “remnants” of the regime of ousted former president Zein Al-Abidine bin Ali. Such analysts maintain that a crisis will erupt whenever the subject of protecting the revolution is brought up or progress is made in the constitutional drafting. This argument implicitly clears the militant takfiri groups in Tunisia of the assassinations of Al-Brahmi and of political activist Choukri Belaid. In like manner, it would seem to exculpate such groups of the murder of eight soldiers in the Chaambi Mountains area on 29 July. Regardless of the identity of those who committed these crimes, some are reminded of events in Algeria in the 1990s, and the Tunisian army has now launched a major offensive into the mountainous area on the borders with Algeria. Thus far, it has succeeded in apprehending a number of terrorists who were hiding in caves, and it has also arrested female operatives who were providing the terrorists with food. As a result of coordination between Tunisian Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh and Algerian officials, militants were prevented from escaping into Algeria, making it possible to apprehend other terrorist elements. The Chaambi Mountains have been declared a military zone, making it difficult to verify the official information or to assess the size of the militant groups operating in the area. What is certain, however, is that these groups are armed and that they have connections with militant cells elsewhere in Tunisia. The security forces have confiscated arms caches from such cells in Sousse, 140km south of the capital Tunis, and in the Wardiya district of Tunis itself. The stalled political process in Tunisia, the mounting tensions and the proliferation of arms have all had serious economic repercussions. Both Tunisian and foreign entrepreneurs have put their investment plans on hold, and the value of the Tunisian dinar has been plummeting. Some foreign companies have already closed up shop, and many people have entered the ranks of the unemployed. As a result, many Tunisians are now wondering where their country is headed.
