Egypt wants independence in its relations with the US, wherein each country acknowledges the value of its partner on its own merit. The Egypt-US relationship needs to undergo a restructuring with a view to liberating itself from the imposition of Israel as an integral part of the equation — in aid as well as trade. Presently, if Israel drops out, the whole relationship crumbles and Egypt may get neither trade nor aid. Two years after the revolution, Washington continues to adopt a “wait and see” attitude. Instead of supporting Egypt's ailing economy (as it had done in the past), we observe backtracking on the part of the administration strongly pressured by Congress. We also see a reticence on the part of US investment to become entangled in Egypt's economy. The first question that arises is whether the US is ready to help Egypt in its negotiations with the IMF, with which an agreement is becoming illusionary. The more we are made to believe that we are getting closer to signing the loan, the further off the agreement becomes. It is clear that Egypt is not capable of designing a credible reform programme and less so of implementing one, as such a programme necessitates a trusted social contract between those who govern Egypt and its citizens. Egypt needs to sign the IMF loan, not because of its magnitude, as the amount of the loan is minimal compared to the amount Egypt effectively needs. It needs to sign the agreement as a vote of confidence while forcing us to adjust, which will compound the hardships experienced by an already fatigued and desperate population. Failing to reach an agreement will be negatively received by the markets. Many Egyptians are wrongly convinced that the US has to step in to help sign the loan agreement with the IMF, maintaining that this would not be the first time where the US comes to our rescue. With the largest voting power, the US can use its clout to make the IMF more lenient in terms of the reform measures it seeks from the Egyptian government. The second question remains whether it is in Egypt's interest to deal with US aid as an integral part of an overall newly negotiated relationship with the US, or to keep it in its present format as an offshoot of the Camp David Accords? US aid policies towards Egypt have undergone some turbulent times lately. Apart from the $190 million that the US secretary of state released as a token of good will, aid to Egypt has been put on hold. The US Congress clearly stands firm against any potential move by the US administration. For the US Congress, Egypt's new government remains unknown and unpredictable. If the choice is left to the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), it might not be very supportive of aid continuance in its present format, although it will have little say in regard to military aid. It is conceivable that the FJP would like to detach aid from Camp David, which imposes Israel — as mentioned above — as an integral part of the equation. Decoupling US aid to Egypt from the Camp David Accords may be the right move, but it certainly entails a new cooperation framework between the two countries. Egyptian policymakers need to rethink Egypt's new leverage and the value that it can press upon the US in these unfavourable and changing circumstances in the region. Mutual interests should be revisited and identified in broader terms. The US administration has an interest to deepen its engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood into a tighter bilateral relationship, which the latter will eagerly welcome. But this is all conditional on the potential of the Muslim Brotherhood to govern and to reach a new modus vivendi with Egyptian citizens. Regarding our trade relations, the tendency to push for a free trade agreement (FTA) with the US is a myth. Not only can Egypt hardly cope with US requirements for an FTA, but also an FTA is not in Egypt's favour. How can Egypt acquiesce to an FTA that involves eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers on trade in goods and services, mutual agreement on investment and the harmonisation of domestic policies? Unlike those FTAs with the EU, FTAs with the US do not include any grace period, gradualism in implementation or aid packages to allow the less developed country to adapt. Believing that an FTA will attract more investment is erroneous, as foreign direct investment needs in the first place security and secured benefits rather than an agreement signed between officials, even if then ratified by parliaments. In addition, the $8 billion two-way trade between Egypt and the US is tilting in favour of the latter, so that the risks of increasing Egypt's imports outweighs the benefits of promoting its exports. Thus, inflating its balance of payments deficit and increasing its unemployment rate. Moreover, with the Trans-Atlantic FTA negotiations and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement negotiations, the US has more on its plate than it can digest, which makes it hardly interested in getting into trouble with Congress and a political argument with Egypt to negotiate yet another FTA. In addition, US interest in the region as a whole is waning. The strategic focus of the US is moving eastward for three main reasons: to impair China's strategic ability to manoeuvre and avert any attempts to achieve regional dominance; to curb North Korea; and to benefit from the growing economy of the Asian-Pacific. Also, over the coming five years, the US will change from the world's leading importer of oil to a net exporter, as it will account for a third of new oil supplies, according to the International Energy Agency. Consequently, demand for oil from Middle-East oil producers will slow, and hence, the priority of the region in US foreign policy will also diminish. Long gone are the years when the US stood firm against its ally the UK in its fight to regain its base in Suez when the matter at hand was the route to Middle Eastern fuel. Unlike what was expected, in his second term Obama is for a reduced role in the Middle East, as he does not seem ready to tarnish his political career by yet another US failure in the region. Furthermore, Israel's position seems comfortable with the status quo and President Obama is not interested in a two-state solution, or in brokering a deal at his own expense. Many years will pass without anything, which ironically enough renders Egypt's importance in the region questionable. Last but not least, the “Arab Spring” is not the simple vision of emerging democracy that the US supported and thought it was. Egypt's transition has been bumpy and marked with dissatisfaction, while fundamental debates are taking place on the role of women, the military, religious freedom, etc. So the strategic situation that arose after the Arab Spring is less favourable for Arab governments in general, and for Egypt in particular. These are but a few arguments that justify why we should not be expecting much of the US. Egypt's wellbeing and progress lie internally rather than externally. We have to put our house in order first — to help ourselves before we can look for external assistance and help from others.
The writer is director of the Prince Alwaleed Centre for American Studies and Research at the American University in Cairo.
