Few regimes have ever identified that they have been falling and that their rule has been close to an end. Weak signals of regime failure have always been overlooked by incumbent leaders who seldom have sensitive or reliable measures of their legitimacy. Accordingly, many such rulers inevitably lost power while unaware of the growing discontent among their people. In many instances of regime failure one can see a common sign of minimal contact, or even loss of contact, with reality. Psychologically, defence mechanisms play a paramount role in the initiation and maintenance of such characteristic behaviour of falling chiefs. Denial of regime failure has been an established practice for many falling rulers, where they have resorted to seeing rejection to their continued rule as an opportunistic act from a tiny minority of political opponents with limited presence in the political street. Minimisation of the impending threat has been endorsed as a defensive argument against rising opposition to such rulers. Yet, such counter arguments have never mitigated the threats that these rulers have been exposed to, or their early signs. As such, the minimisation of threats has been many times conducive to the escalation of a potential threat into an actual one that may eventually lead to regime collapse. Safwat Al-Sherif on 27 January 2011, just a few days before the Mubarak regime collapsed, emphatically asserted that the regime was strong and stable. Similarly, the very same words have been repeated by Salah Abdel-Maksoud, the current minister of information, during his meeting with media leaders, expressing that the Muslim Brotherhood regime is the strongest regime in the history of Egypt. It is hard to find words expressive of the loss of contact with reality in such statements of Abdel-Maksoud while describing the appalling conditions of Egypt's state and society under the Muslim Brotherhood ruling regime. Contrary to Abdel-Maksoud's perception, the March report entitled “Democracy Indicator,” issued by the Egyptian International Development Centre, mentions that Egypt has one of the highest rates of protest, having witnessed 1,354 protests in March, up from 864 in February. Such high rates of protest cannot occur under a “strong” regime as imagined by Abdel-Maksoud. Moreover, a regime cannot be strong and defied by ordinary citizens ignoring a curfew imposed by the head of such a regime. Within the same context, a strong regime should have improved the security status of its homeland, not let Egypt be branded as more dangerous for tourists than Yemen, Pakistan and Chad, as revealed by the World Economic Forum's latest report on tourism. In many cases such leaders have adopted projection as a defensive mechanism where they have acknowledged the crises that their regimes have been experiencing while blaming others for their own failures. Such rulers become victim to misperceptions, particularly regarding their identification of real political contenders. King Farouk, for example, always thought he would be toppled by the British, the Wafd, Communists, etc. He never thought that the army would be the force that would force him to step down. The same could be said of Mubarak, who always thought the Muslim Brotherhood was the only threat to his regime. Sadat, on the other hand, was obsessed with the left while the end of his rule was brought about by onetime allies within the political Islamic trend. Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood regime appears unaware that its real challengers are from the new generations of Egyptians. The regime has been focussing its war efforts against a symmetrical and traditional opposition while its major threat emanates from the less symmetrical, highly resentful yet growingly radicalised youth. Displaced and disenfranchised have become the youth of Egypt with their different socioeconomic backgrounds, a result that has been the consequence of regime misrule with its far-reaching and detrimental political and societal repercussions. Mohamed Morsi's role in the intensification of Egypt's political as well as social conflicts is evident, as many of his decisions have provided the basis for the continuation of such conflicts. Ongoing sectarian violence is perhaps the greatest illustration of the Muslim Brotherhood's failure in managing state and society. Fair to say that the regime has not initiated the conflict. But the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates have polluted the political environment with their violent and fundamentalist discourse and manoeuvres, giving ground for the intensification and surfacing of hidden tensions. Another stratagem adopted by failing rulers has been maximising their role in national affairs in the hope of maintaining popular acceptance for their continued rule. Misled by self-deception, falling rulers have always assured themselves of their invincibility as well indispensability to the nation. Perhaps the famous words of Mubarak stating that chaos would be the alternative to his rule are typical for such self-inflated egos. The same can be said about the Muslim Brotherhood regime with limited and out-dated understanding of the concept of legitimacy. Frederick Barnard mentions that democratic legitimacy is formed of three components: “the electoral (constitutional) right to rule; the procedural (normative) rightfulness in the exercise of rule; and the substantive (teleological) rightness in the ends of rule.” Morsi only reached the first component, while on the other two he fails miserably. The ill-fated constitutional declaration of November 2012 is a typical example for Morsi's abuse of power, and the malicious ends of his rule. For decades if not centuries there has been a debate on the method used to determine and thus unify beginnings of the months of the Hijri calendar across Islamic states. Calculations and sightings of the crescent moon have been used to fix such dates, though sighting has been acknowledged as the indisputable tool. Uncertainties among the people have always prevailed to the last minute, waiting for official announcements about the end of the month and the start of a new one. It can be said that by calculations the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood regime has been completed, yet the sighting of the crescent — representing the new month — has not yet been made. Egypt has been in such a phase of uncertainty about the exact date of the completion of an erratic era and the emergence of new beginnings. Just as most theologians oppose the use of astronomy in deciding on the beginnings of the months of the Hijri calendar, the ruling regime has been categorically rejecting any talk about its evident failure. Economically, socially and politically the regime has become precariously exposed. Evidently a miracle will never happen in any of these dimensions, a fate that suggests that the worst has yet to come. For instance, in the economic sphere, it looks that the long-awaited IMF deal will be conducive to further social upheaval resulting from the lifting of subsidies on many commodities and services. The same can be said about the political landscape, which has been witnessing an escalation from opposition to Muslim Brotherhood rule to a form of rejection of its mere existence. Socially, it is hard to imagine a workable conduit for the restoration of an acceptable degree of security, which is a basic human need. On the regional level, the regime is becoming more and more isolated, losing its few supporters like Qatar and Hamas. Globally, the regime's edifice has been tarnished by its coercive moves against its opponents, a condition that has made the EU — and to a lesser extent the US — highly critical of the regime's behaviour. Obviously, the regime's limited capabilities and competencies have been overstretched, and it offers no solutions to any of these draconian threats. Mr President: it can't be worse. Please don't wait for sighting the crescent.
