Democratic reform in North Africa bears the brunt of increased security cooperation between Washington and the European capitals, writes Rachid Tlemçani* North Africa's states, particularly the 'core' countries, of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, differ widely from one another, both in their historical evolution and their current realities. However, these regimes face similar political, socio-economic and cultural challenges, including widespread official corruption, economic hardship, high rates of unemployment, profound alienation among the youth, and the absence of any credible political alternative to the incumbent regimes. An overview of the limited political openings reveals that these governments have reacted differently to political opposition, particularly the Islamist groups which see Islam not only as a religion, but a political ideology that should be integrated into all aspects of society. The reform package which they envision also includes the organisation of a conservative "official Islam", to the detriment of the secular parties. Attempts to democratise the region have not culminated in democratic outcomes, but to the contrary, have served to strengthen authoritarianism. Morocco is a case in point. After the country gained independence in 1956, the king defeated the powerful nationalist Istiqlal Party, in order to retain power. He then established a system that interlocked the political and the religious spheres within the framework of a constitutional order, yet under the full control of the monarchy at the same time. According to the 1962 constitution, King Hassan II was empowered to nominate and dismiss the prime minister and cabinet at his discretion, without regard for election results, and to dissolve the People's National Assembly, to mention just a few of his powers. While other Arab countries banned opposing political parties the day following independence, Morocco remained one of the exceptions and allowed them to exist, but not to operate freely. As soon as he succeeded his father in 1999, King Mohamed VI pursued the policy of infitah, particularly in co-opting the opposition, secularists and Islamists. The king successfully helped transform the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) and the Istiqlal from opposition parties into servants of the monarchy. However, this policy called the alternance did not modify the power distribution in the makhzen (the politico-bureaucratic establishment). Currently, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) is the only registered party of relevance to run for elections following its transformation into the third largest party in 2002. It is expected to gain even more seats in this year's elections, but not the majority, due to the panoply of political parties that will run. The Justice and Charity (Al-Adl Wal Ihsan) , the largest political opposition movement, remains banned due to its rejection of the king's legitimacy as Amir Al-Mu'mineen, or Commander of the Faithful. The party's activities, however, are generally tolerated, as was the case when it organised a massive demonstration in Casablanca against the new family code, Al-Moudawana. To continue its "mission" in the new security environment, PJD leader Abdel-Salam Yassine, will probably adhere to the moucharaka (active participation) in the political process. Two decades into the reform process, democratisation has yet to begin in Morocco. In Algeria, during the course of its campaign against Islamic insurgents, the state has managed to co-opt the Islamist parties that rejected violence as a tool of political advancement. There are currently three legal Islamist parties which have participated both in government and the People's National Assembly. They are the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), the Movement for National Reform (MRN) and the Movement of Nahda (MN). The MSP, known until 1997 as HAMAS, was founded by Mahfound Nahnah in 1990. His first setback came during the 1991 legislative elections in which HAMAS failed to secure a single seat, while the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the majority of seats in the first multi-party election in the post-colonial period. At the height of civil unrest, HAMAS emerged prominently when five of its members entered the 90-member interim parliament, the CNT (National Council of Transition) whose members are nominated by the state. Nahnah was then one of three candidates in the 1995 presidential campaign. It received nearly 26 per cent of the vote. In the 1997 legislative elections, the MSP officially secured nearly 17 per cent of the votes and 69 out of 380 seats, becoming the second most powerful political party in the country. This ascendancy to political prominence stopped abruptly in 1999, when Nahnah was banned from presidential elections. The MSP was surpassed by the MNR under the leadership of Abdallah Djaballah, during the 2002 legislative elections. The MNR was founded in 1999, as a group which split from Ennadha, which had successfully challenged Djaballah's leadership in 1998. In the 1997 legislations, Djaballah emerged as Nahnah's leading contender, as the MNR secured nearly nine per cent of the vote and 34 seats. In 1998, Djaballah broke away from the party, disagreeing with the decision to support Bouteflika rather than field its own candidate. In May 2002 the MNR routed Adami's MN, taking 10.09 per cent of the votes and 43 seats to the MN's 3.58 and one seat. In the 2004 presidential election, Djaballah came third in a field of six, but polled only 511,530 votes or 5.02 per cent. This was a slight improvement on 1999 when he polled 400,100 votes or 3.96 per cent. As a result of the civil war, constitutional Islamism lost its electoral bargaining power during the May 2007 legislative elections. The MSP won 33 seats against 52 in 2002. Ennadha secured five seats against one while Al-Islah took only five seats against 43 seats in 2002. The Islamists lost around one million voters compared with 2002. Out of a total of 19 million, Islamism has become accredited with only five per cent. In Tunisia, in a bid to gain popular support, General Bin Ali launched a policy of democratic reform from the highest echelons of power downwards as soon as he rose to prominence in 1987. In the process, he legalised a range of political parties. Furthermore, he established a new policy that promoted Islam as a major element of national identity, opened communication channels with conservative groups, and strengthened religious identity. Bin Ali also restored autonomy to Al-Zaytouna University and reintroduced the call to prayer in the mass media. This short period, however, was followed by a wave of repression against both the secular and Islamist parties. Islamists are neither allowed to engage in politics nor involve themselves in charitable activities. During the 1990s the authorities arrested thousands of Tunisians and more than 30 of them died under torture. In 2006, Islamists attempted to defy a 1981 law which banned women from wearing the headscarf in public. Despite this, increasing numbers of Tunisian women are beginning to wear the controversial headscarf again. Over the course of his struggle against Islamists and others, Bin Ali has transformed Tunisia from a back-room of modernity to a semi- authoritarian regime. This process has been waged, up until the war in Iraq, with the blessing of the US and the European governments, and the media's support. Both the United States and the European Union, particularly France, enjoy good relations with the North African regimes which have not threatened to challenge the West's regional interests. Washington and Paris have no particular interest in how the Western Sahara issue, the major conflict in the area, resolves itself. Since 9/11, security and intelligence cooperation between these Western countries and the North African regimes have strengthened at the expense of democratic reform. However, the emergence of the shadowy "Al-Qaeda in the land of the Maghrib", a new Islamist group, now threatens these relations. * The writer is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Centre, Beirut.
