The question of the connection between the youth movement and the Arab future tends more to inspire abstract contemplation than down-to-earth research and field studies with the aim of amassing bodies of empirical evidence necessary for realistic country or regional level projections on the various social, political and cultural dimensions of this movement in Arab societies. After all, a study of this nature would be a formidable task, if only because each country case would have its own specific and complex properties even if some of the societies under study share many of the new dynamics that have been set into motion with the eruption of the youth generation's energies into the political domain, powerful enough to break the barriers of fear that had long inhabited the Arab psyche in what the Iraqi academic Kanan Makiya termed the “republics of fear”. Nevertheless, the following presents a tentative approach. It proceeds from the premise that the current political movements embody a new and vibrant dynamism that is the very antithesis of the political stagnation that had prevailed for decades in the relationship between generations in Arab countries. WAVES OF THE POLITICAL YOUTH MOVEMENT — EGYPT'S CASE: The rise of the political youth movement in Egypt followed the emergence of several activist groups and protest drives and the resurgence of a labour movement and collective actions within various employment sectors. Several years before the revolution there arose such movements as Kifaya (Enough) and the Association of Artists and Intellectuals for Change, and there were mass labour strikes in Mahalla Al-Kubra and a number of protest actions by some public sector employees seeking better working conditions and pay. A parallel is to be found in the General Federation of Labour in Tunisia that was instrumental in paving the way for the Tunisian uprising. In a second wave of political activism that led to the uprisings in Egypt (as well as Tunisia), younger generations spearheaded the protest movements, affecting a generational shift to the 1970s generation and younger age brackets. The demographic profile of the resurgent political activism was increasingly made up of 22-35 year olds, especially from the urban middle class in Cairo, Alexandria, Kafr Al-Dawwar and Suez, as well as from the industrial working class in Suez and Mahalla Al-Kubra. This profile could be seen clearly in the 6 April Movement, founded in 2008. Perhaps the most significant feature of this movement is that it made intensive use of modern telecommunications media to mobilise and organise general strikes. The activist youth generation has proven especially effective in mobilisation in virtual space and on the ground. This strength was demonstrated in confrontations in Mahalla Al-Kubra and then in the creation in the Facebook group “We are all Khaled Said”, named after a young Alexandrian brutally beaten to death by police in June 2010. The outrage stirred by this incident was instrumental to the build-up of discontent that, just over half a year later, would so dramatically channel into the mass action that broke the fear barrier. It was this Internet generation that injected new bursts of life into social and generational structures, and that sparked the revival of political life which had been moribund for 60 years due to the nearly total absence of effective political plurality, systematically repressed liberties and suppressed class and generational struggles, all of which aided the perpetuation of authoritarian military/technocratic rule and its increasingly encrusted political and economic elites. CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS TO THE NEW YOUTH MOVEMENT: As suggested above, the dynamics of the youth movement were central to the Arab revolutionary uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia. This dynamism was the product of numerous factors, chief among which are the following: - Images and instances of mass social and political actions and movements carried by the globalised media and conveying with increasing frequency the message that individuals and groups have a right to act collectively in order to demand civil and personal freedoms and liberties or to protest policies, political decisions or unacceptable phenomena. - The digital revolution and its ability to break through and transcend the boundaries and restrictions on the public domain on the ground. In Egypt, the dialectic between the restricted public sphere and the free virtual domain produced such virtual/practical political exercises as the 6 April Movement and the “We are all Khaled Said” group. It subsequently became the avenue through which the 18-30 year old generation of youth activists spearheaded the uprising the led to the downfall and eventual prosecution of Mubarak and some of the key figures of his regime. - Interaction in the virtual world of the blogger, Facebook and Twitter generation, especially in the context of its interplay with political activism on the ground, became increasingly instrumental to shaping a new political and social awareness among the youth generation. Most significantly, the IT and multimedia revolution has been central to the ongoing process of the dismantlement of the authoritarian and patriarchal social, educational and religious socio-political frameworks and structures that have and continue to impede the relatively fitful birth of the culture of the individual and individualism in the predominantly traditional class and social structures of Arab societies. The emergent youth movement in the period before what is metaphorically termed the Arab Spring accelerated this process, evidence of which is to be found even within the Muslim Brotherhood in the behavioural and attitudinal contradictions that have surfaced and are certain to intensify between the older 1960s generation (especially the Qutbists and “special apparatus” members who currently control the Muslim Brotherhood organisation) and a significant segment of Brotherhood youth. - The political youth movement, as it played out in the context of the current political and social conflicts and dialectics, had a powerful impact on the nature of what we might term “public speech” which, too, reflects the breakdown in traditional and traditionalist mores and structures. The growing inclination to challenge and criticise authority is indicative of a gradual move away from the demands of acquiescence and obedience long instilled in the Arab psyche by a prevailing patriarchal and authoritarian culture. This trend is reflected in a form of rebellion against wooden modes of expression and in a certain verbal audacity, generating a kind of linguistic bond among the youth generation. The phenomenon is particularly apparent in the scathing political sarcasm in Twitter exchanges, in the rapid coinage and circulation of new terms and expressions, and in the “violation” of linguistic conventions and of accepted and acceptable norms in “public speech”. - The senescence of the post-World War II to 1960s generations that have entrenched themselves in political and social authority, thereby generating and perpetuating the stagnation and the trend to fundamentalism in the idea systems and modes of political activity in Arab countries. The senescence is not so much a question of age as it is a question of the rigidity that sets on with age and its consequences. The obsolescence of the cultural and know-how capital among many of the older generations in the authoritarian and totalitarian systems and governments in this region is often glaringly obvious at the levels of political sensibility and imagination, the capacity to accommodate to social change and demographic shifts, and the ability to handle and respond appropriately to new political developments. In many crucial ways, the youth movement is a response to this ineptitude and, specifically, to the practices of the older generations that had been raised in an authoritarian environment and systematically exclude the young from positions of effective say in political parties, government, occupational syndicates and other domains of the establishment.
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE NEW YOUTH MOVEMENT ON THE ARAB FUTURE: In light of the abovementioned generalities, or initial impressions, on the dynamics of change that have been ushered in with the new youth movement, we can proceed to an attempt (albeit tentative since, again, the necessary substantiating empirical and analytical studies have yet to be performed) to formulate certain hypotheses or possible scenarios for the so-called Arab Spring. - Scenario 1: A growth in political and social rivalry and competition could generate dialogue processes that, in turn, could lead to the coalescence of a culture of dialogue. Such a culture, which must inherently rest on the relativism of the views and ideas exchanged, would promote the dissemination of values that support democratic principles and modes of behaviour in social and political intercourse. This, combined with radical or comprehensive political reforms, would support the process of dismantling the monopoly asserted by certain groups on the religious text and its utilisation in the profane, dirty and double-dealing world of politics. It would simultaneously support fresh and more open sermonic interpretations of the text and innovative development in religious ideological, theological and jurisprudential thought in the Arab world. The rapidly expanding forces endowed with the skills and culture of the constantly advancing digital technologies should enhance and accelerate these trends and, hence, boost the processes of democratisation in the Arab region. At the same time, they would eventually break the hold of political and generational senescence even if, in the short run, the fruits of the Arab Spring have been expropriated by politically and ideologically geriatric forces. Still, the question remains as to the extent to which the digital, post-modern changes in the world and the Arab youth movement, which is conversant in these changes, will be able to set the compass for the future of the Arab world. Economic and social crisis and faltering development policies in Arab countries, notably Egypt, Tunisia and Sudan, may exacerbate a gamut of already existing difficulties such as security failures, social and political discontent, rising inflation and unemployment, generating a potentially destabilising environment. We therefore need to consider other possible scenarios: - Scenario 2: Mounting social and political tensions due to economic straits. Already, labour strikes and other protest actions prompted by economic hardship and unacceptable work-related conditions have been on the rise in some Arab countries. The graver the economic crisis the more we can expect such unrest and, perhaps, the more intense and widespread clashes with riot police or the army will become in some countries. In the short and mid-terms, economic and labour-related demands would propel increasing numbers of youth into mass action, which may lead to spiralling violence of various political, social and sectarian dimensions. Naturally, the immediate future beyond this would be largely contingent on the outcome of the confrontations and the contradictions that would come to a head among diverse masses of youth as, for example, between those working for the newcomers to power (the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist forces) and secularised politicised youth, although it is important to bear in mind that the combinations are numerous in the current context of political, religious and sectarian fragmentation. - Scenario 3: Massive social upheaval among the most economically and socially deprived segments of society especially in the urban fringes, which would draw in large masses of youth from these quarters who have not yet participated actively in the political and social struggle. - Scenario 4: Conversely, society could be brought back from the brink of such disaster through minimum-level consensus that would make it possible to build on common grounds in a number of issues central to the reconstruction of political institutions and to the institutionalisation of fundamental conditions regarding democratic values and modes of behaviour within the framework of a government ruled by law. This, in turn, would lead to efforts to rejuvenate processes of integrating, assimilating and domesticating Western legal culture and reconciling it with the general principles of Islamic Sharia and, more importantly, with the loftiest Islamic values that touch on many aspects of life. Such processes would stimulate new dynamics that would propel broad segments of youth to engage constructively in the diverse political, social and intellectual activities in the public domain. The future of the youth movement is contingent upon the form of government and, most immediately, the extent to which the elders of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist movements allow youth effective say in political and social affairs by including them in meaningful ways in the decision-making and administrative processes of political institutions. So far, hope for such a prospect appears bleak. It is important to note the general lack of input, at present, on the part of think tanks with visions, expertise and policies for the future. Decisions are frequently haphazard, opinions often wild and irrational, and political action is more often reactive than proactive. This does not just apply to the government, but also to political organisations of the Salafis, to some quarters of the Muslim Brotherhood hierarchy, as well as to the conventional opposition parties and some secularist political forces. But perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the current situation in Egypt — and in Tunisia to a certain extent — is the decrepitude of the post-independence Arab state. It is a condition characterised by the dissolution of the components of the culture of the state, the erosion of its know-how capital and a relative decline in the levels of expertise and competence in the management of the agencies of government. A root source of this problem is a gross distortion of the concept and nature of the nation state. If, in theory, the state is an entity that remains neutral and above the political conflicts of rival parties and interests, in practice there is always an area of overlap and involvement in the political and social frays, to which testify all applied models of the concept of the modern state. Nevertheless, in the experiences of the post-independence Arab state the area of neutrality has been reduced to next to nothing, effectively stymying the evolution of the modern state in this region. In the Tunisian case, for example, the state had personified to a certain extent in the person of its first post-independence president, Bourguiba. This characteristic continued into the rule of the now-deposed Zein Al-Abidine bin Ali with whose person and regime the state became so closely identified as to strip the state of all but an outward semblance to the modern concept. Over the years, the post-independence Tunisian state had been reduced to a powerful security machine and its exercise of systematic repression in the name of the legitimacy of that state/regime, and to an abbreviated polity in the form of a tightly controlled state party. All of this was sustained by and fed on a vast network of corruption and nepotism that was primarily geared to the redistribution of wealth and the recycling of position among a narrow ruling “political” class. The modern state in Egypt had a longer evolution, dating as it did from the foundations laid by Mohamed Ali Pasha and his grandson Ismail in the 19th century. However, this state, too, along with the conventions and the culture of the modern state, has been the victim of gradual attrition as the consequence of personification or the reduction of the state to the personalised regime, the emergence of power centres revolving around the person of the president, and the militarisation and the totalitarianisation of the state through the involvement of the military and police establishments in political, economic and administrative affairs. These developments would ultimately prove detrimental to the management of the affairs of society, the processes of legislation and decision-making, the methods of selecting and recruiting elites, especially in view of the need to cater to the army and security establishments in ministerial, governorship and other key bureaucratic appointments. Again, it was a recipe for rampant nepotism, bribery, embezzlement of public monies and countless other crimes and abuses of office. One of the foremost effects of such phenomena was to destroy the concept of the state in the public mind, as the prestige of government and respect for the rule of law faded before the rise of a parallel system of law, namely the law of the markets of bribery, nepotism and other forms of corruption. The foregoing combined with the effects of the demographic explosion, soaring unemployment rates and closed horizons for political involvement to hasten the alienation of the young and, at a broader level, the widening gap between state and society. The political anomie or aloofness of the ruling elites heightened the gulf and aggravated the discontent that seethed below the surface. It was against this backdrop of mounting disaffection and mistrust between the ruling political elites and opposition and broad segments of society that there emerged the youth generation, primarily drawn from the middle class, that would grasp the openings offered by digital technologies to create forums for a protest voice and then to mobilise action on the ground, as was famously demonstrated in the “millioniya” (million man) marches that began in Tahrir Square on 25 January and led to the fall of the Mubarak regime. Unfortunately, the confused management of the interim phase favoured the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis and other political Islamist groups, and their accommodations with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. All of these parties shared a declining historical sensibility with respect to the revolutionary moment. They also appeared to have forgotten important lessons from the major political errors and deficiencies in our contemporary history, let alone Egypt's modern history as a whole. It is impossible to say whether such obliviousness or blindness was the result of a lack of historical insight, political knowledge or expertise. But what is even more astounding is that they have simultaneously overlooked certain facts that stare everyone in the face. I refer specifically to the demographic expansion of Egyptian society, in all its diverse components, due to the population boom. This huge society has become far too large for the state to contain, in spite of the growth in the power and size of its repressive machinery that had been put to the service of protecting the regime of Mubarak and his family, the centres of power and entrepreneurs around him, and the fiefs of his bureaucratic state. Egyptian society has proved bigger than a state that has begun to show the frailties of age and that has little to fall back on but the machinery of repression. In this context, we should consider another dimension in the relationship between the citizenry and the state, one referred to by Michel Crozier in the context of European societies as the crisis of governability, which occurs when a heavily top-down, rigid and rules-ridden bureaucracy causes people to turn their backs on the state and its apparatuses, including political parties and the political establishment. In Egypt, this crisis had steadily aggravated during the three decades that preceded the 25 January Revolution. But this crisis did not abate afterwards. Indeed, it worsened because of the absence of a consensus over the nature of the state and because of the conflict over the state and with the state between the Islamists and the democratic liberal, nationalist and leftist forces. Today, Egypt is still grappling with the questions as to whether the state, its constitution and its laws are going to be Islamised or whether the traditions of the modern “secular” state will continue and the conventions of modern customary law and the processes of acclimatising them and reconciling them with Sharia law will be sustained. Such questions are at the heart of the current political conflict and the acute polarisation of society. The struggle over them was apparent in the rivalries, pressures, tensions and disputes that raged while the constitution was being drafted and after it was adopted with all its rhetorical shortcomings, structural flaw, and abundant ambiguities. The conflict was even more boldly stated in the rhetoric calling for “constitutional legitimacy” and the powers the president had vested in himself by virtue of a constitutional declaration versus the established conventions of the rule of law and the principles of judicial autonomy, not just in Egypt but universally. Mistake after flagrant mistake call into question the competence of those in the seats of power, those in their immediate circles, and those who have their ear in offering constitutional advice and opinions. The political risks and dangers they incurred generated ongoing cycles of dispute, sharp divisions and explosive violence that still threatens to escalate to open and protracted political and sectarian violence. Beyond this there are the dangers of the eruption among the most underprivileged sectors of the population. In fact, an impending “revolution of the hungry” is now one of the dire spectres perceived by some members of the urban middle class as the consequence of the impoverishing of the urban and rural poor. The writer is director of Al-Ahram Centre for Social and Historic Studies.
