Impact of war on language (88), Strategic ambush, The Vietnam War (7), ‘Making War for Twenty Years' “You can kill ten of my men for every one I kill of yours, but even at those odds, you will lose and I will win.Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh to the French, late 1940s. In a statement similar to that made to the French almost two decades earlier, North Vietnam leader Ho Chi Minh warned that if the Americans "want to make war for twenty years then we shall make war for twenty years. If they want to make peace, we shall make peace and invite them to afternoon tea". As former First Deputy Foreign Minister of North Vietnam, Tran Quang Co has noted, the primary goal of the war was to reunify Vietnam and secure its independence. The policy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was not to topple other non-communist governments in South East Asia. The Marines' assignment was defensive. The initial deployment of 3,500 in March was increased to nearly 200,000 by December. The US military had long been schooled in offensive warfare. Regardless of political policies, US commanders were institutionally and psychologically unsuited to a defensive mission. In December, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces suffered heavy losses at the Battle of Binh Gia, one that both sides viewed as a watershed. Previously communist forces had utilised hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. However, at Binh Gia they had successfully defeated a strong ARVN force in conventional warfare. Tellingly, South Vietnamese forces were again defeated in June, at the Battle of Dong Xoai. Desertion rates were increasing, and morale plummeted. General William Westmoreland informed Admiral Grant Sharp, commander of US Pacific Forces, that the situation was critical. He said, "I am convinced that US troops with their energy, mobility and firepower can successfully take the fight to the NLF (National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam)". With this recommendation, William Westmoreland was advocating an aggressive departure from America's defensive posture and the sidelining of the South Vietnamese. By ignoring ARVN units, the US commitment became open-ended. Westmoreland outlined a three-point plan to win the war: - Phase one: Commitment of US (and other free world) forces necessary to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965. - Phase two: US and allied forces mount major offensive actions to seize the initiative to destroy guerrilla and organised enemy forces. This phase would be concluded when the enemy had been worn down, thrown on the defensive, and driven back from major populated areas. - Phase three: If the enemy persisted, a period of 12 to 18 months following Phase two would be required for the final destruction of enemy forces remaining in remote base areas. The plan was approved by President Johnson and marked a profound departure from the previous administration's insistence that the government of South Vietnam was responsible for defeating the guerrillas. Westmoreland predicted victory by the end of 1967. President Johnson did not, however, communicate this change in strategy to the media. Instead, he emphasised continuity. The change in US policy depended on matching the North Vietnamese and the NLF in a contest of attrition and morale. The opponents were locked in a cycle of escalation. The idea that the government of South Vietnam could manage its own affairs was shelved. It is widely held that the average US serviceman was nineteen years old, as evidenced by the casual reference in a pop song ("19" by Paul Hardcastle); the figure is cited by Lt. Col. Dave Grossman ret. of the Killology Research Group in his 1995 book On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. However, it is disputed by the Vietnam Helicopter Flight Crew Network Website, which claims the average age of personnel was 22. This compares with 26 years of age for those who participated in World War II. Soldiers served a one-year tour of duty. The average age of the US military men who died in Vietnam was 22.8 years. The one-year tour of duty deprived units of experienced leadership. As one observer noted, "we were not in Vietnam for 10 years, but for one year 10 times." As a result, training programmes were shortened. Some NCOs were referred to as "Shake 'N' Bake" to highlight their accelerated training. Unlike soldiers in World War II and Korea, there were no secure rear areas in which for rest and recreation. One unidentified soldier said to United Press International (UPI) that there was nothing to do in Vietnam and therefore many of the men smoked marijuana. He said, "One of the reasons I guess one of the biggest reasons that a lot of GIs do get high over here is there is nothing to do; this place is really a drag; it's a bore over here. Like right now sitting around here, we are getting loaded. Whereas, it doesn't really get you messed up, that's I guess the main reason why we smoke it." Dear Egyptian Mail readers, your contributions to and/or comments on articles published in this corner are welcome. We promise to publish whatever is deemed publishable at the end of this series. [email protected]
