LONDON - Osama bin Laden took the rare step on Sunday of claiming credit for a failed al-Qaeda attack, but the apparent admission of weakness contained an implicit message of defiance: We can and will carry out more attacks. That boast -- in a bin Laden audio statement featuring a poetic taunting of US President Barack Obama -- might have been dismissed as bluster by many analysts a year or so ago. Bin Laden and his associates are under increasing pressure from US drone attacks on the mountainous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan where they are believed to be hiding. They face uncertainty from talk that their Afghan Taliban hosts are considering possible negotiations with the Afghan government, a move that might deprive al Qaeda of a vital ally. Globally al Qaeda is a diminished force as an inspirational ideology, partly because suicide attacks on civilians in Iraq and elsewhere have alienated many once sympathetic to its cause. But the Dec. 25 attack on a U.S. airliner claimed by bin Laden, and a string of arrests of suspected pro-al Qaeda militants in the United States in 2009, shows al Qaeda's brand of extremism retains global currency for a dangerous and committed few. Analysts suspect bin Laden has hit upon a strategy of smaller, more easily-organised attacks, supported by globally-scattered hubs of sympathisers and financiers. Analysts say that while al Qaeda may no longer be capable of the complex team-based operations epitomised by Sept. 11, it is willing and able to field individuals radicalised at a distance and deployed in "armies of one" against high profile targets. Individuals with limited amounts of direct support, training or financing from decentralised units of al Qaeda or allied groups have shown they are able to pose a real security threat. Examples include an Aug. 27 2009 attempted assassination of a senior Saudi security official by a suicide bomber, a Dec. 29 Afghanistan suicide bombing that killed seven CIA employees and the Nov. 5 killing of 13 at a US army base by a gunman linked to a Yemen-based preacher. Even a botched operation can be a success. The Aug. 27 attempted assassination was a propaganda coup for al Qaeda's Yemen-based affiliate, known as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The admiration generated by the attack in jihadist circles encouraged recruits to go to Yemen and join the group from countries in the immediate region, counter-terrorism source say. And the failed Dec. 25, combined with the Western intelligence failures that lay behind it, caused significant short-term disruption to air travel around the world. Longer-term the security concerns generated by the attack are likely to impose greater spending on security and related technology by the travel and hospitality industry. anxiety and fear, a prime aim of all terrorist groups. And memories of the fear and anxiety it generated could extract a reputational toll on some airlines and destinations for some time to come. Bonuses for al-Qaeda included the infighting the attack sparked within the US intelligence community and reports of strains between the United States and some Western allies over allegations of blockages in intelligence sharing.
