Egypt's current account gap narrows, but overall BoP records deficit    Egypt's PM reviews debt reduction strategy, eyes more private investment    Egypt hosts international neurosurgery conference to drive medical innovation    Egypt, India discuss expanding industrial, investment partnerships    World Bank proposes Egypt join new global health initiative    Egypt's EDA discusses Johnson & Johnson's plans to expand investment in local pharmaceutical sector    I won't trade my identity to please market: Douzi    Sisi sends letter to Nigerian president affirming strategic ties    Egypt welcomes 25-nation statement urging end to Gaza war    Egypt, Senegal sign pharma MoU to unify regulatory standards    Egyptian pound ticks down in early Tuesday trading    Famine kills more Gaza children as Israel tightens siege amid global outrage    Kuwait's Crown Prince, Egyptian minister discuss strengthening cooperation    Egyptian Drug Authority discusses plans for joint pharmaceutical plant in Zambia    Egypt's FM seeks deeper economic, security ties on five-nation West Africa tour    Two militants killed in foiled plot to revive 'Hasm' operations: Interior ministry    Egypt foils terrorist plot, kills two militants linked to Hasm group    Egypt, Somalia discuss closer environmental cooperation    Egypt exports 175K tons of food in one week    Giza Pyramids' interior lighting updated with new LED system    Egypt's EHA, Huawei discuss enhanced digital health    Foreign, housing ministers discuss Egypt's role in African development push    Korea Culture Week in Egypt to blend K-Pop with traditional arts    Egypt, Uruguay eager to expand trade across key sectors    Egypt reveals heritage e-training portal    Three ancient rock-cut tombs discovered in Aswan    Sisi launches new support initiative for families of war, terrorism victims    Egypt expands e-ticketing to 110 heritage sites, adds self-service kiosks at Saqqara    Egypt's Irrigation Minister urges scientific cooperation to tackle water scarcity    Palm Hills Squash Open debuts with 48 international stars, $250,000 prize pool    Egypt's Democratic Generation Party Evaluates 84 Candidates Ahead of Parliamentary Vote    On Sport to broadcast Pan Arab Golf Championship for Juniors and Ladies in Egypt    Golf Festival in Cairo to mark Arab Golf Federation's 50th anniversary    Germany among EU's priciest labour markets – official data    Paris Olympic gold '24 medals hit record value    A minute of silence for Egyptian sports    Russia says it's in sync with US, China, Pakistan on Taliban    It's a bit frustrating to draw at home: Real Madrid keeper after Villarreal game    Shoukry reviews with Guterres Egypt's efforts to achieve SDGs, promote human rights    Sudan says countries must cooperate on vaccines    Johnson & Johnson: Second shot boosts antibodies and protection against COVID-19    Egypt to tax bloggers, YouTubers    Egypt's FM asserts importance of stability in Libya, holding elections as scheduled    We mustn't lose touch: Muller after Bayern win in Bundesliga    Egypt records 36 new deaths from Covid-19, highest since mid June    Egypt sells $3 bln US-dollar dominated eurobonds    Gamal Hanafy's ceramic exhibition at Gezira Arts Centre is a must go    Italian Institute Director Davide Scalmani presents activities of the Cairo Institute for ITALIANA.IT platform    







Thank you for reporting!
This image will be automatically disabled when it gets reported by several people.



The Turkish coup and the mania of cockfighting fans in Egypt
Published in Daily News Egypt on 24 - 07 - 2016

The failed coup in Turkey has revealed an imbalance in the way of thinking between Islamist elites, the political Islamic current, and the military state in Egypt. If you take one look at the logic by which these "teams" analyse and react to recent events through traditional media platforms and social media networks, you will see that they are dealing with the changes in the way that fans of cockfighting would—there is no logic and no thinking. All you hear are the crazy cheers of fans who want to see more blood and death inside the ring.
The two teams have found similarities between what took place in Egypt three years ago and what took place in Turkey a few days ago. Supporters of the political Islamic current have recalled the scene of the 30 June Uprising amid their defence of the Turkish Murshid (supreme guide). They practised their inherited habit of linking cases with absolutely no connection to each other, and once the coup was announced as a failure, they went back to their old habits of living in delusion and telling lies that no one else believes. They go back to fooling themselves with legends about 30 June, the "Photoshop revolution", their president who would eventually return to power, and the reeling coup.
On the other hand, the team of "state militarisation" and those who believe in pure military ruling have dealt with the situation with intellectual adolescence amid an imbalance of values. They were more supportive of the coup than the Turkish military itself. In fact, their stance was more extreme than those of historic opponents of the Justice and Development Party, the liberals and leftists, and the historic opponents of Erdogan, who were against the coup which would have destroyed the democratic rules that the Turkish people have lived by the past three decades.
Now that the Turkish coup is over, are the two teams capable of some clear thinking to try and see events from different perspectives? If the only common denominator between the two teams is the attempt to connect the 30 June Uprising in Egypt with 15 July in Turkey, does this mean there were actual similarities between the two events?
Initially, there are no similarities between the two events, neither on the track nor in the results. The 30 June Uprising was a movement by people of a various ideologies, widespread across Egypt and proceeded by political movements that escalated month after month until, finally, 30 June came.
The move called for the military institution's intervention, according to its moral responsibility, of managing the transition stage after the 25 January Revolution. Thus, the military intervention on 30 June did not fall into dispute between the leaders and officials of the army.
On the other hand, 15 July was a military movement by a small group of centrist leaders in the Turkish army—it lacked the consensus of the military institution, political support, and public or moral justification.
In terms of motives and justification, there is a fundamental difference between the two events. The military institution intervention in Morsi's removal was based on people's demands—we can no longer doubt that they had numerical and political majority. We cannot call their demands into question either.
Erdogan and his party's removal was not a public demand of any kind, even with the growing rage against Erdogan's latest practices. Turkish people still believe that change can happen through the political track with no need for the military's intervention.
While in Egypt, people were facing a religious, political faction that was restructuring policies and legislation in a way that served itself and its desire to remain in power. This faction was industrious in forming armed militia in anticipation of any moment of defiance with the Egyptian people.
The faction's "Brotherhood-isation" of state institutions was based on sectarian partisan ideology, rather than on efficiency and professionalism. In one word, the Egyptian army's intervention in Egypt was necessary to stop this fascist scheme.
Erdogan and his party in Turkey have achieved impressive economic success during the past decade and half and have improved the standard of living and public services for the Turkish people.
They adopted and announced transparent programmes which were viable for social and economic reforms. As a result, Erdogan gained popularity which helped him to adopt constitutional and legal amendments that deducted from the balance of "Atatürk" institutions that were considered his enemies.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt wanted to be paid in advance—they began by trying to tailor the constitution and the law to suit them before providing any indicator of their validity to rule.
July in Turkey differs completely from June in Egypt, the revolution is different from the coup, and the armies that move based on its people's demands are different from those armies that are moving for their own interests.
Erdogan is not Morsi, Justice and Development is not the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Everything is different.


Clic here to read the story from its source.