Revolutions in the modern age are never only a domestic development, and Arab revolutions are no exception. The state is one of several building blocks in an international system. A revolution in one country is a sign of change, for better or for worse, in one of these building blocks. It is likely to cause changes in the entire structure that other states cannot ignore. Beyond this general rule, revolutions and interventions should be evaluated case by case. The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt completed their initial phase of regime removal with minimal foreign intervention. Local political intervention was sufficient in both cases. But things are different in the cases of Bahrain and Libya. Turmoil in Bahrain has had a strong regional dimension since day one. Long-standing Iranian demands in Bahrain have rendered its fate a matter of regional and international concern for decades. Bahrain's position on the frontier between the Arab-Sunni and Persian-Shia worlds grants the conflict there additional regional significance. Bahrain looks like a Sunni-ruled Shia enclave in the heart of the Sunni Arab Middle East. Turmoil in Bahrain jeopardizes the regional balance among states, nations and sects; regional actors had no choice but to intervene. The uniqueness of the Bahrain situation is derived from the fact that regional allies of the government there took the lead in the intervention. The Gulf Cooperation Council proved to be the most effective and cohesive regional bloc in the Middle East. Bahrain's GCC allies demonstrated a great deal of coordination and resolve from the beginning of the crisis. The GCC intervention in Bahrain followed a comprehensive plan with political, economic, media and military dimensions. Contrary to the typical western intervention, the GCC move aimed at defending the status quo and thwarting the challenge of the Shia opposition. The GCC governments experienced no confusion regarding their goals — no conflict between ideological and pragmatic considerations — thereby saving them the hesitation and reluctance typically apparent in western policy. First, the GCC countries under Saudi leadership made a show of political support for the monarchy in Bahrain. They then committed generous financial resources to the troubled country. During all phases of the crisis they employed their media and propaganda resources to serve their purposes without being restrained by professional and ethical considerations. They directed Gulf-controlled media outlets to play down the revolt in Bahrain. Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera, which proved to be very effective in promoting the cause of revolution in Tunisia and Egypt, were used to achieve the opposite outcome in the case of Bahrain. The pan-Arab media have been very effective in manipulating revolution around the region in past years. The role of media and propaganda wars in inter-Arab politics is as important as the role of direct military intervention. This was proven by Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s, and is being proved again in the current time of revolutionary change. When all media, financial and other passive instruments failed to restore stability in Bahrain, the GCC countries did not hesitate to deploy military forces there. Even though Qatar did not take part in the military phase of the GCC's joint plan, it avoided causing any disruption in GCC policy. The GCC countries operated as a coherent concert of autocrats determined to avert revolutionary change at any cost. This unconfused realist approach applied by the GCC countries enhanced their chances of success. Their determination enabled them to render irrelevant western confusion regarding the crisis. Thus, the distinct nature of the conflict in Bahrain and the well-defined priorities of its neighbors facilitated effective intervention. At least in the short term, this has contained the conflict and allowed an opportunity for reconciliation. This is the exact opposite of the situation in Libya, which is likely to develop into extended conflict with further foreign intervention and more serious consequences for Libya's neighbors. The absence of any credible regional institutions in North Africa similar to the GCC in the Gulf is conducive to further instability. A lot of conflicting narratives have emerged from Libya. None is sufficient to shed light on the political dynamic underlying the conflict. The "National Council" in the forefront of the anti-Qaddafi forces has little credibility in commanding opposition forces on the ground, which look like a broad and loose coalition of tribal and political groups, including a wide spectrum of Islamists. The obscure political structure in Libya does not allow for a clear outcome of the conflict, which in turn explains western and regional reluctance and the incohesive intervention there. The western intervention in Libya is a product of both the media and the atrocities committed by pro-Qaddafi forces. The unprecedented Arab League resolution demanding the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya neutralized any western pretext not to intervene. The Arab League decision was made possible through the support of the GCC countries that apparently chose to sacrifice Muammar Qaddafi's regime in order to protect theirs. Further, rescue of civilians in Libya is a popular demand in almost all Arab countries, where governments chose to respond as a means of improving their position at home, with little consideration of the wider regional implications of foreign intervention in Libya. The vague western intervention strategy in Libya reflects both great uncertainty regarding the political reality on the ground there and an effort to avoid military entrapment. Western intervention can mitigate pressure on western governments concerning the suffering of the people of Libya. Western intervention, however, is not likely to be conclusive and decisive in determining the outcome of the conflict. Indeed, it is rather likely to prolong the conflict. While western powers will strongly resist further involvement in Libya beyond the level of air assault, Arab and perhaps African neighbors don't have that luxury. Egypt, in particular, cannot avoid a role in the Libyan conflict. Even though it has adopted a low profile, Egypt's involvement is likely to increase. The hundreds of thousands of Egyptian laborers in Libya, kinship relations between the tribes of Egypt's western desert and Libya's east, and pressure from conflicting Libyan parties all beckon Egypt to get involved. Fairly credible reports of Egyptian and other militants pouring into Libya across the two countries' border already exist. Prolonging the conflict in Libya is conducive to consolidating the influence of militants in the eastern part of the country, a scenario that Egypt cannot long ignore. Unfortunately, Egypt has to make serious choices in Libya even before fully recovering from the impact of the revolutionary upheaval it just experienced. Gamal A. G. Soltan is director of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with bitterlemons-international.org
