Why has the alliance between Turkey and Israel fallen apart? The answer is simple: a Turkish regime that is Islamist neither needs nor wants the continuation of such a relationship. This has been obvious to Israeli analysts for several years despite the fact that the world has only recently realized the situation. The alliance was based on three fundamental strategic interests, though the two sides also received three other benefits from the relationship. Let us begin with the interests. First, the pre-Islamist Turkish governments and armed forces saw the greatest threats as being revolutionary Islamism (for example, Hamas and Hezbollah) and, in particular, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Both Ankara and Jerusalem had common enemies. Thus, there was a strong basis for cooperation. This has all changed. Saddam Hussein was overthrown in Iraq, ending that aspect of the problem. As for Iran and Syria, the current Turkish government views them as allies. Thus, instead of being aligned with Israel against Iran and Syria, Turkey is now aligned with Iran and Syria against Israel. The same point applies to two other common enemies, Hamas and Hezbollah, which are now also the regime's allies against Israel. Another foundation for the alliance was the attitude of the Turkish armed forces. Not only did they view Israel as an ally against their external enemies, they also perceived it as an important supplier of military equipment and modernization of their existing arsenal. The military had a lot of strategic leverage with the Turkish government, which wanted to keep it happy. This has all changed. The armed forces were weakened by EU-encouraged reforms, and their political power was reduced. Beyond this, however, the current regime regards the army as an enemy to be tamed. The fact that the armed forces look with favor on Israel now becomes a motive for the Turkish government to break the relationship with Israel in order to fulfill its general domestic goal regarding the military. The third basis of the relationship was that Israel furnished Turkey with an asset in its dealings with the United States. Israel's lobby and supporters backed Turkish interests in Washington. This has all changed. Not only has the US-Israel relationship declined under the Obama administration, but Turkey's regime found out that it could get away with all sorts of actions against US interests without cost. Thus, the whole basis of the relationship evaporated or even reversed itself. There were, however, also three different benefits from the relationship that remained important for a while to the Turkish regime. Israel was a valuable trading partner. But it has been replaced by Arab countries and Iran in this respect. Israel was a major source of money from tourism. Turkey had to be willing to sacrifice this. The same applies to the opportunity offered to the Turkish regime to play mediator, especially in Israel-Syria negotiations, in order to increase its own prestige and regional influence. Other developments, however, made the Turkish regime willing--even eager--to sacrifice the relationship. On one hand, the AK party Islamists gained increasing confidence as they did better in elections. A lot of the sense of caution and pretense that the regime was merely a center-left government without Islamist goals was abandoned. The final straw was the internal economic crisis and the political threat to the regime. With the revival of the CHP opposition and discontent, the regime faced the possibility of losing the constitutional referendum set for later this year and next year's elections. In a time-tested tradition, the Turkish government stirred up hatred for Israel and the Jews to mobilize support at home. The Davos incident was a test case for this demagoguery. Does this analysis mean that events like the December 2008-January 2009 Gaza war or the recent Gaza flotilla confrontation, with the deaths of nine Turkish citizens, were of no importance? Well, in fact they were of relatively little importance in the major change that took place. If the same events had happened under a different Turkish government, there would have been short-lived friction but no fundamental change in the relationship. It should also be noted that the Turkish government at the highest level played a central role in organizing the flotilla and then escalating the crisis to a point close to war. Yet the foundation had already been kicked out of the relationship before these events. Had they not happened, the result would be the same in strategic terms. The difference is that the Turkish regime would have tried to keep the trade, tourism and mediation components. Even these, however, would perhaps have been sacrificed to suit its domestic political need for a foreign scapegoat that would unite Turks around it. Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center at the Herzlia Interdisciplinary Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal and of Turkish Studies journal. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with bitterlemons-international.org.
