The recent agreement in Doha to end Lebanon s 18-month political stalemate begins the process of re-establishing a functioning government and addressing the legitimate concerns of the Lebanese people. It postpones the discussion about the future role of Hezbollah in Lebanese society until after the election of the president, which brings us to the genius of this agreement: it separates the concerns of the Shia community from those of Hezbollah. This is a crucial development because political equilibrium cannot be restored in Lebanon so long as these two issues are treated as one. The Shi a community was concerned with the failure of the Lebanese political system to provide adequate representation for the largest faction within Lebanon. Successful governance of Lebanon requires that the three largest confessional groups - Maronites, Sunnis, and Shia - have sufficient power within the government to protect their interests. For Lebanon to be governed, a consensus must be reached among these three groups, with each group s allocated political weight playing a determining role. The redistribution of power that occurred at Taif in 1989 shifted influence from the Maronites to the Sunnis, while Shia concerns were left unaddressed. At that time, Hussein Husseini, a Shia leader, observed that Shia political rights were not protected by the Taif Agreement. He recognized achieving such protection was not then possible and that Shia concerns would have to be addressed in the future. They were not. In November 2006, all Shia members of the Lebanese Cabinet submitted their resignations as an attempt to demonstrate their lack of confidence in the government. Thus, the essential consensus required for legitimate governance no longer existed. The Lebanese government chose to govern without Shia support. Even though there were several reasons leading to the resignation of the Shia ministers, the government s decision reinforced the perception that Shia interests were not taken seriously. Thus, it became essential for the Shia community to prove that Lebanon could not be governed without their support. The past 18 months of political impasse has been the result. The Doha agreement breaks this impasse and restores a governing consensus among Maronites, Sunni, and Shia. This objective was accomplished by forming a Cabinet in which the Shia and their allies have sufficient representation to assure that their interests are protected. The second and most difficult accomplishment of the agreement was the drafting of a new election law to replace the Syrian-inspired one under which the current government had been elected. Revision of the law was essential to assure that a governing consensus was sustainable. The accord achieved through the skilful facilitation of the government of Qatar and the Arab League has halted the sit-in demonstrations in downtown Beirut. Michel Suleiman was elected president on May 25, and tranquility is being restored in Lebanon. Political and economic conditions have the prospect of improving for the first time since the 2006 war with Israel. However, the Hezbollah issue still needs to be addressed. While clearly intertwined with the concerns of the Shia community, Hezbollah presents a series of challenges well beyond the concerns of the Lebanese Shia. Few will deny that during the last 18 months the influence of Hezbollah increased. That does not mean that the full array of Hezbollah actions and policies, which alienate much of the world, receive unanimous support among Lebanese Shia. They clearly do not. Nevertheless, in the scheme of Lebanese politics, so long as the Shia saw their security as being dependent upon Hezbollah, the community had no choice but to support them. The Doha agreement begins the process of separating the well-being of the Shia community from support for Hezbollah. In the long run, this is the only way to confront the challenges posed by Hezbollah. As more and more Shia believe their community interests are protected by the government, and as more and more become less comfortable with Hezbollah policies, Hezbollah leadership will either begin to lose popular support or have to change their policies. The challenge to this eventual reform is that in the short run many will see the recent Doha outcome as a victory for Hezbollah, which is likely to be given credit for the political changes. The objective must be to get beyond this initial perception and see the agreement for what it is: the first step toward establishing a more representative government in Lebanon, and in the long-term, diminishing the influence of radical groups. Graeme Bannerman is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute, an expert on Lebanon, and previously worked as Committee Staff Director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This article was written for the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org.
