How far away are the Gulf states from engaging in a nuclear race in the Middle East? This is a legitimate question given the decision in December 2006 by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to establish a nuclear research program. Up to that point, the GCC states had never seriously considered the use of nuclear energy. Most of the members have signed the major nuclear non-proliferation treaties. Five of the six have qualified for Small Quantity Protocol status, which implies almost zero nuclear activity. Therefore, the decision to initiate a nuclear research program marks a major departure from traditional GCC policy and indicates a new attitude in response to the changing political and security environment in the Gulf. The reason is simple. The expansion of Iran's nuclear program, coupled with the Iranian government's belligerent attitude in the past year, has generated deep concern among the GCC leadership. As a consequence, it has started looking for its own regional initiatives to counter the possible threat from an aggressive neighbor armed with nuclear weapons. The decision to establish a GCC nuclear program must be taken seriously by the international community. It was decided at the highest leadership level and has the full support of each of the Gulf governments. Second, since it is a joint program among all member states, logistical and financial support for the program will not be a problem. Third, the decision was reached out of necessity - the GCC countries felt they could no longer lag behind Iran and accept a widening nuclear technology gap, and the long-term possibility of Iran emerging as a sub-regional hegemon intent on changing the regional status quo. Therefore, given that the Gulf security environment is likely to remain unstable, the GCC states will push for implementation of the decision to develop nuclear energy and divert the necessary financial and human resources to make sure the project succeeds. The council's intention is not to enter a "nuclear race with Iran; rather it is a strategic decision and a clear signal to Tehran that the GCC will not duck and hide while Tehran builds up its nuclear capability, interferes in Iraqi affairs, and demonstrates an eagerness to change regional alignments in its favor. That the GCC states have been sincere in trying to avoid a confrontation with Iran has been clear since 2005, when they offered Tehran engagement incentives. At the Abu Dhabi summit, GCC Secretary-General Abdul Rahman Attiyeh announced for the first time an initiative to declare the Gulf region a weapons of mass destruction free zone (WMDFZ) - one that included Iran, Iraq and Yemen. The idea of a WMDFZ in the Middle East was not new. What was new in the initiative was its being based on a sub-regional to regional approach: starting from security cooperation between the nine Gulf states, the idea was to see it expanded to the entire Middle East, including Israel. The idea for sub-regional cooperation originated from an assumption that GCC threat perceptions differed from those of other Arab states. While the GCC states, because of geographical proximity, perceive Iran as a direct threat, countries like Egypt or Morocco see the threat as less imminent. Therefore, the GCC states felt that security cooperation was more effective among states that shared common interests and threat perceptions. The intention of the member states was not to undermine WMDFZ in the Middle East. On the contrary, the GCC leadership assumed that once a WMDFZ in the Gulf was established, it could be the cornerstone for a broader regional security arrangement that other Arab states could join. At the same time, the GCC announcement about pursuing nuclear research did not contradict the Gulf WMDFZ initiative. In fact, its approach allows research and development for a peaceful nuclear program, while providing a legal framework and assurances to all member states that there is no military agenda. The GCC states thus wanted to make clear that it is not the Iranian nuclear program per se that is being opposed, but Iranian behavior and the lack of security assurances from Tehran. After all, doubts about Iran's intentions came after the discovery that it was working secretly on the development of sophisticated nuclear facilities and that it had provided the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with false information. The Gulf states are still interested in cooperating with Iran and including it as a key member of the WMDFZ in the Gulf, but if the Iranian regime provides full transparency and cooperates with the IAEA. Iran has officially declared its willingness to explore this initiative. However, the credibility of such an announcement remains doubtful. While the Gulf states initially accepted a sub-regional initiative hoping that Israel could be convinced to join a larger Middle East initiative at a later stage, Iran does not agree to such a condition. During ongoing Track II negotiations, Iranian officials made the nuclear disarmament of Israel a precondition for Iran's membership in the Gulf WMDFZ, knowing this would lead to deadlock. If the GCC is ready to explore a sub-regional security arrangement, then why isn't Iran? It can only be assumed that Iran does not have a serious interest in reaching such an arrangement. Paradoxically, the Iranians have demanded "comprehensive confidence-building measures and "non-interference of foreign powers as preconditions for any regional security architecture, even as they have undermined these very conditions. Iran is pursuing its nuclear program, and has threatened the GCC states with closing the Strait of Hormuz in case of an American attack on its nuclear facilities. It is also deeply involved in Iraq. At some point the GCC states will wonder why they should engage further with a regime that talks about cooperation, but ends up doing nothing for regional security. Nicole Strackeis a researcher in the Security and Terrorism Program at the Gulf Research Center (GRC) in Dubai. THE DAILY STAR publishes this commentary in collaboration with the GRC.
