There are really only a few times that Dr. Muhammad ‘Imara has made the news, and yet he is all over it. More often, he takes on the role of commentator, putting his best efforts into shaping the way that an ever-widening audience understands what is going on around them. He provides regular consultation to Al-Jazeera news and other media, exerting a strong influence on public opinion. ‘Imara also seems to be a reliable resource for book blurbs, yet another medium for propagating his criticisms and endorsements. Indeed, in Egypt, one comes across his name without much effort, and so he seems like an appropriate figure to profile. Born in 1931 in the governorate of Kafr ash-Shaykh, ‘Imara began writing and gained prominence from a very early age. His own thinking went through many transformations, but he has demonstrated a continuous devotion to understanding the great figures of Islamic philosophy, from whom he takes inspiration in developing his own arguments. After years of study, he ultimately received his doctorate from Cairo University in 1975 in Islamic philosophy. Today, ‘Imara is known as an outspoken Islamist. However, this comes in the wake of a major shift away from an earlier commitment to the perspective of critical Marxism – a transformation not uncommon among intellectuals of his generation. Though traces of this prior intellectual allegiance are still evident in ‘Imara’s deep suspicion of the Western imperialist impulse, he now carries the banner of “Islam huwa al-Hall.†‘Imara can be found arguing at times against secularists, at times against other Islamists, always on behalf of “true Islam†as the basis and “solution†for all aspects of life, both public and private. ‘Imara’s understanding of Islam, and the relationship between the Muslim world and the West, is interesting and nuanced and it warrants further consideration. ‘Imara has been called a “moderate Islamist†and, by some, even a “liberal.†This characterization is largely due to his strong ties to the thought of Muhammad Abduh and other “reformers†of the generation that preceded ‘Imara. In particular, his claims about political structure and leadership in an Islamic community are said to reflect liberal values. For example, he denies that worldly political authority is absolute, defending the right of a community to reject an unjust leadership upon judging that the leadership does not serve the public good – a position with obvious implications in contemporary Egypt. A substantial portion of ‘Imara’s work deals with the question of Islamic governance, the state, and secularism. He advocates an unconventional stance, neither simply promoting nor rejecting a division between religious and public life. ‘Imara reads the classic sources, as well as his intellectual predecessors, as providing for an interpretation of Islam that neither restricts it to the realm of the merely “spiritual,†nor endows it with the kind of authority claimed by clergy of the Catholic Church (an institution with which he is fond of contrasting Islam). In defending this position, ‘Imara must actually take on secularists and Islamists alike. He holds, against secularists, that secularism is unnecessary at best, and harmful at worst, for predominantly Muslim societies. The sacred sources in Islam simply do not call for a religious authority of the nature of the Catholic Church, where (historically at least) individual human beings claim a special proximity to God and are thereby also endowed with an earthly political power that is immune to challenges from the populace. ‘Imara notes that secularism emerged in the context of a specific historical reality where the Church’s religious authority was equated with worldly power, making the concept appropriate for Europe and America. Because Islam does not provide for such a power structure interfacing sacred and profane, the same concept will only deliver confusion and disarray in Muslim societies. ‘Imara’s attitude towards secularism cannot be separated from his broader understanding of Muslim faith and community. He takes arguments for western-style modernization head-on, arguing that Muslims reap more benefits from “true Islam†than they would from secularism and institutions fashioned in the image of the West. Islam, he claims, provides for all the elements of a just, unified, and flourishing community – a community which, he insists, transcends local and national ties. Indeed, in some instances, he claims the very same benefits can be attained by adherence to Islam as are claimed by proponents of Western secularism and modernization. For example, he somewhat awkwardly champions “progress†as a distinctive value in Islam, emphasizing that Islam does not conceive of an opposition between spirituality and science in the way that Christianity has. His opposition to secularism is thus based on a firm belief that Islam is not only sufficient but supreme as a resource for developing thriving political and social forms. However, again, this opposition is not simply an endorsement of a ubiquitous religious authority. ‘Imara must debate some of his own co-religionists on this point. There are some Islamists who imagine that the intersection of religious and public life involves a special kind of doctrinal religious authority, a position that ‘Imara claims is not supported by the classical sources. He argues that no one may (consistently as a Muslim) lay claim to special authority as a believer, arguing instead that religious knowledge is possible to the same degree for anyone who so strives. Some readers have found this position to resonate strongly with liberal, democratic values – as well as with Protestant Christian attitudes. Many a conservative interpreter will argue that the stability of political authority is better than the chaos of revolt or revolution. But Imara insists that the ruler, or even the political form itself, must be critically assessed to ensure that they meet the standards of “public good.†Religious principles do inform the structure and operation of the state, and beyond this, its performance is judged by those standards. This does not, however, translate into what could be called a theocracy. ‘Imara is firm in denying this charge. For the most part, ‘Imara’s representation of Islamic morality and political theory has gained approval. However, during one of his public defenses of his anti-secularist position, ‘Imara did find himself in the middle of a controversy. He took part in an infamous debate on secularism, at the 1992 Cairo Book Fair, between Islamists and secularists. It has been described as the one and only of its type – a public debate, hosted by a government institution. In the wake of this debate, one of Imara’s opponents, Farag Foda, was assassinated – gunned down by two members of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. ‘Imara was in no way involved in Foda’s murder, but his apparent alliance with those who did endorse the killing drew the ire of some observers and critics. In reality, ‘Imara has explicitly distanced himself from those advocating violence, even when he shares with them a number of similar concerns and values with respect to preserving an authentic Islamic community. In terms of concrete alliances, ‘Imara is a member of the Wasat party – a group characterized by some as a “post-Islamist†and moderate, many of whose members are either former Brotherhood affiliates, who wish to distance themselves from some components of that platform, or they are other figures who wish to organize a counter-weight to al-Gama’a or other more militant groups. Although he finds himself right at the center of very practical debates about secularism, the state, and Islam, this is not necessarily the realm of analysis in which ‘Imara feels most at home. In fact, his critical approach is distinct in its emphasis on the psychological impacts of a hegemonic Western culture, starting with the colonial period. ‘Imara uses the term “intellectual and cultural invasion (ghazw)†to characterize the relationship between West and Muslim world. He strives to illuminate these sometimes subtle dimensions of the encounter between the Muslim world and the West, which are not often sufficiently considered by the countless talking heads in either the Arab world or the Western media. Transformations in the realm of intellect and culture, in Imara’s perception, often have the most destructive impacts on a society. The protagonist in ‘Imara’s narrative of urgent concerns is another very well-known abstraction: identity. Although this term has been trafficked by many scholars and cultural critics, there is no clear, shared understanding of what it means. ‘Imara himself was asked what this term meant in one of many appearances on the program “Shari’ah and Life†on al-Jazeera. He answered by saying that identity is the stable and enduring core of any personality, nation or civilization – that which provides integrity and unity, resisting the constant flux of time and material reality. The keepers of this identity that ‘Imara wishes to defend are the terms and concepts of Islamic civilization and the Arabic language. Hence the position against secularism: this is a term and an idea that is not part of the essential vocabulary of Islamic societies and thus stands to erode their identity. ‘Imara is motivated by the belief that the Muslim world is in ongoing conflict with the West. However, for Imara, the conflict’s central battle ground is not necessarily found in military operations but in subtler influences of Western culture on Muslim identity, including the gradual infiltration of foreign terms and ideas. This is no mere accident of political and economic realities. For ‘Imara, this is part of a broader imperialistic agenda that aims to chip away at the strength and resistance of the Muslim world. ‘Imara’s anxiety about the influence of liberal ideas in the Muslim world is based on the belief that they nurture a variety of forms of dependence on the West, severely distorting Muslim perception of what is of value and impairing the ability of Muslims to develop viable political and social dynamics on their own terms. Dependence (whether economic, military or even diplomatic) induces a mis-ordering of priorities and a focus on superficial realities: The real battle according to ‘Imara is one over ideas and identity. The legacy of colonialism is institutions that are controlled – even if indirectly – by Western ideas, practices, and values, which are the more subtle weapons for corroding and ultimately defeating Muslim identity and personality. In this aspect of his philosophy, ‘Imara relies on a important distinction between material and Sacred spheres of existence. This is no doubt a reflection of both his past familiarity with Marxism and his deviation from it: he argues that ideas and ideologies do not simply reflect material realities, but rather – and specifically in the case of Islam – they reflect an interaction or contact with divine reality. Hence his effort to shift his audience’s priorities to piety and the relationship with God – the augmentation of true faith will be the first step in securing a genuinely Islamic polity. ‘Imara’s central concern is not that all features of social life that resemble Western ones be removed. Rather, his concern is that Islam be the source of the values in relation to which judgments about such questions be made. So, he has said (in what may strike one as a concession) that secularism in itself may not be problematic but it should be judged to be so based on Islamic and not Western values. On this topic and others, ‘Imara strives to negotiate subtlety and nuance on the one hand, and firm determination on the other. In a world that insists on dividing between “liberal†and “conservative,†he is perceived to err at times on the side of the former, disappointing his Islamist colleagues. At other times he is charged with erring on the side of more conservative peers, disappointing his liberal interlocutors. Perhaps this is an indication that ‘Imara’s own struggles with this thing called “identity†are ongoing; or perhaps, this polarization in interpreting his stance serves to substantiate ‘Imara’s claim that the dominant terms and distinctions are simply unsatisfactory. BM
