When, if ever, is it appropriate for an American president to tell the leader of another country to leave office? In the last several decades, when the U.S. government has determined that vital U.S. interests would be served by the removal of a Mossadegh or Diem, Allende or the Shah, Noriega or Saddam Hussein, then our government has acted to produce that outcome. The full and ugly list includes kings, dictators, and democratically-elected presidents and prime ministers. In all these cases the U.S was instrumental in regime change, either by plotting the overthrow of a government or publicly refusing to come to the aid of a former ally – acts of commission and omission. Whether America intervenes or not, our presidents and secretaries of state couch their decisions in language designed to play well domestically, and globally too, if possible. That language also shapes the policy debate in this country and the way Democrats and Republicans think and talk about intervention. When a U.S. government decides to play an active role in regime-change (and is willing to acknowledge doing so), it uses terms such as “standing with the people of country X against oppression and corruption”, “supporting democracy around the world”, “championing universal human rights,” “upholding the ideals of the founding fathers” or “being on the right side of history”. When a U.S. government decides not to intervene, it claims that “America cannot be the policeman of the world”, “it's not our role to pick winners and losers”, “we should not interfere in the domestic affairs of another nation”, “we do not seek to impose our values on other people,” “we respect the rights of country X, as a sovereign state, to determine its own future,” or “that's a matter for the Security Council.” We claim the moral high ground whether we take action or refrain from it. So far, in the current Egyptian crisis, President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and special envoy Frank Wisner have managed to demonstrate that American policy is susceptible to dramatic change from one day to the next, employing principled rhetoric to justify each new position. For the past three decades, U.S. administrations, both Democratic and Republican, have referred to the U.S.-friendly autocratic rulers of Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Oman as “moderates”, as distinct from more “radical” unfriendly-to-the-U.S. autocratic rulers in Libya, Syria, and Iran. The bargain between America and the “moderates” of the Middle East has been clear. Every administration that has dealt with Hosni Mubarak or his counterparts in other Arab countries knew what it was getting, what it was supporting, and what it was turning a blind eye to. In keeping with this bipartisan, bilateral bargain, for the last two years Obama and Clinton have expressed support and friendship for Mubarak. But soon after the recent wave of huge Cairo demonstrations began and once their seriousness was recognized, the administration privately encouraged Mubarak to go. As his February 1st address to the Egyptian people made clear, Mubarak declined the invitation. In a press conference three days later, Obama publicly hinted that Mubarak should ensure his legacy by leaving now. But then Wisner called for Mubarak to stay through the end of his term to ensure a smooth transition. And now the focus of the administration has shifted from ousting Mubarak to working with Omar Suleiman, the government, and the military on a gradual opening up of the system so as to ensure free and fair elections in September. Like millions of Egyptians and Americans, I would like to see the emergence of a truly democratic, multi-party system to replace the Mubarak regime, whose one-party domination of the state and heavy-handed security apparatus are nothing new to Egypt. These structures also characterized the prior regimes of Nasser and Sadat. Indeed, what's at stake in Egypt today is not the name of the ruler but the nature of the regime. No one knows if the desired democratic change will really occur. Also unknown is whether any U.S. president, even Obama, would really rejoice if it did. As many commentators have pointed out, a civilian Egyptian administration not subservient to the military would likely be less supportive of a whole range of American strategic priorities in the region, including military and intelligence cooperation, anti-terrorism, Palestine, Israel, Iraq and Afghanistan. A truly independent new government in Cairo that breaks with its authoritarian past could give the U.S. real headaches even as it provides new freedom for millions of Egyptians. So, is it a good idea, from an American perspective, for Mubarak to go now rather than at the end of his term in the fall? If he stays, the regime may subvert the new democratic spirit of the demonstrations, in which case, America will be blamed. If he goes, a potentially orderly transition could turn chaotic. Or worse, a younger, more energetic replacement might further entrench the forces of repression. For the U.S., Egypt's future is a matter of concern both for our interests and our principles, which are not always aligned with one another. Democracy is an American principle. Stability in the region is in America's interest. Egypt is unique, and therefore it requires a unique and tailored diplomatic approach from Washington. Still, I can't help but compare America's treatment of Egypt with its treatment of Iran – the speed with which the Obama administration was willing to chuck Mubarak out the window as compared with its unwillingness to confront Khamenei and Ahmadinejad about an election they stole and their mistreatment of those who protested it. Why has this administration stood up more for Egyptian demonstrators than it ever has for Iranian ones? One argument for the different treatment is monetary. Iran is not on the U.S. payroll, while America provides Egypt with financial assistance to the tune of some one and a half billion dollars per annum. According to one report, approximately one third of the Egyptian annual military budget is underwritten by the U.S. That gives us the kind of leverage that we don't have with Iran. If the U.S. gives Egypt money, then it can – in advance – attach whatever strings it wishes to that aid. Call it a contract. Call it linkage. We can condition our money on their behavior towards their own people or towards their neighbors. (If it wishes, the U.S. can do the same with Israel regarding outposts, settlements, roads and checkpoints, Gaza, or other Israeli policies that the U.S. disapproves of.) Another argument for treating the leaders of Egypt and Iran differently is based on influence. It's easier to influence one's allies than one's enemies. Mubarak is “our” strong man, so it is appropriate for us to discipline him. The U.S. has real, though limited, influence on what happens within the Egyptian military, business, and governmental elites. Ahmadinejad is not one of ours, so we can't really tell him what to do, or so the argument goes. Besides, we need to engage the Iranian regime on the nuclear issue as well as on Iraq and Afghanistan. Sometimes, however, a position should be stated and acted on not for its immediate effect but for its long-term impact. If the U.S. had seriously stood by the Iranian opposition in 2009, then today it might have more credibility with demonstrators in Tahrir Square and elsewhere in the region. When is it appropriate for an American president – on behalf of the American people – to tell the leader of another country to leave office? Only after the various outcome-scenarios have been run through thoroughly and the most likely result of their leaving is good both for the people of that country and for the United States. Only when the real reason we want that person gone can stand the light of day. And only when there is a principle to be enunciated that America will stand up for, not just today but from now on. BM
