President Musharraf went on the offensive this week -- and pitched his country into freefall, writes Graham Usher in Islamabad For the second time in eight years, former Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif has been exiled to Saudi Arabia. In December 2000, he went voluntarily, courtesy of an agreement in which he vowed to stay out of Pakistani politics for 10 years. On Monday it was involuntary, as intelligence men bundled him into a Boeing throbbing on the tarmac of Islamabad airport. In 2000 the exile had been enabled by late Lebanese leader Rafik Al-Hariri, Saudi Arabia and the United States. The same powers, almost certainly, were the enforcers this time. But the man behind both expulsions was Pervez Musharraf. In December 2000 -- as then General Musharraf -- he saw the prime minister as the last obstacle to his coup of October 1999. On Monday Sharif's deportation was the president's last, desperate lunge on the helm to prevent a rule and a regime sliding to the rocks. "Musharraf is now fighting his own war of survival," says Zaffar Abbas, one of Pakistan's most astute political analysts. "He is prepared to take on the opposition, the courts and the street to keep his hold on power." This latest joust between the past and present leaders originated in the catalyst behind so much of Pakistan's current ferment -- a reinvigorated judiciary. In August the Supreme Court ruled that the December 2000 agreement could not be invoked to prevent Sharif's "inalienable" right to return to his homeland. It also warned the government not to mount any obstruction. Most observers, including many in government, believed Musharraf would heed the call. Until last weekend. On Saturday, Saad Al-Hariri and Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Miqrin bin Abdul-Aziz, appeared in Islamabad to state their countries were "the guarantors" of the December 2000 agreement and they expected Sharif to honour it. "King Abdullah considered the stability and security of Pakistan as the stability and security of Saudi Arabia," said the prince. It was reportedly after consultation with the Saudis -- as well as his intelligence heads -- that Musharraf decided that what had served in December 2000 would do too today. Neither his government nor the attorney-general was told of the decision. Sharif might have had an inkling. But he didn't seem to take it seriously. He told his brother, Shahbaz, to stay back in London to "hold the fort". But as he boarded his flight home late Sunday he exuded confidence, convinced he was about to "liberate the country from the scourge of military dictatorship." The government may have arrested "thousands" of his party workers, he said, but "millions" would turn out to greet him in the long motorcade from Islamabad to Lahore, his political citadel. It took 12 hours for hubris to become humiliation. No sooner had the plane touched down than army commandos ringed it with guns. A government official asked for Sharif's passport. On board the plane, negotiations were "civil", said a witness. But once Sharif got to the airport lounge things became ugly, with intelligence officers issuing the ex-premier with an arrest warrant and then frog- marching him to the Boeing. Government ministers said later Sharif had "chosen" to go to Jeddah. There were only the most desultory of protests. One reason was the phalanx of police, rangers and army snipers deployed to steel the airport against all dissenters. It was also true that thousands of Sharif's supporters had been detained, including party leaders. But Sharif is the head of an alliance of Pakistan's main opposition parties and their cadre were nowhere to be seen. They thought they wouldn't be needed, said one party activist. "The parties are relying entirely on the media and the judiciary. But they must show their strength among the people. We need a popular wave behind the Supreme Court." The wave has yet to rise. The Supreme Court may rule that Sharif's deportation is unconstitutional and in contempt of its August ruling. If it does -- and especially if it also rules that Musharraf cannot again run for president -- there is a growing, fearful sense in Pakistan that the General will declare martial law for a second time. There would be only one power that could prevent him. Last Friday, US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher arrived in Islamabad at around the same time as Al-Hariri and Prince Miqrin bin Abdul-Aziz. He was in town ostensibly to prepare for the visit to Pakistan on 12 September of US Deputy Secretary John Negroponte. But there is not a diplomat in the Pakistan capital that believes that a decision of the magnitude of Sharif's deportation could have been taken by Musharraf and the Saudis without Washington's connivance. They also know the cause. For the last year Boucher and other US officials have been shepherding a power-sharing deal between Musharraf and former prime minister Benazir Bhutto. The US believes the pair comprises the only coalition that can popularly support and fight America's war in Afghanistan. The presence of Sharif leading the opposition in Pakistan may rend that coalition asunder, not least because so many Musharraf and Bhutto's cohorts are against it. For this vantage Sharif's deportation was "not necessarily the worst thing that could happen," an administration official told the New York Times on Tuesday. Bhutto seems to agree. Her rival's exile would have "no impact" on either her "imminent" return to Pakistan or the negotiations with Musharraf, she said Monday. Musharraf is a commando by trade. By reflex, he believes attack is the best form of defence. He understands power, and who wields it in Pakistan. He has America on his side. He has the army, with not the faintest fissure emerging in the ranks over the decision to expel Sharif. In negotiating with Bhutto, he has divided the Pakistani opposition. In bringing to Islamabad the full weight of Saudi Arabia, he has apparently tamed his Islamic opponents, at least those committed to electoral politics. But he may have a poor grasp of history. In 1968, Pakistan's first military dictator, General Ayub Khan, was forced from power by mass street protests. Its second, General Yehia Khan stood down after a civil war that saw East Pakistan fracture into Bangladesh. And in 1988 Zia ul-Haq was killed in a helicopter crash, engineered probably by enemies but perhaps by friends. As Pakistanis watched the Boeing steal away Sharif for a second time, many were wondering whether its final landing might not be a similar crash.
