As geopolitical tectonic plates shift, Galal Nassar views the emerging landscape Last week I discussed a number of developments in international relations that presage a major change in global political topography. My column focussed in particular on recent events in Georgia and some former Soviet republics, and on the US missile shield, components of which are being installed in Eastern Europe and which Russia regards as a threat to its national security. In this article I will attempt to answer two central questions concerning the features of the new era and how the Arabs might turn them to their advantage. The epoch that began with the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s was an interval in the history of empires and nations. The monopolar order transformed relations between nations from "adversarial" mode to a "partnership" governed by balances of power. As the exception to the rule in international relations, this phase seemed a dissonant anomaly, a sudden break for all other players in the wrestling arena that is the global decision-making process. As momentous as the events that took place during this period were and as significant an impact as the revolutions in communications technology and the advances in bioengineering and other realms of science have had, it would be mistaken to extrapolate from this period the contours of the approaching era. After all, the three decades in which a sole power occupied the throne of international hegemony were, in a sense, a detour in the course of human history. A more productive approach to discerning the shape of the future after the end of the monopolar epoch can be drawn from the era that preceded this brief detour, that which immediately followed World War II. The first point that strikes me is how deep the differences were between the two powers, the US and the former USSR, that formed the poles of the international order during this period. These were not merely two powerful rival regimes vying for dominance, as was the case with previous empires. Since one was a capitalist order and the other communist, the differences resided at the very heart of their political structures, culture and value systems. Whereas the capitalist order favoured private ownership of the means of production and economic liberalism, the communists espoused public ownership of all means of production, socialist redistribution of wealth and a centralised economy. This point is extremely important to the process of identifying the properties of the Cold War era because this ideological difference cast its shadow over the entire fabric of international relations and alignments. The capitalist system, because the viability and progress of its economic order are governed by the law of profit, was ever thirsty for markets in which to sell its products. Among the axiomatic corollaries to this law is the capitalist machinery's need for speed, originality, dynamism and a constant influx of fresh blood. The democratic system, with its peaceful rotation of authority, rule of law and checks and balances between the three branches of government, is a singular expression of the efficacy of the capitalist order. In the socialist order things moved in very different directions. For one, the profit factor had very little influence on the policies of the regime. Planned economic development and indifference to the laws of the market combined with security paranoia to build an iron curtain which literally cut off the Eastern bloc. Among the consequences of state control over the means of production and virtually all other economic and social activities is the growth of a cumbersome and increasingly sluggish bureaucracy, the paralysis of the spirit of initiative and creativity, the militarisation of society through the concentration of power in the hands of the army and intelligence agencies, and economic stagnation. The ideological and economic distinctions between the US and USSR were echoed in the pattern of international relations. Wealthy countries in the Third World turned westward for their technological, military and other material needs while the majority of poorer countries drifted into the former Soviet Camp where they could meet the same needs at a lower price due to the relative insignificance of the profit factor and the availability of long-term, low-interest loans that often went unpaid. The resultant fissure of the Third World into countries that dealt heavily with the capitalist West and others that dealt heavily with the non-capitalist East was reflected in their governing systems and the political and cultural orientations of their societies. The new era, in contrast, will not be characterised by ideological conflict but by a general spirit of pragmatism. After all, the Russians have embraced the capitalist system of social organisation in which the West had long since led the way. In other words, Russia has now adopted democracy in the Western manner as conceptualised by Montesquieu and Locke: political plurality, systematic rotation of authority, the separation of executive, legislative and judicial authorities. One can therefore envision a new mode of international relations in which competition is not ideologically driven but, instead, driven by profit and the accumulation of wealth, and control over the strategic assets necessary for this purpose. Such an international order inherently propels towards openness to world markets and to the world in general and away from iron curtains and totalitarian systems. It means countries and societies must encourage creativity and the spirit of initiative in order to compete in the international marketplace. What concerns us here is that the laws of historical evolution and the forces of multipolar economic competition will pry off the US and other Western nations' iron grip on the export of technology. With the dissolution of this monopoly new horizons will open before the peoples of the Third World, offering them access to the latest scientific and technological products and know-how in all domains. Indeed, the spectacular economic breakthroughs accomplished by the People's Republic of China and the growing economic influence of India are tangible harbingers of the new reality and a new climate in which it will become increasingly possible to break free of Western capitalist hegemony and promote a more equitable and balanced international order. Another important contrast between the Cold War phase and the new, universal era that is just around the corner is that the backbone of the former was heavy industry, which necessitated huge and heavy concentrations of capital assets, whereas in the latter different needs and different assets will increasingly come into play. The world is now undergoing its third, perhaps fourth, technological revolution, and as we all come to depend more and more on computer programming and software, which is to say on such intellectual assets as innovation and artistic creativity rather than on capital, the repercussions will be enormous. Once we possess the necessary resolve to meet this age face on, innumerable avenues will be open to us -- enabling us to take ever greater strides. Consider, too, that in the fierce competition in the new capitalist camp circumstances will tend to favour consumers, which means that the countries of the Third World will be better poised to leverage their vast markets into political and economic capital that will serve to promote their developmental goals. In addition, conditions will be more conducive to their need to diversify their sources of arms and technology as well as to diversify the destinations they choose to send study missions. Such diversification is vital to promoting and sustaining national independence and autonomy. On a political level the international community will see the reinstatement of international covenants, charters and conventions which had been frozen or abused during the past three decades. I refer, here, in particular to the UN Charter, the Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments.
